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ABSTRACT
Essays in Social Economics
by
Eric Theodore Chyn
Chair: Martha J. Bailey
The central idea in social economics is that an individual’s actions are influenced by the
choices and characteristics of peers. This occurs because group (network) membership pro-
vides information and shapes beliefs (norms). For both researchers and policymakers, the
interest in social economics stems from its ability to explain a range of phenomena including
the persistence of urban poverty and the spatial distribution of crime.
This dissertation contributes to the literature by providing new empirical evidence on
the effects of social interactions. Specifically, the first two chapters examine the impact
of neighborhood peers on children. The third chapter (joint with Lasse Brune and Jason
Kerwin) studies how coworkers affect workplace productivity. In what follows, I provide a
detailed description of each chapter of my dissertation.
Chapter 1: Moved to Opportunity: The Long-Run Effect of Public Housing
Demolition on Labor Market Outcomes of Children
This chapter provides new evidence on the effects of moving out of disadvantaged neigh-
borhoods on the long-run economic outcomes of children. My empirical strategy is based
on public housing demolitions in Chicago which forced households to relocate to private
market housing using vouchers. Specifically, I compare adult outcomes of children displaced
by demolition to their peers who lived in nearby public housing that was not demolished.
Displaced children are 9 percent more likely to be employed and earn 16 percent more as
adults. These results contrast with the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) relocation study,
which detected effects only for children who were young when their families moved. To ex-
plore this discrepancy, this paper also examines a housing voucher lottery program (similar
x
to MTO) conducted in Chicago. I find no measurable impact on labor market outcomes for
children in households that won vouchers. The contrast between the lottery and demolition
estimates remains even after re-weighting the demolition sample to adjust for differences
in observed characteristics. Overall, this evidence suggests lottery volunteers are negatively
selected on the magnitude of their children’s gains from relocation. This implies that moving
from disadvantaged neighborhoods may have substantially larger impact on children than
what is suggested by results from voucher experiments where parents elect to participate.
Chapter 2: The Impact of Disadvantaged Peers: Evidence from Resettlement
after Public Housing Demolition
During the mid-1990s, Chicago began to demolish its public housing stock, forcing thou-
sands of disadvantaged households to relocate across the city. There has been widespread
concern about the potential impact on residents living in areas where former public housing
households relocated. Using novel administrative data from Illinois, this chapter estimates
how the presence of these displaced households affected children living in resettlement neigh-
borhoods. My empirical strategy compares criminal behavior of children who lived on city
blocks that received displaced public housing residents with that of children that lived on
similar, nearby blocks with no displaced households. I find evidence that children who grew
up near former public housing residents have more arrests for property crimes. Additional
analysis provides suggestive evidence that the effects are largest in areas where displaced
young males relocated.
Chapter 3: Peer Effects in the Workplace: Experimental Evidence from Malawi
(with Lasse Brune and Jason Kerwin)
This chapter sheds light on the nature of workplace peer effects by analyzing an experi-
ment with a tea estate in Malawi. We randomly allocate tea-harvesting workers to locations
on fields to estimate the impact of peers on worker performance. Using data on daily pro-
ductivity, we find strong evidence of positive effects from working near higher-ability peers.
Our estimates show that increasing the average of co-worker ability by 10 percent increases
own-productivity by about 0.5 percent. We find nonlinearities in the magnitude of peer
effects across the distribution of own-ability: peer effects are the largest for the lowest abil-
ity workers. Since workers receive piece-rates and there is no teamwork, peer effects in our
setting are not driven by production or compensation externalities. In additional analysis,
we find evidence against learning or worker socialization as mechanisms. Results from an
incentivized choice experiment suggest instead that peer effects in this context are driven
xi
by co-workers as a source of “motivation.” When given a choice to be re-assigned, the
majority of workers want to be assigned near a fast (high-ability) coworker, even if switch-
ing is assigned an explicit cost. In open-ended survey responses, workers with demand for
high-ability peers state that working near faster peers provides motivation to work harder.
xii
CHAPTER I
Moved to Opportunity: The Long-Run Effect of Public
Housing Demolition on Labor Market Outcomes of
Children
1.1 Introduction
Over the past three decades, the number of U.S. children living in high-poverty neigh-
borhoods has grown by nearly 80 percent to reach 20 million (Bishaw, 2014; Census, 1990).
This increase has renewed concern over the long-run consequences of growing-up in disad-
vantaged areas. Theory suggests that a child’s odds of success are reduced if they live in
impoverished neighborhoods where most adults are unemployed and peers engage in criminal
activity (Wilson, 1987; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Massey and Denton, 1993).
Yet, quantifying the causal impact of neighborhoods on children has proven difficult
largely because unobserved factors influence both selection into neighborhoods and individ-
ual outcomes. The best evidence to date comes from the Moving to Opportunity (MTO)
experiment which randomly allocated housing vouchers to a sample of families living in low-
income public housing. Recent analysis of MTO detected a positive impact on adult labor
market outcomes for children who were young when their families moved and no detectable
effect for older children (Chetty, Hendren and Katz, 2015). While MTO provides important
and credible estimates of neighborhood effects, some researchers have expressed concern that
findings based on a group of motivated volunteers may not generalize.1 For example, Durlauf
(2004) writes: “[O]ne cannot extrapolate the [MTO] findings to the broader population of
the poor.”
1 The MTO researchers have been careful in discussing the issue of external validity. Ludwig, Duncan and
Hirschfield (2001) write: “We hasten to note that because participation in the MTO program is voluntary,
our estimates of the effects of relocation may be different from the effects of relocating a randomly selected
group of families from poor areas.”
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This paper provides new evidence on the impact of neighborhood conditions on a general
population of disadvantaged children by exploiting public housing demolitions as a natural
experiment. During the 1990s, the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) began reducing its
stock of public housing by selecting buildings with poor maintenance for demolition while
leaving nearby buildings untouched. Residents of buildings selected for demolition received
housing vouchers and were forced to relocate.
Public housing demolition in Chicago provides plausibly exogenous variation in the neigh-
borhoods where displaced children grow up. My research design compares adult labor market
outcomes of children from displaced households to their non-displaced peers that lived in the
same public housing development. Because these two groups of children and their households
were similar before the demolition, any differences in later-life outcomes can be attributed
to neighborhood relocation (Jacob, 2004).
Novel administrative data from Illinois makes it possible to match social assistance
records to pre-demolition addresses of public housing to create a sample of displaced and
non-displaced children and their households. In addition, the address information in assis-
tance records allows me to verify that displaced households relocated to less disadvantaged
neighborhoods. Three years after demolition, displaced households lived in neighborhoods
with 20 percent lower poverty and 33 percent less violent crime relative to non-displaced
households.2
Using employment data linked to the social assistance records, I find that displaced
children grow up to have notably better labor market outcomes. Displaced children are 9
percent (4 percentage points) more likely to be employed as adults relative to their non-
displaced peers. Further, displaced children have $602 higher annual earnings – an increase
of 16 percent relative to their non-displaced counterparts. The trajectory of these benefits
is relatively stable across the range of adult ages that I observe for my sample of children.3
The estimates in this paper contrast with previous findings in the neighborhood effects
literature.4 Unlike the recent extended analysis of MTO that revealed earnings benefits
for the subgroup of children who were young (below age 13) when their families moved, this
paper detects a positive impact regardless of the age when a child’s family moves.5 Moreover,
2 This change in neighborhood conditions is similar to the pattern for MTO volunteers that were randomly
selected to be part of the unrestricted (“Section-8”) housing voucher treatment group.
3 In the last year of my administrative data, individuals in my sample were between ages 21 and 32 and
experienced demolition when they were 7 to 18 years old. The results are not sensitive to including even
younger children.
4 This paper also relates to previous work on the impact of Chicago’s public housing demolitions. I extend
Jacob (2004) which studies the short-run impact of public housing demolition on schooling outcomes.
5 Note that Sanbonmatsu et al. (2011) also analyzed children who participated in MTO finding no de-
tectable impact on labor market outcomes. The more recent MTO analysis by Chetty, Hendren and Katz
(2015) differs from this previous work by focusing on younger (below age 13) children who were not old
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these benefits accrue to displaced children whose family received standard vouchers, whereas
the MTO study finds effects only for children receiving vouchers that were restricted for use
in low poverty areas.
To understand these differences in results, I analyze a housing voucher lottery that oc-
curred in Chicago shortly after the demolitions began. Similar to MTO, authorities in
Chicago randomly allocated vouchers to households that were sufficiently motivated to sign
up for this program. While families that won the lottery moved to lower poverty neighbor-
hoods, the effects of winning a voucher on labor market outcomes of children are small and
not statistically significant.6 The contrast between the effects in the lottery and demolition
samples remains even after re-weighting the demolition sample to adjust for the fact that
lottery households are relatively more advantaged.
Comparing the lottery and demolition results suggests that children who move through
voluntary mobility programs have lower gains to relocation. This “reverse Roy” pattern of
negative selection parallels education studies which find that children who would benefit most
from attending charters or other high-quality schools are the least likely to apply (Walters,
2014; Hastings, Kane and Staiger, 2006). In addition, these results are consistent with recent
analysis that suggests children with the largest achievement gains from Head Start are the
least likely to enroll (Kline and Walters, 2015).
I conclude that there are significant benefits to relocating children (of any age) from
public housing. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that a child who moves out of
public housing due to demolition has about $45,000 higher total lifetime earnings ($12,000
in present value). The increased tax revenue associated with this earnings gain exceeds the
(average) cost of relocating public housing residents. This suggests that efforts to improve
long-run outcomes of disadvantaged children will yield net gains for government budgets.
1.2 History of Public Housing Demolition in Chicago
During the 1990s, the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) had the third largest public
housing inventory in the U.S., providing services to nearly five percent of the city’s popu-
lation (Popkin et al., 2000; Jacob, 2004). Seventeen housing developments (also known as
“projects”) spanned the city providing homes specifically for families with children. Each
enough to have completed their education at the time that data was collected for Sanbonmatsu et al. (2011).
In other major work on neighborhood effects, Oreopoulos (2003) found no improvement in labor market
outcomes for adults that grew-up in very different public housing projects in Toronto.
6 To compare the effects on adult labor market participation in the lottery and demolition samples, I test
that the difference in point estimates is zero, and the resulting p-value is 0.13. Results for labor market
earnings are much less precise in the lottery sample, and a test of the difference in point estimates across
samples has a p-value of 0.43.
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project consisted of a collection of apartment buildings built in close proximity. Many of
these buildings were large high-rise structures providing 75 to 150 units of housing.
Low-income households were eligible to live in public housing if their income was at or
below 50 percent of Chicago’s median income. Because public housing is not an entitlement,
eligible families typically spent years on waiting lists and usually accepted the first public
housing unit that was offered to them.7 The vast majority of public housing residents during
this period in Chicago were African-American, and a large share were single-parent, female-
headed households.
The demolition of public housing in Chicago during the 1990s began as a reaction to
serious housing management problems.8 By the end of the 1980s, chronic infrastructure
problems plagued much of the public housing stock which had been built poorly during
the 1950s and 1960s. Few city officials believed that the CHA could effectively address
these maintenance issues after a series of scandals revealed that housing authorities had
mismanaged public funds. With this in mind, authorities laid plans to replace project-based
housing assistance with vouchers and gradually eliminate public housing through building
demolition.9 Although the city wanted to eventually eliminate much of the housing stock,
funding limitations implied that only a small number of demolitions occurred in the 1990s.
The first demolitions in Chicago stemmed from a variety of events and circumstances
that were sometimes unforeseen (Jacob, 2004).10 For example, in January 1999 pipes burst
in several high-rise buildings in the Robert Taylor projects causing flooding that shut down
heating systems. Residents were forced to evacuate four buildings, and the CHA subsequently
closed these buildings for demolition (Garza, 1999a). Similarly, harsh winter weather dam-
aged several buildings in the Henry Horner Homes project, prompting the CHA to close
these buildings for demolition (Garza, 1999b). When not reacting to specific crises, the CHA
generally sought to close buildings that had the most severe maintenance issues.11
7 For example, over 30,000 households were on the CHA public housing waiting list during the mid-1990s
(Jacob, 2004). Households must wait as their request for housing assistance rises to the top of the queue.
Once at the top of the list, a household that is unsatisfied with their offer can reject their assignment, but
they must then return to the bottom of the wait list. Further, due to the same high demand for services,
there is also little opportunity to transfer between housing units after entering the public housing system.
8 For a detailed history of public housing in Chicago, see Popkin et al. (2000).
9 A number of federal housing policy reforms also facilitated public housing demolition in Chicago. Specif-
ically, the creation of the HOPE VI program in 1993 helped provide funding for demolition. The CHA was
one of the largest recipients of HOPE VI funding, receiving nearly $160 million during the 1990s.
10 Note that the analysis in this paper only pertains to building demolitions that occurred from 1995-1998
which preceded public housing demolitions under the Chicago Housing Authority’s “Plan for Transforma-
tion”. This focus on demolitions during the 1990s allows me to study long-run outcomes and also corresponds
to the period studied in Jacob (2004).
11 An additional motivation for building closure was related to criminal activity. For example, snipers
located on the roof of a Cabrini Green building shot 7-year-old Dantrell Davis in 1992. The building from
which the shots were fired was permanently closed after the shooting and later demolished in 1996 (Hawes,
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When the CHA selected a building for demolition, the authority provided Section 8
housing vouchers to displaced residents which allowed recipients to rent housing on the
private market.12 Alternatively, residents of affected buildings were also given the option of
applying to transfer to another unit in their current project or transfer to another unit in a
different CHA project. In the case that a resident selected the voucher offer, the CHA paid
for all moving expenses. Note that the CHA provided few support services such as housing
counseling during the period of my study.13
Typically, the voucher subsidy was equal to the difference between the gross rent or the
local Fair Market Rent (FMR) and the family’s required rent contribution (30 percent of
adjusted income). The FMR was equal to the 40th percentile of the local private-market
rent distribution. Families that obtained a housing voucher were able to keep the voucher as
long as they remained eligible for assistance. Finally, the transition to vouchers from public
housing should not mechanically affect income of assisted households because the program
and rent rules for vouchers and project-based assistance were similar.14
1.3 Expected Effects of Demolition on Children
The expected effect of public housing demolition is related to the relocation decision
of affected households. One possibility is that displaced households used their vouchers to
move to lower poverty neighborhoods. In this case, theory suggests that children may benefit
because relatively affluent adults serve as role models that shape norms and social identity
(Wilson, 1987; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). Living in a less disadvantaged neighborhood
can also affect a child’s long-run outcomes by providing exposure to higher-income peers
that can provide job information and referrals.15 Relatedly, lower poverty areas may provide
displaced parents with better access to job-finding networks, which implies that they may
be more likely to work and invest in goods that promote child development.
While these mechanisms suggest children should benefit from moving to low-poverty
neighborhoods, existing empirical studies provide mixed support for this prediction. For ex-
1992). I exclude the projects and the buildings where these crime-based closures occurred from the analysis
in this paper.
12 Prior to the beginning of Chicago’s public housing demolitions, low-income households had no ability to
access housing vouchers because the CHA stopped allowing requests in 1985 (Jacob and Ludwig, 2012).
13 Later initiatives by the CHA included providing relocation support to residents who were displaced by
building demolitions that occurred during the 2000s (Popkin et al., 2012).
14 For the interested reader, a full list of program rules for housing vouchers is contained in Appendix
Section A2.
15 In addition, living in a lower poverty areas may reduce a child’s exposure to peers who commit crime.
This is particularly relevant in the context of Chicago where many poor neighborhoods also have very high
rates of crime. Damm and Dustmann (2014) provide evidence that a child’s long-run outcomes are causally
affected by the share of youth criminals living in their neighborhood.
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ample, analysis of Chicago’s Gautreaux program found that low-income children who moved
to the suburbs had much better outcomes than their peers whose families moved within the
city (Rosenbaum, 1995).16 However, Oreopoulos (2003) did not detect any impact of living
in a lower poverty area for children living in public housing in Toronto. In addition, Chetty,
Hendren and Katz (2015) find no evidence of benefits for children who were older when their
family moved to a low-poverty area through MTO. In relation to the present paper, the
MTO results are the most relevant comparison given its similar focus on distressed, high-
crime public housing in major U.S. cities.17 As mentioned previously, the results from MTO
may differ from the demolition context because MTO families volunteered to participate.
Another way in which demolition and relocation may affect children is through changes
in the quality of schooling. A variety of studies provide credible evidence that attending
schools with better teachers and smaller classes generates notable gains, especially in terms
of long-run labor market outcomes (Chetty et al., 2011; Fredriksson, O¨ckert and Oosterbeek,
2013; Fryer and Katz, 2013; Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff, 2014). Yet, previous studies of
housing assistance programs suggest that families typically do not use vouchers to relocate
to areas that give their children access to better schools. In the MTO evaluation, there
was little impact on child school quality although households moved to areas with notably
lower poverty (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2006). Moreover, the most relevant evidence for the
demolition context comes from Jacob (2004), who studied the short-run impact of public
housing demolition on education outcomes. He finds that there is little difference in school
quality for displaced and non-displaced children after relocating due to demolition.18
Finally, displaced children may have different outcomes even if their households did not
relocate to less disadvantaged neighborhoods. One idea proposed by sociologists posits that
the physical design and density of public housing projects fosters criminal and other negative
behavior (Newman, 1973). Hence, relocation to less-dense private market housing can impact
16 The Gautreaux program provided housing vouchers to a limited set of low-income families in Chicago
in the late 1970s. As part of this voucher program, counselors recommended apartments in lower-poverty
areas of Chicago or the surrounding suburbs. Researchers studying the Gautreaux program argue that this
process resulted in a quasi-random assignment of households to new neighborhoods. In support of this
argument, Popkin, Rosenbaum and Meaden (1993) report that 95 percent of program participants accepted
the first apartment offered. However, Shroder and Orr (2012) argue that it is unclear whether the Gautreaux
setting approximated random assignment because there are statistically significant differences in observed
characteristics between the set of participants that moved to the suburbs or within Chicago.
17 There are notable differences between public housing neighborhoods in the U.S. and Canada (Oreopoulos,
2003, 2008, 2012). For instance, Oreopoulos (2012) notes that “[a]lthough large public housing projects in
Toronto are unattractive, they do not exhibit nearly the same degree of crime and racial segregation that
occur in high-poverty neighborhoods in the United States.” This suggests that the effects of public housing
in Toronto may not apply to the U.S. context.
18 As will be discussed in Section 1.7, Jacob (2004) also finds few detectable effects on student outcomes
such as test scores and grades. This suggests that an impact on long-run child outcomes is not due to changes
in schooling achievement.
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child development irrespective of changes in exposure to neighborhood poverty.
1.4 Data Sources and Sample Construction
The data that I use to test whether demolition has an impact on long-run outcomes of chil-
dren is drawn from multiple administrative sources. Specifically, I combine building records
from the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and social assistance (i.e., TANF/AFDC, Food
Stamp and Medicaid) case files (1989-2009) from the Illinois Department of Human Services
to create a sample of children that lived in public housing and were affected by demolition
during the 1990s. I obtain additional information on long-run outcomes by merging this
sample of children with unemployment insurance wage records (1995-2009) from the Illinois
Department of Employment Security. In addition, I also obtain measures of baseline (prior
to demolition) characteristics by linking the sample to arrest records from the Illinois State
Police.19 The employment and police data are linked to the social assistance case records
using identifiers created by Chapin Hall at the University of Chicago, a research institute
and leader in administrative-data linking. In the next sections, I describe my sample and
the data construction in more detail.
1.4.1 Sample of Public Housing Buildings
My analysis focuses on a subset of public housing projects and buildings listed in CHA
building inventory records from the 1990s. Specifically, I examine non-senior-citizen projects
that experienced building closure and demolitions from 1995-1998 which were part of the
initial wave of housing demolitions associated with HOPE VI grants.20 I also restrict atten-
tion to high-rise buildings (defined as having 75 units or more).21 Finally, I exclude projects
where documented evidence suggests that building demolition was correlated with unob-
served tenant characteristics. Specifically, I exclude the Cabrini Green and Henry Horner
projects.22
19 I also use the police data for supplementary analysis of adolescent criminal behavior.
20 Note that I exclude high-rise projects that did not have any buildings closed due to demolition. This is
because my empirical specification includes project fixed effects to account for systematic differences across
projects. Hence, projects that did not experience demolition would not contribute to the identification of
the impact of demolition.
21 In general, low- and mid-rise buildings did not experience the same type of sudden and abrupt demolition
process as observed in high-rises.
22 As highlighted by Jacob (2004), the housing authority chose to demolish buildings at the Cabrini-Green
Homes that were associated with gang activity and crime. I also exclude the Henry Horner project because
selection of buildings for demolition and voucher distribution was notably different at this site (Vale and
Graves, 2010). This non-standard process was due to an earlier lawsuit initiated by the Henry Horner
residents.
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The final sample contains 53 high-rise buildings located in seven projects. I obtain the
date when a building was closed from Jacob (2004) which determined the year of closure
by examining CHA administrative data on building occupancy supplemented by qualitative
sources.23 Based on this information, there were 20 demolished (treated) and 33 stable
(control) buildings during my study period. Note that stable buildings are defined as those
that did not close during the 1995-2002 period.
1.4.2 Linking Households to the Public Housing System
To create my main analysis sample, I exploit the fact that social assistance records
provide the exact street address for welfare recipients. Specifically, I link welfare recipients
who have a street address that matches a building in my public housing project sample
in the year prior to notification of demolition. Note that by focusing on addresses in the
assistance data in the year before demolition, the sample definition is unrelated to any impact
that demolition has on public assistance participation. Overall, the assistance data contains
5,676 adult recipients that live in public housing in the year before demolition. Since the
sample of public housing buildings contains 7,770 individual apartments, this suggests that
my assistance sample covers at least 73 percent of the households living in the demolition
sample of buildings (assuming there are no vacant apartments). The high coverage rate is
not surprising given that the disadvantaged status of the Chicago public housing population
implies that many residents will receive some form of public assistance.24
Finally, I focus on children aged 7 to 18 in the year that building demolition takes place at
their project. With this sample, I observe adult (age> 18) outcomes for at least three years
and at most 14 years for each child. Moreover, this age restriction allows me to compare
my results directly to the analysis of children in the final impact evaluation from MTO.25
The final data contains 5,250 children from 2,767 households. Using this set of children from
project-based public housing, I create a panel at the person-year level which covers the period
from demolition to 2009, the last year of my administrative data on labor market and welfare
outcomes. The number of observations per individual is determined by the demolition date.
For example, residents of projects that had demolitions in 1995 will have 14 observations
in their panel. I merge this panel with the administrative data on labor market outcomes,
social assistance receipt and criminal arrests.
23 Appendix Section A3 provides further details on the process for determining the year of demolition.
24 Only 15 percent of households living in Chicago public housing had an employed member, and the
average CHA household income was $6,936 per year (Popkin et al., 2000).
25 In Appendix Table A8, I show that my main results are not sensitive to changing the sample definition
to include even younger children who will be just entering the labor market in the final years covered by my
employment data.
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1.5 Empirical Approach
1.5.1 Estimating the Reduced-Form Effect of Demolition
As in Jacob (2004), I study the impact of demolition by exploiting the fact that the CHA
selected a limited number of buildings for demolition within each public housing project
during the 1990s. Hence, my empirical strategy compares children who lived in buildings
selected for demolition to their counterparts living in non-demolished buildings.26 The former
is the treatment group which is displaced from public housing. To the extent that displaced
and non-displaced individuals are randomly assigned within the same project, subsequent
differences in outcomes can be attributed to the demolition and relocation.
I use the following linear model to study the impact of demolition on outcome y for
children,
Yit = α + βDb(i) +X
′
iθ + ψp(i) + δt + it, (1.1)
where i is an individual and t represents years. The indexes b(i) and p(i) are the building and
project for individual i. The terms δt and ψp(i) are year and project fixed effects, respectively.
The vector Xi is a set of control variables (e.g., age) included to improve precision. The
dummy variable Db(i) takes a value of one if an individual lived in a building slated for
demolition. Hence, β represents the net impact of demolition on children’s outcomes.
In addition, I also estimate two augmented versions of Equation 1.1. First, I estimate
a model which includes interactions for gender.27 This analysis is motivated by a large
body of previous empirical work that documents significant heterogeneity by gender. For
example, many of the benefits detected in the MTO evaluations were found for girls but not
for boys (Kling, Ludwig and Katz, 2005). In addition, Anderson (2008) analyzes data from
several education interventions finding that all benefits accrued to girls, with no statistically
significant long-term benefits for boys. Second, I also explore how treatment effects vary
with age by estimating a model which interacts an individual’s age in a given year and
the treatment indicator. Hence, this specification compares displaced (treated) and their
26 For example, in the Robert Taylor Homes project, building #1 was slated for demolition in 1995 while
other high-rises in Robert Taylor were left untouched at that time. Residents of this latter group of stable
buildings can be used as a comparison group that holds constant characteristics specific to residents at
Robert Taylor Homes.
27 Formally, the augmented model I estimate is:
Yit = βgGiDb(i) + βb(1−Gi)Db(i) +X ′iθ + ψp(i) + δt + it
where G is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if individual i is female. In this equation, βb is the
average difference in outcomes between males in the treatment and control group while βg is the average
difference for females.
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non-displaced peers at each age of measurement observed in my sample.
Estimates of β in Equation 1.1 have a causal interpretation if the CHA’s selection of
buildings for demolition was unrelated to resident characteristics. The historical evidence
suggests that this condition is plausible because building maintenance issues were the main
concern when selecting buildings for demolition. Moreover, there should be little difference
between residents living in demolished and non-demolished buildings because the tenant
allocation process restricts the ability of households to sort into different buildings. Recall
that most families spend years on the public housing waiting list and accept the first unit
that becomes available. Finally, in the next section, I provide empirical support for this
assumption that building demolition is unrelated to resident characteristics by showing that
my sample of displaced and non-displaced residents have similar observed characteristics in
the year prior to demolition.
1.5.2 Comparing Treated and Control Individuals in the Year Prior to Demo-
lition
The validity of my research design depends on whether the selection of buildings for
demolition was uncorrelated with characteristics of children living in public housing. To
provide support for this assumption, I exploit the comprehensive nature of my administrative
data to compare children living in buildings marked for demolition (treated) and stable
(control) buildings. Specifically, I examine crime and demographic characteristics measured
in the (baseline) year prior to demolition.
Table 1.1 compares children living in treated and control buildings by estimating a re-
gression model where the dependent variable is a child characteristic measured in the year
before demolition and the key independent variable is an indicator for living in a treated
building. Column (1) of the table shows means for various outcomes for all non-displaced
children living in stable public housing buildings. The second column reports the mean
difference between control and treated individuals from the regression model. If selection
of buildings was uncorrelated with child characteristics, we expect that the mean difference
would equal zero. The table shows that the mean difference is never statistically different
from zero for all measures of past criminal activity and demographics in my sample.28 In
addition, Table 1.1 shows there is no difference in schooling outcomes at baseline by repro-
ducing the balance test results from Jacob (2004), who studied the impact of demolition
28 Note that juvenile arrests come from the Illinois State Police (ISP) data. Prior to 1998, the arrest data
for juveniles in the ISP data is limited to serious felonies. After this date, revisions in the Illinois Juvenile
Court Act allowed for the submission of juvenile misdemeanor arrests into the ISP database, resulting in
more complete coverage of juvenile criminal activity.
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on schooling outcomes.29 Columns (3) through (6) similarly show no detectable difference
between displaced and non-displaced youth by gender subgroup.30
I also examine whether there are detectable differences in the baseline characteristics of
adult (age > 18) residents of public housing. One important limitation in this analysis is
that the data only includes adults living in public housing who are observed in the social
assistance case files. Table 1.1 examines this sample of adults in Columns (7) and (8) in
terms of demographic, criminal and labor market characteristics. Similar to the exercise for
youth, Column (7) reports the mean for non-displaced adults measured in the year before
demolition. Column (8) reports the difference between displaced and non-displaced adults
as calculated from a regression model. Reassuringly, adults living in buildings marked for
demolition do not appear statistically different in terms of past criminal activity or labor
market activity. Adults in treated buildings are one year older, but the magnitude of this
difference is small relative to the mean adult age.
1.5.3 Testing for Attrition and Spatial Spillovers
Administrative data allows me to avoid many concerns over sample attrition and missing
data that are problematic in other studies. If an individual works in the state of Illinois in
any quarter from 1995 to 2009, I observe earnings as reported to the Illinois unemployment
insurance (UI) program. At the same time, one may be concerned that my estimates are
biased if children displaced by demolition are more likely to move out of state. In this case,
my administrative data would suffer from a missing data problem: an individual who moves
out of state will have zero earnings in the Illinois data even if they are working in their new
state of residence.
To address concerns over attrition, I follow Grogger (2013) and use terminal runs of zeros
to measure permanent out-of-jurisdiction attrition. Intuitively, the idea is that attrition
has a distinctive pattern: when an individual moves out of state, all of their subsequent
entries in administrative panel data from their original location are zeros. As detailed in
Appendix Section A.1, I construct this measure of attrition based on terminal zeros and test
for imbalance across treatment and control groups. This analysis reveals no evidence that
children displaced by demolition are any more likely to attrit from the administrative data
than non-displaced children.
A final concern for my empirical results are spatial spillovers stemming from demolition.
29 The sample of treated and control public housing buildings used in this paper matches the sample used
in Jacob (2004) except I exclude buildings from the Henry Horner project where there was a distinct process
for public housing demolition. All of my results are robust to including Henry Horner in my analysis.
30 For schooling outcomes, there are no gender specific balance tests because Jacob (2004) did not provide
balance tests for schooling outcomes separately by gender.
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In other words, the control group of non-displaced children could be affected by the demoli-
tion of neighboring buildings and the relocation of their peers. This would bias my estimates
upward if non-displaced children are worse off due to demolition. To test for the existence of
spillovers, I augment Equation 1.1 with additional indicators for living in a stable building
that is adjacent to a demolition building,
Yit = α + β
′Db(i) + piNb(i) +X ′iθ + ψp(i) + δt + it, (1.2)
whereNb(i) is an indicator that a public housing building borders (is adjacent to) a demolition-
targeted building. The omitted group in the regression is the set of children living in sta-
ble buildings located farther away from a demolished building. This specification tests for
spillovers on stable buildings under the assumption that social interactions between build-
ings within a project decrease with distance. Appendix Table A2 presents the results of
this specification for labor market and welfare outcomes. I find no evidence of this type of
spillover given that the analysis fails to reject the null pi = 0 across outcomes.
I also test for the existence of general spillovers at the project level. For instance, a
concern is that demolition reduced social cohesion in all remaining (control) buildings at
the project and this could affect long-run child outcomes.31 To address this, I conduct an
event-study of Census-tract-level homicides as a proxy for social conditions at and around
public housing projects.32 Formally, I use the following specification: 33
Hit =µi +
−1∑
j=−4
pij 1(t− t∗ = j) +
10∑
j=1
τj 1(t− t∗ = j) + δt + st (1.3)
where the dependent variable Hit is homicide rate for Census tract i at year t. The terms
µi and δt are tract and year fixed effects, respectively. In the notation, t
∗ is the year t
in which a particular tract experiences a public housing demolition directly (or there is a
demolition within one mile of the tract). The dummy variables 1(t− t∗ = j) indicates that
an observation in year t is j-periods before or after demolition occurs. For example, the
dummy variable 1(−1 = j) indicates that the observation y is one year before the policy is
implemented.
31 Previous research on the demolitions in Chicago finds that there is no evidence of this type of negative
spillover affecting non-displaced residents. Aliprantis and Hartley (2015) estimate that there is a decrease
in violent crime after a project experiences building demolition. Yet, in contrast to the present study, they
study the impact of demolition on neighborhood-level crime over a longer time period and include demolitions
that occurred after 1998.
32 I focus on homicides because tract-level data on property or other forms of criminal activity are unavail-
able for Chicago for my period of study from 1995-1998.
33 See Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) for further discussion of event-study specifications.
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I restrict the estimation sample to include tracts that (1) that contained public housing
with at least one building demolition or (2) are within one mile of a public housing demolition
site. The data contain observations that are at most four years before demolition and up to
10 years after a demolition. I choose four pre-periods because the bulk of the demolitions
I consider occur in 1995 and my homicide data start in 1991. Note that year effects δt are
identified using data from locations that have not yet or already have had a demolition. The
Figure A1 plots the coefficients pij and τj along with the 95-percent confidence interval. The
results show that there is no detectable impact of demolition on the tract homicide rates
following public housing demolition.
1.6 Main Results
Since the expected effects of demolition depend on relocation choices, I begin by showing
that displaced households with children moved to less disadvantaged neighborhoods com-
pared to their non-displaced peers. Next, I study labor market outcomes, finding that there
is a large positive impact on long-run employment and annual earnings. Yet, there is no
detectable impact of demolition on any measure of public assistance utilization.
1.6.1 The Impact of Demolition on Household Location
Housing vouchers increase housing location choice (relative to project-based housing as-
sistance) and can potentially reduce low-income household exposure to poverty and other
forms of neighborhood disadvantage. Increased choice may be particularly important for
families on housing assistance since public housing projects tend to be located in the most
distressed areas of cities. For example, the public housing buildings in my Chicago sample
reside in Census tracts where the poverty rate – defined as the fraction of persons below the
federal poverty line – was about 78 percent. To put this figure in perspective, Census tracts
with 40 percent or more households falling below the poverty line are typically classified as
extreme poverty tracts (Coulton et al., 1996). According to 2000 Census data, only 12.4
percent of the U.S. population had income below the poverty line (Bishaw, 2014).
I test whether displaced public housing residents move to better quality neighborhoods
using address information from social assistance case records. The primary concern with this
analysis of post-demolition location is that address data is only available if some member
of a household received assistance such as AFDC/TANF, Foodstamps or Medicaid. Hence,
this analysis may be biased if demolition has an impact on participation in social assistance
programs.34 In subsequent Section 1.6.3, I find that there is no detectable difference in the
34 If demolition reduces the likelihood that a household uses social assistance, they will not have an active
13
probability that displaced children are on social assistance in the years following demolition.
Table 1.2 shows that displaced (treated) households are less likely to live in public housing
and moved to better quality neighborhoods relative to their non-displaced (control) peers.
Column (2) shows that three years after demolition treated households with children are
about 80 percent less likely to reside in public housing and live in Census tracts that average a
20 percent lower poverty rate relative to control households. In addition, their neighborhoods
have less crime: treated households lived in neighborhoods with about 23 (about 33 percent)
fewer violent crimes per 10,000 residents. Overall, these statistics on neighborhood relocation
are similar to those reported in Jacob (2004), who relied on a different administrative source
(specifically, he uses data from the Chicago Public Schools) to examine changes in children’s
location.35
Figure 1.1 presents densities of neighborhood (tract) poverty rates to help characterize
the cumulative impact of demolition on neighborhood quality.36 Specifically, the poverty
rates in the figure are duration-weighted averages over all the locations at which a household
lived at since demolition. Separate densities are presented for displaced (solid) and non-
displaced (dashed) households. This figure indicates that a large share of displaced residents
relocated and lived in neighborhoods with notably lower poverty rates relative to residents
of stable buildings. Nearly 44 percent of treated households lived in neighborhoods with
poverty rates less than 40 percent (the threshold for classification as an extreme poverty
neighborhood). Overall, the change in neighborhood condition in my sample is similar to
the pattern for MTO volunteers that were randomly selected to be part of the unrestricted
(“Section-8”) treatment group (Kling, Ludwig and Katz, 2005; Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011).
The difference in neighborhood quality also shrinks over time. Column (4) of Table 1.2
shows that there is no detectable difference in neighborhood quality eight years after the
demolition. This occurs because the vast majority of the control group moves out of public
housing by this time.37 To further explore the impact on neighborhood quality over time,
Figure 1.2 plots the difference in the (tract) neighborhood poverty rate in each post de-
record in the social assistance data which implies that I will not observe their address history. The direction
of this bias for the mobility analysis then depends on what kind of neighborhood these households selected.
35 Moreover, the similarity between these results and Jacob (2004) should provide further reassurance
against concern over the impact of demolition on the address histories that I construct from social assistance
records. This is because Jacob (2004) analyzed relocation outcomes using Chicago Public School data where
there is no concern over differential attrition due to the impact of demolition on use of social assistance.
36 This analysis uses the tract poverty rate associated with a household’s address in a given year which is
obtained from social assistance case records. When a household does not have an active case in a given year,
no address is observed. For the duration weighting, I only consider years in which an address (and poverty
rate) is observed for a given household.
37 Recall that the set of control (non-demolished) buildings are defined as those that did not close during
the 1995-2002 period. This implies that much of the movement by control households out of public housing
(even in the long-run) was not due to later waves of demolition.
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molition year. Unsurprisingly, the difference in neighborhood poverty is largest in the first
year after demolition: displaced households live in neighborhoods with about 28 percentage
points lower poverty relative to non-displaced households. After this point, the difference
in poverty rate begins to attenuate to nearly 13 percentage points by year three. Eventu-
ally there is no detectable difference in neighborhood poverty eight years after demolition
when the youngest children in my sample (age 7 at baseline) may be leaving their parents’
household.
1.6.2 Adult Labor Market Outcomes of Children
Table 1.3 examines the impact of demolition on children’s adult labor market outcomes
by presenting results from Equation 1.1. The point estimate reported in Column (2) show
that children (age 7 to 18 at baseline) whose households were displaced have higher labor-
force participation and earnings during their adult working years (age > 18). On average,
children who were displaced are 4 percentage points (9 percent) more likely to be employed
and have about $600 higher annual earnings.38 While I do not directly measure hours worked,
Table 1.3 also shows that the probability of earning more than $14,000 – the equivalent of
working full time (35 hours a week) at $8 per hour for 50 weeks – increases by 1.3 percentage
points (13 percent). Overall, these results show that demolition and subsequent relocation
is strongly associated with better adult labor-market outcomes for children.
Table 1.4 presents estimates from a modified version of Equation 1.1 which allows treat-
ment effects to vary by gender. The point estimates show that the positive impact detected
for the full sample is driven mainly by girls. Relative to non-displaced peers, girls are 6.6
percentage points (13 percent) more likely to be employed and have $806 (18 percent) higher
annual earnings. The corresponding effects for boys are less precisely estimated although
the point estimates for all outcomes are positive.39
I also explore how labor market activity evolves as my sample ages by interacting an
individual’s age in a given year (hereafter “age of measurement”) and the treatment indica-
tor.40 Figure 1.3 plots each point estimate for the estimated labor market treatment effect
38 Recall that these results are from analysis of a panel of employment and earnings based on IDES data.
If an individual is not present in the IDES data, their earnings in that year are zero. All monetary values
are in 2012 dollars.
39 Note that I cannot reject the equality of treatment effects for male and female earnings (p-value = 0.18).
However, I can reject the hypothesis of the equality of treatment effect estimates for male and female labor
participation (p-value = 0.07).
40 Note that the treatment effect for older ages (e.g. age 32) are only identified using children who were
relatively old at the time that displacement occurred. Again, this is because children who were displaced
when they were younger have just entered adulthood by the end of my sample. For example, the youngest
child in my sample is age 7 at the time of demolition and age 21 in 2009, which is the last year in my
administrative data on employment outcomes.
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at each age for adult employment and earnings. Note that age of measurement on the x-axis
ranges from 19 to 32 because the oldest child in my sample is age 32 in the last year of
my sample. Despite larger standard errors at older ages, Panel (a) shows that the positive
treatment effect for employment is relatively stable as the sample ages. Panel (b) shows that
the earnings treatment effect is relatively stable although there is a slight positive trend and
the point estimates are approximately $5,000 after age 28.
Figure 1.4 examines the evolution of treatment effects separately for very young (age < 13
at baseline) and older children (age 13 to 18 at baseline). Note that I restrict the age of
measurement because younger children are age 26 in the final year available in my admin-
istrative data. Overall, this analysis reveals two important findings. First, the treatment
effects for older children (in red) are always positive (although not precisely measured) and
shows little trend over time. Second, the analysis of younger children reveals that there is a
slight increase in the size of the treatment effect point estimates at older ages. This pattern
is consistent with a recent long-run evaluation of MTO evaluation by Chetty, Hendren and
Katz (2015) which reveals that treatment effects for MTO children younger than age 13 are
positive starting in their mid-twenties. However, Chetty, Hendren and Katz (2015) tend to
find negative treatment effect point estimates for MTO children that are older at baseline
(age 13 to 18), whereas I find that the point estimates for the effects on older children are
always positive.41
I also examine additional types of heterogeneity in the labor market response to demo-
lition. Panels (a) and (b) in Appendix Table A4 present results for labor market partici-
pation and earnings, respectively. Each row of the table reports descriptive statistics and
results specific to a given subgroup based on baseline characteristics. The results for younger
(age < 13) and older (age 13 to 18) children do not show any heterogeneity based on age;
however, this average difference masks the notable heterogeneity of treatment effects by age
of measurement shown in Figure 1.4. The additional subgroup results paint a mixed picture
of how treatment effects are related to baseline measures of household disadvantage. On the
one hand, children from (more disadvantaged) households with no working adults have large
treatment effects, and there are no detectable effects for children from households that have
at least one working adult. On the other hand, children from (more disadvantaged) house-
holds with adults who have at least one prior arrest have no detectable treatment effects,
while there are large treatment effects for children from households in which no adult has a
past criminal arrest.42
41 For more on this comparison with recent re-analysis of MTO, see Figure 1 and Table 3 of Chetty, Hendren
and Katz (2015).
42 At the same time, it is worth noting that I cannot reject the equality of treatment effects across these
different subgroups.
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Finally, Figure 1.5 and Appendix Table A3 further explore heterogeneity in the impact
of demolition by estimating quantile treatment effects. Note that the lower bound of the
x-axis on the figure is restricted to the 60th percentile because a large fraction of earnings
are equal to zero.43 This analysis examines the treatment effect for particular percentiles of
the earnings distribution and does not measure the effect for any particular individual in the
sample. The pattern of the point estimates show a notable degree of heterogeneity in the
earnings response with the treatment effects generally increasing for higher quantiles. At
the 85th percentile, the quantile treatment effect is about $2,100, which is a 22 percentage
point increase relative to the same percentile in the control distribution.
1.6.3 Adult Welfare Receipt of Children
Demolition and neighborhood relocation may also affect welfare receipt through many of
the same mechanisms that link neighborhood conditions and labor-market outcomes. For
example, Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan (2000) examine U.S. Census data and find
that use of social services and public assistance is affected by the usage rate of neighbors in
one’s social network (measured by language spoken). In this section, I test whether there
is any impact of displacement due to public housing demolition on public assistance receipt
(TANF/AFDC, foodstamps or Medicaid).
Table 1.5 presents results from Equation 1.1 in column (2), which shows no detectable
impact of demolition and relocation on utilization of AFDC/TANF, foodstamps or Medicaid
services across years. The point estimates are generally very small (less than or equal to
0.01), and the 95-percent confidence intervals generally rule out effects larger than negative
or positive 3 percentage points. Columns (4) and (6) present results by gender and show
little detectable heterogeneity.
This lack of effects may seem initially surprising given that the positive treatment effect
on labor market activity should reduce reliance on social assistance. However, the intensity
of disadvantage in this sample of children means that even sizable gains in labor-market
activity are not sufficient to reduce eligibility for social assistance. For example, the mean
annual earnings for non-displaced (control) in my sample is about $3,700, and the reduced
form impact of demolition is about $600 which implies that the average displaced (treated)
households will still be below the maximum annual income limits for foodstamps ($25,000),
TANF ($7,000) and Medicaid ($26,000).44 Even at the 90th percentile of the earnings dis-
43 Specifically, the descriptive statistics in Panel A of Appendix Table A3 show that 48 and 67 percent of
annual earnings for males and female, respectively, are zero.
44 Social service eligibility depends on both income and family size. The maximum income allowance
described in the text applies to a family size of three. Details on Illinois TANF, foodstamp and Medicaid
eligibility come from DHS (2015), DHS (2014) and Brooks et al. (2015), respectively.
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tribution, treated individuals still qualify for both foodstamps and Medicaid assistance.45
Hence, the detected treatment effects of labor market participation and earnings would not
reduce social program eligibility for the vast majority of individuals in my sample.
1.7 Mediating Mechanisms
Why does demolition have such a large impact on the adult labor market outcomes
of children? In addition to the mechanisms described in Section 1.3, displaced parents
may be more likely to work and use the additional household income to invest in child
development (Black et al., 2014). To test for this parental channel, Table 1.6 explores
whether there is any impact of relocation due to demolition on labor market outcomes of
parents.46 Column (2) shows that the point estimates are consistently small and the effects
are never statistically different from zero. For example, the reduced form effect on labor
market participation represents less than a one percent effect (=0.004/0.489).47 Overall,
these results are consistent with previous analyses of MTO which found no detectable impact
of vouchers for adults (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011).
Another possibility is that living in a less disadvantaged neighborhood with less crime
could possibly affect teenage criminal behavior. Indeed, Damm and Dustmann (2014) show
that children who live in areas with a higher share of youth criminals are more likely to
commit crime when they grow older. In this way, moving to lower poverty neighborhoods
may boost labor market outcomes by affecting the likelihood of committing crime and being
arrested. I test this hypothesis by examining the impact of demolition on teenage arrests
using data from the Illinois State Police. Table 1.7 presents results that suggest that the
positive impact of relocation due to demolition does not arise from reductions in adolescent
criminal behavior. Column (2) reports results from estimating Equation 1.1 where the
dependent variable is the number of arrests in each post-demolition year and the sample
is restricted to years in which the individual is between 13 and 18 years old. The point
estimate for the impact on total arrests is negative, but this effect is not precisely measured
(p = 0.37). Looking at the impact by type of arrest reveals notable heterogeneity in that the
impact on property arrests is actually positive. Specifically, children displaced by demolition
had 16 percent (=0.008/0.048) more property crime arrests than their non-displaced peers.
While the increase in property arrests during ages of peak criminal activity may be somewhat
surprising given the effects on labor market outcomes, supplemental analysis in Appendix
45 For descriptive statistics on the quantiles of the earnings distribution, see Appendix Table A3.
46 A parent in my sample is defined as any adult (age > 18 at baseline) who lives in a household with a
child.
47 The LATE estimates (not reported) are similarly small in magnitude (and imprecise).
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Table A9 shows that there is a positive impact (reduction in arrests) on long-run crime.
This analysis examine arrests over the entire sample of post-demolition years for children.
The point estimate shows that youth who relocate have 14 percent fewer arrests for violent
crimes.48
Finally, as discussed in Section 1.3, demolition has the potential to change long-run child
outcomes by affecting school quality or student achievement. Previous research by Jacob
(2004) sheds light on this issue by providing a short-run analysis of the impact of demolition
using data from the Chicago Public Schools.49 Interestingly, he finds that displaced families
are not enrolled in better schools after demolition, and there is no detectable impact on test
scores or grades. Yet, there is a 9 percent increase in the probability of dropping out of
high-school for older children in his sample. This suggests that the labor market benefits for
older (age > 13) found in this paper are not due to improvements in schooling.
1.8 Multiple Comparisons
One particular concern for my results is how to manage the risk of both false positives
and false negatives given that my analysis considers labor supply and additional outcomes
such as social assistance usage and youth crime. I follow current best practices to adjust per-
comparison p-values to account for multiple outcomes (Jacob, Kapustin and Ludwig, 2015;
Anderson, 2008). To start, I specify a limited set of outcomes for my main, confirmatory
analysis. Based on the preceding analysis, I focus on four outcomes: (1) labor market par-
ticipation; (2) annual earnings; (3) use of social assistance (i.e., AFDC/TANF, Foodstamps
or Medicaid); and (4) total number of criminal arrests. Next, I use a two-step procedure
from Benjamini, Krieger and Yekutieli (2006) to calculate adjusted p-values that control for
the false discovery rate (FDR), which is the proportion of rejections that are false positives
(Type I errors).
Reassuringly, the results in Appendix Table A5 show that the main conclusions of my
demolition analysis do not change based on examination of adjusted p-values to account for
testing multiple outcomes. For convenience, Columns (1) and (2) repeat the results from
Tables 1.3, 1.5 and 1.7. Column (3) reports the standard per-comparison (pairwise) p-values
associated with each of the four outcomes. Again, these results show that I can reject the
null hypothesis of no effect on labor market participation and earnings at the 1 percent
level. Similarly, the adjusted p-values in Column (3) show that I can still reject the null of
no effects even after accounting for the fact that my analysis of the impact of demolition
48 Interestingly, Kling, Ludwig and Katz (2005) show that there was an increase in property crime for boys
whose household moved to a low-poverty neighborhood through the MTO program.
49 Jacob (2004) has data on student outcomes up to five years following demolition and relocation.
19
considered four different outcomes.
1.9 Reconciling Estimates Across Studies
The positive impact of public housing demolition on labor market outcomes of children
seems at odds with the results from the MTO evaluation, which is one of the most credible
studies of neighborhood effects. This section begins with a description of the MTO study
and reviews its findings. Next, I provide a heterogeneous treatment effects framework which
explains the difference between the parameters identified in the present study and MTO. The
framework highlights that the effects from MTO may be different from the average treatment
effect because a relatively small fraction of families in MTO’s target population volunteered
for the experiment. Estimates from public housing demolition represent effects for a more
general population because families had no ability to control whether demolition affected
them. In short, volunteers for MTO may differ from the sample of families from demolished
housing. The final part of this section provides evidence in support of this interpretation
by examining a housing voucher lottery held in Chicago just after the housing demolitions
began.
1.9.1 The MTO Evaluation and Comparing Estimates
The MTO evaluation sought to relocate families living in public housing projects located
in extremely poor neighborhoods using housing vouchers. The program operated from 1994
to 1998 and recruited 4,600 households into the experiment across five major U.S. cities.
The program randomly assigned each family to one of three groups: (1) a control group that
received no vouchers through MTO; (2) a treatment group that received housing vouchers
that could be used to subsidize private market housing; and (3) a treatment group that
received housing vouchers that could be used only to lease private market housing in Census
tracts with poverty rates below 10 percent (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011).
Using this random assignment, the MTO studies report intent-to-treat (ITT) effects of
receiving a housing voucher offer and treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) effects. As explained
in Kling, Ludwig and Katz (2005), the latter provide an estimate of the causal effects of
vouchers among those who used a voucher to move. Specifically, the TOT estimate is equal
to the ITT estimate divided by the fraction of the treatment group that successfully used
an MTO voucher.
Figures 1.6 and 1.7 show that there is notable contrast between estimates of the TOT
effects for each MTO treatment arm and the reduced form effect of public housing demo-
lition. The outcomes of interest are labor market participation and annual earnings for all
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children who were between ages 7 and 18 at baseline in each study.50 For each outcome, the
MTO estimates are negative and fall outside of the 95-percent confidence interval around
the demolition estimate. Recall that households displaced by demolition received housing
vouchers so that the demolition estimate can be interpreted as an ITT effect of vouchers. In
addition, the ITT estimate from the demolition sample can be interpreted as a TOT estimate
if all households displaced by demolition used their voucher and none of the non-displaced
households used a voucher.
1.9.2 A Framework for Interpreting Estimates Across Studies
Why do estimates of the impact of demolition differ from what one might have expected
based on the MTO study? While families in both contexts received housing vouchers, the
demolition experiment is different because use of vouchers was effectively mandatory and
households had no ability to control whether they were affected by demolition. In this
section, I review the importance of these differences with a formal model of causal inference
in the context of vouchers and heterogeneous treatment effects.
Let Vi be an indicator of whether the family of child i used a subsidized housing voucher
to lease private market housing. Our main interest is in learning about the effects of vouchers
on children. Denote by Y1i the outcome of child i if their family used a voucher to move,
and let Y0i be the outcome if their family did not use a voucher. Represent the causal effect
of a voucher on child i as ∆i = Y1i − Y0i.
To identify the impact of a housing voucher, let Oi be a binary variable that indicates
whether the family of child i received a randomly allocated housing voucher. Using the
general framework of Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2001), Angrist (2004) and DiNardo
and Lee (2011), I assume that the housing voucher offer Oi affects voucher use according to
the following latent-index assignment mechanism,
Vi = 1(γ0 + γ1Oi > i), (1.4)
where i is a random error that represents the unobserved cost of voucher use for child i’s
family. The coefficient γ1 represents the impact of receiving a voucher offer on the decision
to use a voucher.
As shown in (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996), the 2SLS estimate using a randomly
assigned voucher offer Oi as an instrument for voucher use (Vi) is the local average treatment
50 Note that I use the MTO estimates as reported in Sanbonmatsu et al. (2011) because the age of children
in this sample best aligns with the ages observed in my data. Specifically, children affected by demolition
are ages 21 to 32 at the end of my sample. Similarly, the sample used Sanbonmatsu et al. (2011) examines
“grown” children who were between the ages 21 of 31 by December 31, 2007.
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effect (LATE) of vouchers,51
E(Yi|Oi = 1)− E(Yi|Oi = 0)
E(Vi|Oi = 1)− E(Vi|Oi = 0) = E(∆i|γ0 + γ1 > i > γ0). (1.5)
The left side of this expression is the Wald Estimator, which is the ratio of the reduced
form (ITT) effect to the difference in the voucher-use rate in the treatment and control
groups. Note that this parameter is nearly identical to the TOT estimates reported in the
MTO studies.52 The right-hand side is the local average treatment effect (LATE) of housing
vouchers. This estimate represents the average effect of a housing voucher on children from
households who “comply” by moving using a voucher that is randomly assigned to them.
With Equation 1.5 in mind, I consider a parametric model to illustrate how the LATE
depends on the fraction of the public housing population that is induced to use a voucher
within an experiment. For simplicity, I assume the distribution of (∆i, i) is bivariate normal:
(∆i, i) ∼ N2(µ∆, µ, σ2∆i , σ2i , ρ). Here, µ∆ and µ are the mean benefits to children and mean
costs of using a voucher, respectively. The correlation between child gains and costs is ρ while
the respective variances for benefits and costs are σ2∆i and σ
2
i
, respectively.
Under these assumptions, the LATE of using a voucher is:
E(Y1i − Y0i|γ0 + γ1 > i > γ0) = E(∆i|γ0 + γ1 > i > γ0)
= µ∆︸︷︷︸
ATE
+ρσ∆
(
φ(γ0)− φ(γ0 + γ1)
Φ(γ0 + γ1)− Φ(γ0)
)
(1.6)
The right side of Equation 1.6 shows that the LATE will differ from the average treatment
effect (ATE) as a function of the parameters of Equation 1.4, which models whether a family
uses a voucher to move and the correlation between gains and costs (ρ). Importantly, the
discrepancy between the LATE and ATE decreases with P(Vi = 1|Oi = 1) ≡ Φ(γ0 + γ1),
which is the fraction of households that use a voucher.
Figure 1.8 considers two different scenarios which show that the LATE may be far above
or below the ATE when few households are induced to use a voucher to move. Panel (a)
assumes a slight positive selection on gains (ρ = −0.15). This pattern is referred to as “Roy
style selection,” in which parents are more likely to use a voucher if their children would
51 Note that the standard monotonicity assumption is implied because this latent index model in this
framework has a constant coefficient for the impact of the instrument.
52 MTO provides an estimate of the treatment-on the-treated (TOT), which differs from the LATE because
the endogenous (first stage) variable is using an MTO voucher rather than any voucher (Kling, Ludwig and
Katz, 2005). Since voucher allocation outside of MTO was limited, there are few “always-takers” who obtain
a voucher even when they are assigned to the control group. This implies that E(Vi|Oi = 0) ≈ 0 and that
the TOT reported in MTO is very close to the LATE of voucher use.
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experience higher benefits to moving. In this case, the LATE is much higher than the ATE
if a small fraction of households use a voucher to move. Intuitively, few households have
sufficiently low costs of using a voucher (i), and these children have higher returns if ρ < 0.
In contrast, Panel (b) illustrates a scenario where there is slight negative selection on gains
(ρ = 0.15). With this type of selection, the children who would most benefit from moving
live in households with parents who are the least likely to use a voucher. This implies that
the LATE is far below the ATE when few families elect to use a voucher. Here, the children
in these selected households with lower costs have less to gain if ρ > 0.
The key insight in this section is that the context and pattern of results in the MTO and
demolition settings fit the model presented in Panel (b), which features negative selection in
terms of voucher use. In the case of MTO, there was relatively low interest in using a housing
voucher (i.e., P(Vi = 1|Oi = 1) was low). Goering et al. (1999) report that only 25 percent
of eligible families at the five MTO sites volunteered.53 In addition, the point estimates and
confidence intervals in MTO suggest that there are small benefits to moving for children
among the households that had sufficiently low costs that they sought vouchers by signing
up for the experiment. In contrast, the natural experiment created by demolition induced
a broader population to use a voucher because the housing authority (essentially) randomly
allocated vouchers to a large fraction of public housing residents and use of vouchers was
effectively mandatory. Hence, the demolition context implies that P(Vi = 1|Oi = 1) is high,
and the effects in the demolition sample suggest that there are larger gains for children from
families that have a relatively high cost of moving using a voucher.
1.9.3 The Chicago 1997 Housing Voucher Lottery
To test further for the existence of negative selection into voluntary housing mobility
programs, I study a housing voucher lottery that occurred in Chicago shortly after the
public housing demolition began. During the late 1990s, the Chicago Housing Authority
Corporation (CHAC) created a new waiting list for Section 8 vouchers.54 Because demand
for these vouchers far exceeded supply, the CHAC randomly assigned vouchers to applicants.
Using data collected for Jacob and Ludwig (2012) and Jacob, Kapustin and Ludwig
(2015), I analyze the CHAC 1997 lottery using the following definitions for treatment and
control groups.55 There were 82,607 income-eligible applicants and the CHAC randomly
53 In keeping with the spirit of the model shown in Equation 1.4, I assume that all individuals who did not
volunteer for the MTO experiment know their own idiosyncratic cost. Any household with cost that exceeds
γ0 + γ1 would never volunteer for the experiment and is a “never-taker” for the treatment (Vi).
54 In 1995, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) transferred housing operations
from the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) to a non-profit organization, the Chicago Housing Authority
Corporation (CHAC).
55 For a detailed description of the data including summary statistics, see Appendix Section A4.
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assigned each a position on a voucher wait list. The top 18,110 applicants and their families
comprise the treated group that received housing vouchers. Families whose lottery position
was between 35,001 and 82,607 are the control group because the CHAC told these families
that they would not receive vouchers.56
Panel (a) of Table 1.8 shows voucher-usage statistics for my main analysis sample of
children from lottery households that lived in public housing at the time of applying for
the CHAC 1997 lottery.57 The first row shows that 63 percent of the treated group uses
a housing voucher, while a notable share (31 percent) of the control group also obtains a
housing voucher from some program other than the CHAC 1997 lottery.58 Similar to the
MTO unrestricted treatment arm, Appendix Table A6 shows that households that used
a voucher through the CHAC 1997 program moved to notably better neighborhoods. For
example, winning a voucher decreased the neighborhood poverty rate by about 10 percentage
points (22 percent).
Also similar to the MTO results, Panel (b) of Table 1.8 shows that there is no measurable
impact of vouchers for children from households that volunteered for the CHAC 1997 lottery.
Column (2) provides the reduced form (ITT) estimates while Column (3) provides estimates
of the LATE of vouchers. Specifically, I compute the LATE estimates by estimating a 2SLS
system in which the dependent variable in the first stage is an indicator for whether an
individual used a voucher. The reduced form effects on the probability of employment are
fairly precisely estimated zeroes, while the estimate for earnings is also small but has a larger
standard error. Notably, the lottery sample 2SLS estimate for the labor market participation
and earnings fall far below the lower bound on the 95-percent confidence interval around the
demolition estimates (see Figure 1.6 and 1.7).
56 The CHAC originally planned to provide voucher offers to applicants whose position on the wait list
fell between 18,111 and 35,000. However, due to fiscal constrains the CHAC was unable to meet this initial
plan. For more detailed background on the CHAC lottery, see Jacob and Ludwig (2012).
57 This analysis of lottery children from public housing is distinctly different from the analysis in Jacob,
Kapustin and Ludwig (2015) which focused on lottery children living in private market housing. For these
households, receiving a voucher is a large in-kind transfer because they were not previously receiving housing
assistance. In contrast, the set of public housing children in the 1997 lottery do not experience a change
in household income because because the housing contribution rules for vouchers and project-based housing
are similar.
58 Previous studies have highlighted that voucher utilization rates tend to be far less than unity. For
example, Jacob and Ludwig (2012) find that about 43 percent of households living in private market housing
at baseline chose to use a voucher offer provided through the CHAC 1997 lottery. Finkel and Buron (2001)
also study voucher take-up rates across U.S. cities and find that the overall voucher utilization rate was 69
percent in 2000.
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1.9.4 Interpretation of the CHAC 1997 Lottery Results
The relatively small estimates of the impact of vouchers detected in the CHAC 1997
lottery sample are consistent with the hypothesis that there are relatively small gains for
children from households who are likely to use or seek vouchers voluntarily. However, there
are other interpretations. One concern is that the treatment effects may be correlated with
observed characteristics that differ between the demolition and lottery samples.59 For ex-
ample, Appendix Table A7 shows that households in the demolition sample are much more
disadvantaged across a number of important characteristics such as adult labor market ac-
tivity and criminal history.
To address this difference, I re-weight the demolition sample to be more similar to the
more-advantaged CHAC 1997 lottery sample. Specifically, I pool children in the demolition
and lottery samples and estimate a propensity score where the dependent variable is an
indicator for membership in the lottery sample. The covariates include a rich set of observable
household and child characteristics including baseline measures such as adult labor market
activity and criminal behavior.60 As shown in Column (4) of Table A7, re-weighting using
these propensity scores insures that the characteristics of the weighted demolition sample
are statistically indistinguishable from the lottery sample.
Panel (c) of Table 1.8 shows that even after re-weighting the demolition estimates are
still strikingly different from the lottery sample results. Moreover, the weighted sample
point estimates are similar to the results for the un-weighted analysis. This demonstrates
that differences in observed characteristics are unlikely to explain why the impact of moving
is larger in the demolition sample. Moreover, it also suggests that observed characteristics
are not correlated with unobservable (costs) that drive the decision to move.
Overall, this evidence suggests that large gains among children from households that are
unlikely to use or seek vouchers drive the effects detected in the demolition sample. The point
estimates and confidence intervals for labor market participation in the MTO and CHAC
1997 lottery samples suggest that children from volunteer households have relatively smaller
gains. As shown in Figure 1.8, this pattern of negative selection between the probability
that a parent decides to move using a voucher and the gains to children is consistent with
“reverse Roy” selection where children with the most to gain from moving have parents who
are the least likely to move using a voucher.
One explanation for this negative selection is that parents who invest more in human
59 This can occur under a potential outcomes model where Yji = µj(Xi) + Uj for j ∈ {0, 1} where µj(Xi)
is a general function of observables Xi and Uj represents unobservable determinants of potential outcomes
(Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil, 2001).
60 Appendix Figure A2 provides further details on the propensity score estimates and illustrates the propen-
sity score distributions for households in the lottery and demolition samples, respectively.
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capital or other margins may the most willing or able to move out of public housing. In
addition, moving to a neighborhood with lower poverty and less crime may substitute for
parenting effort or household resources. Interestingly, supplementary research of the MTO
evaluation provides suggestive evidence that parents living in public housing do compensate
and substitute parenting effort in response to concerns over neighborhood safety. Specifi-
cally, Kling, Liebman and Katz (2001) report that moving through MTO actually reduced
parents’ child monitoring intensity, presumably because treated parents felt safer in their
new neighborhood.
To provide further intuition for why reverse Roy selection could occur in the context of
a housing mobility program, Appendix A5 provides a stylized model in which neighborhood
safety and parenting effort (e.g., child monitoring) are substitutes in the production of child
outcomes. In the model, parents living in the same public housing project have different
perceptions about neighborhood safety while having identical preferences and resources. As
expected, parents who have the worst view of their neighborhood’s safety opt into a program
that provides vouchers. In an experimental setting, these parents will choose high parenting
effort when they are randomized into the control group, and this reduces the contrast between
treatment and control child outcomes. Intuitively, the model predicts larger treatment effects
for children of parents who would not seek vouchers because these non-volunteering parents
have relatively more optimistic perception of safety, and this view causes them to choose
lower parenting (child monitoring) effort.
Finally, it is worth highlighting that previous studies have found a similar pattern of
negative selection in education markets. Walters (2014) and Hastings, Kane and Staiger
(2006) examine school choice and academic performance in Boston and North Carolina,
finding that children who would have the highest gains from attending charters or other
high-quality schools are the least likely to seek these schooling options. Similarly, Kline and
Walters (2015) find that children who would have the largest test score gains from enrolling
in Head Start have a lower likelihood of participating.
1.10 Cost-Benefit Analysis
This section uses the results from Section 1.6 to provide back-of-the-envelope estimates
of the benefits and costs of relocating youth from project-based public housing assistance
using unrestricted Section 8 vouchers. These calculations are informative because we know
little about the optimal design of housing assistance (Olsen, 2003). Moreover, the fact that
the U.S. federal government currently spends $46 billion on housing assistance underscores
the need for a comparison of the relative efficiency of different housing assistance programs
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(Collinson, Ellen and Ludwig, 2015).61
To understand the earnings benefit of relocation, I use the reduced form estimate from
Table 1.3. Recall from Section 1.5 that these estimates reflect the impact of relocating using
a subsidized Section 8 housing voucher relative to the counterfactual of living in project-
based public housing. With this in mind, the estimates show that replacing project-based
assistance increased youth earnings by about $602, a 16 percent increase above the control
group mean.
Similar to Chetty, Hendren and Katz (2015), I translate the impact of relocation into
a predicted lifetime impact on income using the following assumptions: (1) the 16 percent
increase in annual income is constant over the lifecycle; (2) the lifecycle profile of income
for demolition participants follows the U.S. population average; (3) the real wage growth
rate is 0.5 percent; and (4) the discount rate is 3 percent, approximately the current 30-year
Treasury bond rate. Under these assumptions, moving youth out of public housing using
vouchers would increase pre-tax lifetime income by about $45,000. The present value of
this increase in lifetime income is about $12,000.62 For a family with two children, this
corresponds to a total family benefit of about $24,000.
In terms of cost, a variety of previous studies suggests that the direct fiscal cost of housing
voucher programs is much lower than the cost of project-based housing assistance (Olsen,
2014). This implies that housing authority payments for moving expenses were the main
direct cost of replacing project-based assistance with Section 8 vouchers.63 To the best of
my knowledge, there is no record on moving payments provided by the Chicago Housing
Authority. However, one way to get a sense of these costs is to look at the federal moving-
cost fixed payment schedule that the U.S. federal government uses to reimburse individuals
displaced by government projects such as highway construction. The fixed moving cost
payment is set at $1,100 for a furnished four bedroom apartment in the state of Illinois.64
Overall, this simple accounting suggests that relocating children from public housing is
likely to generate a high rate of return on investment since the value of increased lifetime
61 The $46 billion in expenditures on housing programs is more than twice the level of federal spending on
cash welfare and more than five times the amount spent on Head Start (Collinson, Ellen and Ludwig, 2015).
62 The estimate of the impact on lifetime income is calculated as follows. First, I calculate the mean of
individual pre-tax annual income for all working-age adults (age 19 to 65) from the 2000 Census. Next, I
apply a 0.5 percent wage growth rate, which yields an undiscounted sum of lifetime earnings for the average
American at $1.75 million. Average income for non-displaced (control) youth in my demolition sample is
about 16 percent of the average adult in the U.S. This implies that the estimated effect of relocation on
pre-tax undiscounted lifetime earnings is about $45,000 (= 0.16 × 0.16 × $1.75m). Note that all monetary
values are in 2012 dollars.
63 Unlike households in the MTO study, there were few supplemental services provided to families forced
to relocate due to building demolition (Jacob, 2004).
64 The fixed moving payment is determined by the number of furnished bedrooms and varies by state.
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earnings is about $24,000 for a family with two children and the main cost comes from moving
expenses which are most likely around $1,100 per family. Assuming that there is just a 10
percent increase in tax revenue for relocated children, this implies that the government
would save about $1,300 (= $24, 000 × 0.10 − $1, 100) per family. At the same time, it
is important to recognize that these cost-benefit calculations ignore any negative spillover
effects on residents of neighborhoods where displaced households move. In a neighborhood-
level study of demolition and crime, Aliprantis and Hartley (2015) found no detectable
increase in homicides for neighborhoods that received displaced individuals. However, there
were detectable increases in other types of crime such as assaults and property crime.65
1.11 Conclusion
This paper exploits public housing demolition as a natural experiment to study the
impact of growing up in a disadvantaged neighborhood. During the 1990s, the CHA selected
some public housing buildings for demolition while leaving other buildings untouched. This
event provides quasi-random variation in childhood environment because authorities selected
buildings for demolition for reasons unrelated to resident characteristics.
Importantly, the setting in this study provides a unique opportunity to study public
housing families who were not volunteers and were required to relocate. This contrasts
with the well-known MTO experiment that provided volunteering families with the option of
leaving public housing using vouchers. This optional feature of the MTO treatment is notable
because 75 percent of the (eligible) population targeted by MTO chose not to volunteer for
the experiment. While the MTO evaluation cannot speak to the effects of relocation for
these “never-takers”, there is no such compliance issue in the demolition sample because
nearly all displaced households relocate from public housing.
My analysis reveals that the benefits of relocation are more general than what one might
expect given estimates from MTO. I find that children displaced by public housing demolition
have notably better adult labor market outcomes compared to their non-displaced peers.
This positive impact is detectable regardless of the age at which a child’s family relocates.
This contrasts with analysis from MTO, which finds a positive impact only for children who
were young when their families moved (Chetty, Hendren and Katz, 2015).
One of the main contributions of this paper is to provide a new explanation to reconcile
findings in the neighborhood effects literature. On the one hand, a number of observational
65 Popkin et al. (2012) also studies the impact of public housing demolition and relocation on neighborhood-
level crime measures. Using different data and methodology relative to Aliprantis and Hartley (2015), Popkin
et al. (2012) find evidence that both violent and property crime increased in areas that received displaced
public housing residents.
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studies find a substantial positive correlation between child outcomes and measures of neigh-
borhood quality (Galster et al., 2007; Ellen and Turner, 1997). This pattern inspired a large
theoretical literature to support a causal interpretation of these estimates (e.g., Massey and
Denton (1993); Wilson (1987)). On the other hand, some have suggested that neighborhood
effects must be small in light of the lack of detectable improvement in outcomes for some
children who moved through the MTO experiment.
The empirical results presented in the present paper support the idea that the discrepancy
between observational studies and MTO exists because children whose families move through
voluntary mobility programs are negatively selected on the potential gains to treatment
(moving using a voucher). The lack of effects in Sanbonmatsu et al. (2011) suggests that
the large benefits of relocation detected in the present paper are driven by children whose
households had relatively low demand for moving out of public housing. This interpretation
is further supported by my analysis of the CHAC 1997 housing voucher lottery that occurred
in Chicago after the beginning of the demolitions. Similar to MTO, there are no detectable
benefits of moving using a voucher for children from households that volunteered and won the
CHAC 1997 lottery. The contrast in effects persists even after re-weighting the demolition
sample to match the observed characteristics in the lottery sample.
In terms of housing policy, this paper demonstrates that relocation of low-income families
from distressed public housing has substantial benefits for both children (of any age) and
government expenditures. I estimate that moving a child out of public housing using a
standard housing voucher would increase total lifetime earnings by about $45,000, which
has an equivalent present value of $12,000. In all likelihood, this will yield a net gain for
government budgets because there are negligible moving costs to relocating families and
housing vouchers have similar costs compared to project-based assistance.
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1.12 Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Density of Neighborhood Poverty for Displaced (Treated) and Non-displaced
(Control) Households
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Notes: This figure displays the density of the Census tract-level poverty rate for households (N = 2, 767) with at least one
child (age 7 to 18 at baseline) affected by demolition. Poverty rates for each household are duration-weighted averages over
all locations that a household lived since being displaced (treated) by housing demolition. Household location is tracked to
2009. The duration-weighted poverty rate for households that were displaced by demolition is shown in the solid red line, while
households from non-demolished buildings are shown in the dashed blue line.
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Figure 1.2: Difference in Neighborhood Poverty For Displaced and Non-displaced
Households by Post-Demolition Year
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Notes: This figure illustrates the change over time in the difference in neighborhood poverty rate between dis-
placed (treated) and non-displaced (control) households with children (age 7 to 18 at baseline). Specifically,
I plot (in solid black) the set of coefficients piy for y ∈ {0, · · · , 10} from the following specification:
pbpovhtp =
y=10∑
y=0
piy treath 1(t− t∗ = y) +
y=10∑
y=0
δy1(t− t∗ = y) + ψp + ht
where h indexes a household; t represents years; and p indexes projects. The dependent variable is the
percentage of residents living below the poverty line in a Census tract and ψp is a set of project fixed
effects. The variable t∗ represents the year of demolition for a particular household. Recall that public
housing demolitions occur from 1995-1998 in my sample. The variable treath is an indicator for treatment
(displaced) status. The data used with this specification is a panel for a particular household where the first
observation is the poverty rate based on the household’s address at the time of demolition (t∗). Hence, the
set of coefficients piy represent the difference in poverty rate between displaced (treated) and non-displaced
(control) households in a particular post demolition period (y). There are 2, 767 households in the sample.
The dashed gray lines in the figure also outline the 95-percent confidence interval for the year-specific point
estimates.
31
Figure 1.3: Labor-Market Treatment Effects for All Children by Age of Measurement
(a) Dependent Variable: Employed (=1)
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(b) Dependent Variable: Annual Earnings ($)
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Notes: The figures in Panels (a) and (b) display estimated treatment effects at adult ages for children (age 7 to 18 at
the time of demolition). Specifically, each point (red circles) is a coefficient αj ∀ j ∈ {19, . . . , 32} from the following specification:
yitp =
32∑
j=19
αjDi,b 1(agei,t = j) +X
′
iθ + ψp + δt + itp
where i is an individual; t indexes years; and p is a project. The terms δt and ψp are year and project fixed effects, respectively.
The dummy variable D takes a value of one if an individual was displaced by demolition. The main effects for the indicator
terms for individual age are included in the vector Xi. The area shaded in blue that surrounds the plotted coefficients covers
the 95-percent confidence interval for the age-specific point estimates. Note that age 32 is the last age observed for the oldest
children in the sample. All monetary units are in 2012 dollars.
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Figure 1.4: Younger vs Older Children: Labor-Market Treatment Effects by Age of
Measurement
(a) Dependent Variable: Employed (=1)
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Notes: The figures in Panels (a) and (b) display estimated treatment effects at adult ages for children affected by demolition.
Each figure presents two sets of results: estimates for younger (age < 13 at baseline) and older (age 13 to 18 at baseline) children
as solid red diamonds and solid blue squares, respectively. Each point plotted on the figure is a coefficient αj ∀ j ∈ {19, . . . , 26}
from the following specification:
yitp =
26∑
j=19
αjDi,b 1(agei,t = j) +X
′
iθ + ψp + δt + itp
where i is an individual; t indexes years; and p is a project. The terms δt and ψp are year and project fixed effects, respectively.
The dummy variable D takes a value of one if an individual was displaced by demolition. The main effects for the indicator
terms for individual age are included in the vector Xi. Note that the index only goes up to age 26 because this is the oldest age
of measurement observed for younger children (age < 13 at baseline). The dashed lines in the figures plot out the 95-confidence
intervals for each age-specific point estimate. All monetary units are in 2012 dollars.
33
Figure 1.5: Quantile Treatment Effects for Adult Earnings of Children
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Notes: This figure plots estimates of the quantile treatment effect on adult earnings outcomes for children (age 7 to 18 at
baseline) affected by public housing demolition. These estimates measure the treatment effect for particular percentiles of the
distribution of earnings. In other words, the quantile treatment effect estimate for the 60th percentile measures the difference
between the 60th percentile of the treated (displaced) and control (non-displaced) earnings distributions. The bars surrounding
each point estimate are the 95-percent confidence interval. Note that the lower bound of the x-axis on the figure is restricted
to the 60th percentile because a large fraction of earnings are equal to zero.
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Figure 1.6: Effects on Adult Employment of Children Across Studies
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Notes: This figure displays box and whisker plots of the effects on adult labor market participation for children (age 7 to 18 at
baseline) from different studies. The center of each box is the point estimate in each sample while the top and bottom of each
box represent effects that are one standard error above and below the point estimate. The top and the bottom of the whiskers
display the 95-percent confidence interval. The MTO evaluation provided vouchers to low-income households, and this figure
reports the treatment-on-the-treated effects (TOT) of vouchers as reported in Sanbonmatsu et al. (2011). Similarly, households
received vouchers if they were displaced by public housing demolition or if they won the CHAC 1997 housing lottery. The
demolition results are the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect which is equal to TOT effect of a voucher if all households displaced by
demolition used their voucher offer and none of the non-displaced households used a voucher. The CHAC lottery result is the
local average treatment effect (LATE) which is similar to a TOT because only a small fraction of the control group received
vouchers even if they did not win the CHAC 1997 lottery. The demolition and CHAC lottery samples contain 5, 246 and 4, 661
children, respectively. The MTO final evaluation has 3, 052 children in the sample for the labor market outcome analysis.
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Figure 1.7: Effects on Adult Earnings of Children Across Studies
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Notes: This figure displays box and whisker plots of the effects on adult earnings outcomes for children (age 7 to 18 at baseline)
from different studies. The center of each box is the point estimate in each sample while the top and bottom of each box
represent effects that are one standard error above and below the point estimate. The top and the bottom of the whiskers
display the 95-percent confidence interval. The MTO evaluation provided vouchers to low-income households, and this figure
reports the treatment-on-the-treated effects (TOT) of vouchers as reported in Sanbonmatsu et al. (2011). Similarly, households
received vouchers if they were displaced by public housing demolition or if they won the CHAC 1997 housing lottery. The
demolition results are the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect which is equal to TOT effect of a voucher if all households displaced by
demolition used their voucher offer and none of the non-displaced households used a voucher. The CHAC lottery result is the
local average treatment effect (LATE) which is similar to a TOT because only a small fraction of the control group received
vouchers even if they did not win the CHAC 1997 lottery. The demolition and CHAC lottery samples contain 5, 246 and 4, 661
children, respectively. The MTO final evaluation has 3, 052 children in the sample for the labor market outcome analysis.
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Figure 1.8: The Local Average Treatment Effect When the Fraction Induced to
Treatment Varies
(a) Positive Selection on Gains (Roy Style)
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(b) Negative Selection on Gains (Reverse Roy)
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Notes: Panels (a) and (b) display the local average treatment effect (LATE) as a function of the fraction
of the population that is induced to use a housing voucher. Panel (a) is drawn so that there is positive
selection on gains (ρ = −0.15), and treatment effects are largest for individuals who are most likely to take
the treatment. Panel (b) is drawn so that there is negative selection on gains (ρ = 0.15), and treatment
effects are larger for individuals who are less likely to take the treatment. The x-axis shows the fraction of
the public housing population that is induced to use a voucher (P(V = 1|O = 1)). The models depicted in
each panel show how the effects of vouchers in the demolition setting differ from findings from the MTO
evaluation. In the MTO context, few families within the targeted public housing population were induced
to use a voucher. In the demolition context, the fraction of families that used vouchers was higher because
the housing authority randomly selected buildings for demolition and voucher-use was effectively mandatory
for displaced families. See Section 1.9 for further details and discussion. Other parameters are set to the
following values in both panels: σ = 0.15, µ∆ = 0.25 and γ0 = 0.05.
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Table 1.2: Impact of Demolition on Neighborhood Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3 Years After Demolition 8 Years After Demolition
Control Mean
Difference:
Treated–Control,
Within Estimate
Control Mean
Difference:
Treated–Control,
Within Estimate
Household Has Address (=1) 0.777 0.01 0.656 0.007
[0.020] [0.020]
Restricted to Households with Address
Public Housing Address (=1) 0.549 -0.440** 0.105 -0.058*
[0.042] [0.033]
Distance from Baseline Address (miles) 1.993 1.409** 4.914 -0.447
[0.458] [0.419]
Tract Characteristics:
Black (%) 94.897 -2.563** 90.042 -0.82
[1.125] [1.230]
Below Poverty (%) 64.208 -12.929** 40.858 -1.571
[2.531] [1.884]
On Welfare (%) 57.153 -18.365** 34.821 -1.392
[2.164] [1.673]
Unemployed (%) 39.337 -12.422** 24.852 -2.363**
[1.497] [1.156]
Violent Crime (per 10,000) 68.855 -23.426** 30.801 3.236
[4.371] [2.547]
Property Crime (per 10,000) 103.247 -15.72 68.675 5.902
[10.122] [4.269]
N (Households) 2,767 2,767
N (Households with Address) 2,162 1,824
1
Notes: The unit of analysis in this table is a household with at least one child (age 7 to 18 at baseline). The table shows
the analysis of location and neighborhood characteristics in the years following public housing demolition for displaced and
non-displaced households. Location is measured using address data from IDHS social assistance case files. Some households
lack address data in the years following demolition because they are not on active social assistance cases. The control mean
statistics in Columns (1) and (3) refer to averages for non-displaced households. The mean difference between displaced and
non-displaced households three years after building demolition is reported in Column (2). This difference is computed from a
regression model where the dependent variable is a household location outcome (each row) measured three years after demolition
and the independent variables include an indicator for treatment (displaced) status and a set of project fixed effects. Column
(4) reports similar results where the location outcome is measured eight years after demolition. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the public housing building level. Neighborhood measures such as percent black, percent of residents below poverty
and percent on public assistance are measured at the tract level using Census 2000 data. Note that statistical significance is
denoted by: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.3: Impact of Demolition on Adult Labor Market Outcomes of Children
Panel Model Results
(1) (2)
Control Mean
Difference:
Treated-Control,
Within Estimate
Employed (=1) 0.419 0.040***
[0.014]
Employed Full Time (=1) 0.099 0.013**
[0.006]
Earnings $3,713.00 $602.27***
[153.915]
Earnings (> 0) $8,856.91 $587.56**
[222.595]
N (Obs.) 35,382
N (Individuals) 5,246
1
Notes: This table analyzes adult labor market outcomes for displaced (treated) and non-displaced (control) children (age 7 to
18 at baseline). The control mean statistic – Column (1) – refers to averages for non-displaced individuals. The mean difference
between displaced and non-displaced children is reported in Column (2). This difference is computed from a regression model
where a labor market outcome (each row) is the dependent variable for individual i in year t. The independent variables in the
regression include an indicator for treatment (displaced) status and a set of project fixed effects. See Equation 1.1 of the text
for more details. The indicator variable for “Employed Full Time” is based on whether an individual makes more than $14,000
in annual earnings – this is the equivalent of 35 hours a week at $8 per hour for 50 weeks. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the public housing building level. Note that statistical significance is denoted by: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Note that the analysis omits some observations (less than one percent) that are outliers in the distribution of earnings.
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Table 1.4: Impact of Demolition on Adult Labor Market Outcomes of Children By Sex
Panel Model Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Males Females
Control Mean
Difference:
Treated–Control,
Within Estimate
Control Mean
Difference:
Treated–Control,
Within Estimate
Employed (=1) 0.325 0.017 0.505 0.066***
[0.019] [0.014]
Employed Full Time (=1) 0.080 0.013 0.117 0.015*
[0.008] [0.008]
Earnings $2,946.51 $417.46* $4,416.94 $806.22***
[236.705] [188.520]
Earnings (>0) $9,55.43 $552.21 $8,739.53 $609.26**
[439.299] [274.111]
N (Obs.) 16,876 18,506
N (Individuals) 2,546 2,700
1
Notes: This table analyzes adult labor market outcomes for displaced (treated) and non-displaced (control) children (age 7 to 18
at baseline) by sex. The control mean statistics – Columns (1) and (3) – refer to averages for non-displaced children. The mean
difference between displaced and non-displaced children is reported in Column (2) for males and in Column (4) for females.
This difference is computed from a regression model where a labor market outcome (each row) is the dependent variable for
individual i in year t. The independent variables in the regression include an indicator for treatment (displaced) status and a
set of project fixed effects. The indicator variable for “Employed Full Time” is based on whether an individual makes more
than $14,000 in annual earnings – this is the equivalent of 35 hours a week at $8 per hour for 50 weeks. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the public housing building level. Note that statistical significance is denoted by: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05 and
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The analysis omits some observations (less than one percent) that are outliers in the distribution of earnings.
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Table 1.6: Impact on Labor Market Outcomes of Parents
Panel Model Results
(1) (2)
Control Mean
Difference:
Treated-Control,
Within Estimate
Employed (=1) 0.489 0.004
[0.015]
Employed Full Time (=1) 0.192 0.015
[0.013]
Earnings $6,281.49 $403.76
[335.892]
Earnings (>0) $12,836.39 $783.19
[478.826]
N (Obs.) 52,028
N (Individuals) 4,077
1
Notes: This table analyzes labor market outcomes for displaced and non-displaced parents defined as adults (age > 18 at
baseline) living in households with children affected by demolition. The control mean statistic – Column (1) – refers to averages
for non-displaced individuals. The mean difference between displaced and non-displaced households is reported in Column (2).
This difference is computed from a regression model where a labor market outcome (each row) is the dependent variable for
individual i in year t. The independent variables in the regression include an indicator for treatment (displaced) status and a
set of project fixed effects. See Equation 1.1 of the text for more details. The indicator variable for “Employed Full Time” is
based on whether an individual makes more than $14,000 in annual earnings – this is the equivalent of 35 hours a week at $8 per
hour for 50 weeks. Robust standard errors are clustered at the public housing building level. Note that statistical significance
is denoted by: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.8: CHAC 1997 Voucher Lottery and Re-Weighted Demolition Analysis
(a) Voucher Use and Mobility Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control
Mean
Treated Mean
p-value
Difference:
Treated–
Control
N
Leased Using CHAC 1997 Voucher 0.00 0.49 0.00 4,702
Leased Using Any Voucher 0.31 0.63 0.00 4,702
(b) Lottery Sample: Effect of Vouchers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control
Mean
Difference:
Treated-Control
(Reduced Form)
LATE
(2SLS)
Control
Complier
Mean
Employed (=1) 0.463 -0.008 -0.025 0.482
[0.013] [0.041]
Employed Full-Time (=1) 0.125 -0.003 -0.008 0.125
[0.008] [0.026]
Earnings $4,724.83 $3.04 $9.37 $4,586.11
[258.574] [794.805]
Earnings (>0) $10,214.81 $256.05 $788.83 $9,263.54
[380.898] [1173.760]
N (Obs.) 33,718 33,718
N (Individuals) 4,661 4,661
(c) Re-weighted Demolition Sample: Reduced Form Estimates
(1) (2)
Control
Mean
Difference:
Treated-Control
(Reduced Form)
Employed (=1) 0.430 0.060***
[0.015]
Employed Full-Time (=1) 0.105 0.013**
[0.005]
Earnings $3,891.26 610.087***
[125.687]
Earnings (>0) $9,058.31 $206.50
[225.969]
N (Obs.) 35,382
N (Individuals) 5,246
1
Notes: This table displays the results from analyzing the CHAC 1997 lottery and the re-weighted demolition sample. Panel (a)
describes household voucher use for households that signed up for the 1997 CHAC housing voucher lottery. Panel (b) analyzes
adult labor market outcomes for children (age 7 to 18 at baseline). The control mean statistic in Panel (b) Column (1) refers
to averages for children whose household did not win a voucher offer. The reduced form difference is calculated by regressing
the outcome (row) on an indicator for winning a voucher offer through the CHAC 1997 lottery. The 2SLS results are obtained
by estimating a first-stage where the dependent variable is an indicator for using any housing voucher and the instrument is an
indicator for winning a CHAC 1997 housing voucher. Panel (c) revisits the impact of mandatory relocation due to demolition
after re-weighting the demolition sample to match observed characteristics in the lottery sample. As explained in the text, I
use propensity score weights to achieve balance in observed characteristics between the two samples. Note that the indicator
variable for “Employed Full Time” is based on whether an individual makes more than $14,000 in annual earnings – this is the
equivalent of 35 hours a week at $8 per hour for 50 weeks. Robust standard errors are clustered at the public housing building
level. Note that statistical significance is denoted by: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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CHAPTER II
The Impact of Disadvantaged Peers: Evidence from
Resettlement After Public Housing Demolition
2.1 Introduction
Over the past 30 years, policymakers have sought to reduce concentrated poverty by
providing more than $6 billion to redevelop and demolish nearly 155,000 units of public
housing across the U.S. (GAO, 2007). As part of this process, city housing authorities have
provided housing vouchers to displaced public housing residents, many of whom have used
these vouchers to move to higher-income neighborhoods (GAO, 2003). This inflow of new
residents – many of whom, especially in large cities, relocate from housing projects which
have serious problems with violent crime and gang activity – has caused concern about the
possible impact on individuals already living in the areas that received displaced households.
Two key issues have hampered research on the effects of resettlement on residents living
in areas where households displaced by demolition relocated. First, displaced public housing
residents typically have some degree of choice over where they relocate. This complicates
analysis because differences in outcomes for individuals in resettlement and non-resettlements
areas may be caused by unobserved characteristics correlated with relocation choices. Sec-
ond, the few existing studies on resettlement rely on aggregate-level data, which prevents
researchers from analyzing any interactions (spillovers) between displaced residents and their
new neighbors. Effects on neighborhood-level outcomes could arise from the actions of dis-
placed residents rather than a change in behavior of existing residents.
In this paper, I test whether the arrival of displaced residents affects criminal activity of
children already living in resettlement neighborhoods by studying public housing demolition
in Chicago. During the mid-1990s, thousands of former public housing residents resettled
throughout the city after the housing authority began demolition of high-rise public housing.
To estimate the effects, I use an approach pioneered by Bayer, Ross and Topa (2008) and
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compare outcomes of children living on the same block as displaced residents with children
who live on nearby blocks.1 By comparing households living in close proximity, this strategy
attempts to minimize differences in pre-existing characteristics that may affect youth crime.
Novel administrative data from Illinois allow me to both track displaced households
and create a sample of children living in resettlement areas. Specifically, I use address
information in social assistance records to identify 7,363 public housing residents displaced
during the initial wave of Chicago’s public housing demolitions (1993-1998). I then identify
811 resettlement areas, defined as any Census block on which at least one displaced resident
lived one year after demolition. Next, I construct a treatment group of 25,668 children (18
years old or younger) receiving government assistance who lived on a resettlement block.
Finally, I again use the social assistance data to construct the comparison group of 37,726
children in low-income households located near a resettlement block.
Using arrest data linked to the social assistance records, my preferred estimates show
that children who lived on the same block as a displaced household are 7 percent more likely
to be arrested for property crimes in the years after resettlement. Notably, the analysis
also shows small and non-significant effects on the number of an individual’s violent or
drug crime arrests. Supplementary analysis provides suggestive evidence that the effects on
property crime are larger for children living near 13- to 24-year-old males displaced from
public housing.
While this finding of increased property crime is consistent with previous studies of
neighborhood and peer effects, the estimates in this paper help shed light on mechanisms.
Specifically, several studies exploit experimental or quasi-experimental variation in the as-
signment of individuals to neighborhoods or schools to provide evidence of causal effects on
criminal activity or risky behavior (Case and Katz, 1991; Kling, Ludwig and Katz, 2005;
Ludwig and Kling, 2007; Carrell and Hoekstra, 2010; Deming, 2011; Imberman, Kugler and
Sacerdote, 2012; Damm and Dustmann, 2014; Billings, Deming and Ross, 2016).2 By de-
sign, many of these interventions have limited ability to distinguish between the distinct
channels driving the effects. For instance, an individual’s criminal behavior may depend
on his classmates’ characteristics. These “endogenous” or “exogenous” effects are the stan-
dard mechanisms of social interaction Manski (1993). Alternatively, individuals in the same
neighborhood or classroom may have similar outcomes because they share the same insti-
tutional influences such as police or teacher quality. In Manski’s (1993) terminology, these
1 Specifically, Bayer, Ross and Topa (2008) provide evidence on the effects of job referrals by examining
whether individuals residing in the same city block are more likely to work together than those who live on
nearby blocks.
2 Another related literature shows that exposure to different peers within juvenile detention centers affects
recidivism (Bayer, Hjalmarsson and Pozen, 2009; Stevenson, 2015).
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are “correlated effects” and do not represent the impact of social interactions. Relative to
studies that examine the impact of a child changing neighborhoods and schools, estimating
the impact on individuals in resettlement areas speaks more forcefully to the role of social
interactions since the broader institutional environment may not change after a relatively
small number of displaced persons move into the community.3
In addition, this study also contributes to an active debate over the externalities asso-
ciated with housing assistance.4 Specifically, the effects on long-run property crime in this
paper complement previous neighborhood-level analysis of Chicago by Aliprantis and Hart-
ley (2015) which showed that resettlement of public housing households caused an increase
in crime rates for burglary, trespassing and gang activity in resettlement neighborhoods.5
The estimates in the current paper suggest that part of this increase in crime may be due to
peer effects for the youth living in resettlement areas. Interestingly, the results in both this
paper and Aliprantis and Hartley (2015) contrast somewhat with popular media accounts
which, at the time of demolition and resettlement, suggested that public housing demolition
led to increases in homicides (Rosin, 2008; Bovard, 2011).6
Overall, the increase in the number of property crimes among children who lived in reset-
tlement areas should be weighed against the benefits of relocating public housing households
from severely disadvantaged areas. The estimates in this paper suggest that there are 1.9
additional arrests for property crime after resettlement for every 1,000 children living on
blocks where displaced residents relocated.7 Offsetting this cost, both Chetty, Hendren and
Katz (2016) and Chyn (2015) find that relocation of children from public housing results in
large gains in adult labor market outcomes. Moreover, Chyn (2015) also finds that displaced
children experience a large and significant reduction in violent crimes arrests as adults, which
have far higher social costs than property crime.
3 Moffitt (2004) discusses the difficulty in separating environmental and social interaction effects within the
context of neighborhood relocation programs such as Moving to Opportunity (MTO). Damm and Dustmann
(2014) also address this point in their study of random assignment of refugees in Denmark. Their approach to
isolating social interaction effects relies on including neighborhood fixed effects and measures of time-varying
neighborhood characteristics to control for institutional and environmental factors.
4 Several papers cover a wide range of effects of housing assistance programs on crime. For example, Carr
and Koppa (2016) find that individuals who live in private market housing have increased rates of criminal
arrest for violent crime after receiving a Section 8 housing voucher. Freedman and Owens (2011) find that
the U.S. Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program reduces violent crime in poor neighborhoods.
5 Using different data and methodology than Aliprantis and Hartley (2015), Popkin et al. (2012) study the
impact of public housing demolition and relocation on neighborhood-level crime measures, and find evidence
that crime increased in areas that received displaced public housing residents.
6 Aliprantis and Hartley (2015) find no statistically significant effect of displacement on neighborhood-level
homicides; however, they do observe increases in arrests for assault and battery.
7 As detailed in Section 2.6, a back-of-the-envelope calculation using estimates from Lochner and Moretti
(2004) suggests the social cost of these additional crimes is about $370,000.
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2.2 Background
At the start of the 1990s, Chicago had 17 developments (also known as “projects”)
providing more than 40,000 units of apartment housing. Low-income households were eligible
to live in public housing if their income was at or below 50 percent of Chicago’s median
income. During this period, nearly all public housing residents were African-American, and
the majority of households were single-parent, female-headed households (Popkin et al.,
2000).
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) began demolish-
ing public housing in Chicago as a response to both serious issues in the city’s housing
management system and major changes in national housing policy. After decades of mis-
management, Popkin (2000) writes that the city’s public housing was “...among the worst in
the nation – poorly constructed, poorly maintained and extremely dangerous.” Yet, these
conditions in Chicago were mirrored elsewhere in the country: after visiting and investigat-
ing 21 U.S. cities, a Congressional committee identified 86,000 “severely distressed” units
of public housing that were physically deteriorating buildings and located in communities
plagued by high-levels of drug trafficking and violent crime (National Commission, 1992).
Reacting to these findings, Congress created the HOPE VI Urban Revitalization Demon-
stration (hereafter, HOPE VI) program in October 1992 to fund rehabilitation or building
demolition (GAO, 1997).
Bolstered by funding from the HOPE VI, the CHA closed and eventually demolished
54 high-rise buildings between 1993 and 1998 (Jacob, 2004). For displaced residents, the
CHA offered Section 8 housing vouchers that subsidized rent in private market housing.8,9
Alternatively, displaced households could request a transfer to another public housing unit,
pending availability. Notably, for households seeking to use a voucher, the CHA did not
provide relocation counseling during this initial wave of demolition.
Although official statistics on relocation outcomes from the mid-1990s are not available,
existing studies suggest that a large fraction of Chicago’s displaced public housing families
relocated to private market housing. Jacob (2004) identifies 3,500 displaced children in
administrative school records and finds that about 60 percent were living in private market
housing three years after demolition. Similarly, Aliprantis and Hartley (2015) use credit
8 Prior to the CHA demolitions, public housing households could not access housing vouchers because the
CHA stopped taking requests in 1985 (Jacob, Kapustin and Ludwig, 2014).
9 Typically, the voucher subsidy is equal to the difference between the gross rent and the family’s required
rent contribution, which is 30 percent of adjusted income. An exception to this is when the gross rent exceeds
the local Fair Market Rent (FMR). During the 1990s, the FMR was equal to the 40th percentile of the local
private market rent distribution. Note that the CHA allowed families to keep the voucher as long as they
remained eligible for assistance.
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report data to track about 700 displaced households and find that, in the third year after
demolition, 55 percent lived in Census blocks that did not contain any public housing.
2.2.1 Expected Effects of Displaced Households on New Neighbors
Presumably, social interactions are the primary mechanism by which former public hous-
ing households could affect the behavior of their new neighbors. In a simple linear model,
the context of the present paper suggests that social interaction effects would be negative,
especially for criminal behavior which is the focus of the present paper. This prediction
stems from the fact that residents of Chicago’s public housing developments lived in ex-
tremely disadvantaged neighborhoods as is evident from the neighborhood statistics in Ta-
ble 1. Specifically, Column (2) shows that residents of demolished public housing lived in
high-poverty areas where the rate of violent crime was about three times higher than the
city’s average.
Although research testing specifically for social interactions in neighborhood settings is
relatively limited, the empirical evidence thus far confirms this as a mechanism for criminal
activity.10 For example, Damm and Dustmann (2014) find that immigrant children in Den-
mark grow up to commit more crime if they are (quasi-randomly) assigned to neighborhoods
with high levels of youth crime. To support the interpretation of these effects as social inter-
actions, they show that their results are robust to the inclusion of neighborhood fixed effects
and a number of controls for other time-varying neighborhood measures. In other relevant
work studying children in North Carolina, Billings, Deming and Ross (2016) find that youth
who live in the same neighborhood and attend the same school are much more likely to be
arrested for committing the same crime together.
2.3 Data
I use multiple administrative sources to test whether households displaced by demo-
lition increased long-run criminal behavior among children living in their new neighbor-
hoods. Specifically, I first create a sample of public housing residents displaced by public
housing demolition by merging building records from the CHA with social assistance (i.e.,
TANF/AFDC, Food Stamp and Medicaid) case files (1989-2009) from the Illinois Depart-
ment of Human Services (IDHS). Using the panel of addresses in the assistance case files, I
10 As discussed in the introduction, a number of prominent studies examine criminal behavior in natural
experiments which randomly assign individuals to neighborhoods or schools. By design, these papers are
usually unable to separate the effects of social interactions from broader features of the neighborhood or
schooling environment.
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identify the Census blocks to which at least one displaced resident moved.11,12 Next, I create
a sample of low-income non-displaced children (age 18 or younger) living on the same block as
displaced households by merging the list of resettlement blocks with the social assistance case
files. To estimate the effect of resettlement, I construct a comparison group from children in
the social assistance files who live on a non-resettlement block that is within one-quarter of
a mile of a resettlement block. To analyze children’s outcomes, I link the samples of reset-
tlement and comparison group children to arrest records from the Illinois State Police. The
police data are linked to the social assistance case files using identifiers created by Chapin
Hall at the University of Chicago, a research institute and leader in administrative-data
linking. In what follows, I describe my sample and the data construction in more detail.
2.3.1 Sample of Demolished Public Housing Buildings
The analysis in this paper studies the resettlement of residents displaced by public housing
closures and demolitions that occurred in from 1993 to 1998.13 Specifically, the identity and
date of demolition for these buildings is obtained from Jacob (2004) who determined the
year of closure by examining CHA administrative data on building occupancy supplemented
by qualitative sources. Note that focusing on this particular period (1993 to 1998) allows me
to examine criminal activity for children over a number of years after resettlement occurs.
In total, there are 54 buildings that were closed during this initial wave of selective building
demolition.
To identify areas where resettlement occurred, I create a sample of households living in
public housing selected for demolition and examine their addresses after relocating. Creating
this sample requires linking the list of demolished buildings with social assistance case files
using exact street address information contained in both files. With this linked data, the
sample I study is the set of welfare recipients who have a street address that matches the
building sample in the year prior to demolition. Under this definition, the assistance data
contains 7,363 adults and children on who were displaced by public housing demolition and
can be tracked for at least one post-demolition year. These households relocated to 811
blocks immediately after demolition. Consistent with previous research on public housing
demolition in Chicago, Table 2.1 shows that the resettlement blocks identified in the IDHS
data are low-income areas which have notably high rates of violent and property crime
(Popkin et al., 2002; Jacob, 2004; Popkin et al., 2004; Aliprantis and Hartley, 2015).
11 Note that Census blocks correspond roughly to actual city blocks.
12 This data construction implies that I can track displaced residents only if they remain on forms of social
assistance after building demolition occurs.
13 Following Jacob (2004), I designate a building with more than 75 units as a high-rise.
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2.3.2 Sample of Low-Income Children Living in Resettlement Areas
My analysis studies a sample of low-income children who lived in areas of Chicago where
resettlement of displaced households occurred. Specifically, I begin by creating a treatment
group based on matching the list of 811 resettlement blocks to a panel of addresses listed
in social assistance case files from the IDHS. From the merged panel, I find 25,668 children
whose household matched to a resettlement block in the year prior to resettlement.14 Note
that by focusing on the year before resettlement, the sample definition is unrelated to any
subsequent effects on neighborhood composition. Next, I create a comparison group of
children by returning to the IDHS panel of addresses and merging the data with a list of the
2,297 non-resettlements blocks in the city of Chicago that are within one-quarter mile of a
resettlement block. As discussed in greater detail in Section 2.4, the outcomes for the set of
37,726 comparison group children will serve as the counterfactual for inferring the effects of
living on a resettlement block near displaced public housing residents. I link this sample of
non-displaced children to individual-level data from the Illinois State Police that contain all
arrests up to the first quarter of 2012.
Figure 2.1 presents hypothetical Census blocks to illustrate the definition of the sample
of children living in resettlement areas. Different types of households on social assistance
with children are represented by colored dots. There is one resettlement block based on
the location of a single displaced household. Children living on this resettlement block (red
dots) are the treated group. Children who live on non-resettlement blocks are included in
my analysis (green dots) only if they live within one-quarter of a mile of the resettlement
block. All non-resettlement area children in the IDHS data that live outside the one-quarter
mile radius (black dot) are not included in the analysis.
2.4 Empirical Strategy and Interpretation
The main question in this paper is whether children who grew-up near resettled public
housing residents are more likely to engage in criminal behavior later in life. If resettlement
of households were random, I would be able to answer this question simply by comparing
children who lived on the same block as a displaced household to all other children. However,
Column (4) of Table 2.1 shows that the resettlement of former public housing residents
appears to be far from random. For example, former public housing residents moved to
areas with much lower income and higher rates of crime relative to areas that did not receive
any public housing residents. This pattern of neighborhood sorting suggests that children in
14 To be clear, the sample of children in this analysis are age 18 or younger in the year that resettlement
occurred in their area.
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resettlement and non-resettlement areas are likely to have different unobserved characteristics
that may be correlated with later-life outcomes.
To attempt to minimize differences in unobserved characteristics, I use an approach
pioneered by Bayer et al. (2008) and compare outcomes of children who lived on resettlement
blocks to those who lived in nearby blocks which did not receive any displaced households.
Specifically, my main specification models criminal behavior observed over adulthood for
individual i living on block b as follows:
yib = θDb + βXi + µr + ib (2.1)
where the dependent variable yib is the total number of arrests for different types of offenses
observed in my sample. Alternatively, I also conduct analysis where the measure of crime
is an indicator for having at least one arrest. The key variable in Equation 2.1 is Db which
is an indicator for whether individual i lived on a block where displaced public housing
residents resettled. Importantly, the reference group fixed effect µr is included to control
for area-specific effects – that is, this is the baseline probability of committing a crime for
children who grew up in the nearby, non-resettlement blocks surrounding block b. Note
that I define the reference group as individuals residing in non-resettlement blocks that are
within one-quarter of a mile of a resettlement block. Finally, the vector Xi includes controls
for race, gender and parental criminal history (measured before resettlement) to control for
differences in background characteristics.
In this specification, the key concern for interpreting estimates of the parameter θ is is
whether there is a correlation between residency on blocks with displaced households and
unobserved determinants of criminal behavior ib after conditioning on reference group fixed
effects and observed background characteristics. As discussed by Bayer, Ross and Topa
(2008), there is likely to be little difference between households within a narrowly defined
reference group if the housing market is relatively thin. Within the context of this paper, the
scarcity of housing within each block group would make it relatively difficult for displaced
households to sort to specific blocks in the aftermath of public housing demolition.
To shed light on the internal validity of this research design and residential sorting pat-
terns, I examine background characteristics of both adults and children that resided in
blocks that received displaced households and the reference group of nearby, non-resettlement
blocks.15 Column (4) and (6) of Table 2.2 provides estimates from a regression where the
dependent variable is a measure of demographic characteristics or past criminal history re-
gressed on an indicator for living on a resettlement block and reference group fixed effects.
15 Note that while adults are not the focus of my main analysis, an examination of their characteristics
still provides insight on whether resettlement and non-resettlement areas are comparable.
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If the relocation pattern of displaced households was random within the narrowly specified
reference group, we would expect that the coefficient on the indicator for living on a resettle-
ment block would be zero. There are two notable findings in these results. First, there are
some detectable differences in demographic characteristics, but these effects are substantively
small in magnitude. For example, adults in resettlement areas are only about 1 percent more
likely to be African American than residents of nearby, non-resettlement areas. Second, the
results show that there are never any detectable differences in criminal background between
individuals living on resettlement and nearby non-resettlement blocks.16 This shows there is
no evidence that residents of resettlement blocks lived in areas with greater levels of resident
criminality. Overall, these results suggest that children in resettlement and non-resettlement
areas may have similar unobserved characteristics because there is little evidence of sort-
ing of displaced public housing residents. As foreshadowed in Equation 2.1, the analysis
that follows includes background characteristics to control for differences in demographic
characteristics.
2.5 Results
Table 2.3 shows the results from estimating versions of Equation 2.1 using data on the
sample of children living in resettlement and nearby, non-resettlement neighborhoods. Col-
umn (2) and Column (3) present estimates from specifications with and without controls for
background characteristics, respectively. Each row provides results for a different type of
criminal arrest record.
The estimates in Panel A show that resettlement of public housing households signifi-
cantly increased property crime arrests: children who lived on blocks with displaced public
households have about 7 percent more total arrests for property crime in the years following
relocation. There are no detectable effects for violent or drug crime arrests and the point
estimates are small relative to the mean rate of arrests in the comparison group shown in
Column (1). In Panel B, I also estimate the effect of resettlement where the dependent
variable is a binary indicator of ever having a given type of criminal arrest in my sample
of post-resettlement years. The results show that relocation also significantly increased the
extensive margin of criminal activity for both property (5 percent) and drug crime (3 per-
cent). Note that there is little change in the estimates after adding background controls for
16 As evident in Table 2.2, there are few baseline (juvenile age) arrests for children in the analysis sample.
Prior to 1998, the arrest data for juveniles in the ISP data is limited to serious felonies. This implies that
baseline criminal activity of children (not adults) is incomplete. However, it is important to note that for the
main analysis of post-resettlement crime that the ISP data is complete after 1998: revisions in the Illinois
Juvenile Court Act allowed for the submission of juvenile misdemeanor arrests into the ISP database.
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the full specification in Column (3).
Interestingly, this finding of an increase in property crime has a parallel in Chyn (2015)
which studies the long-run behavior of displaced children. Comparing displaced and non-
displaced public housing children, Chyn (2015) finds that displaced children commit about
17 percent more property crime. This evidence of increased property crime lends credibility
to the possibility that displaced children may have been “partners in crime” with their new
peers who lived in resettlement areas. Due to data limitations, I am unable to directly test
for this phenomenon; however, recent research on criminal partnerships by Billings, Deming
and Ross (2016) using detailed data from North Carolina reveals that children who live in
close proximity and attend the same school are more likely to be arrested for the exact same
crime.
The results in Table 2.4 explore the possibility of heterogeneous effects of resettlement.
Given that previous research has detected notable differences in the effects of neighborhoods
by sex, Columns (2) and (4) provide effects for males and females, respectively (Kling,
Ludwig and Katz, 2005; Damm and Dustmann, 2014). There are two notable results in
this analysis. First, the effects for property crime in Table 2.3 appear to be driven by the
impact on males. Second, the results pooling males and females obscure significant increase
in drug arrests for females. The point estimate represents a 16 percent increase relative to
the comparison group mean for females.
To analyze the impact for children of different ages at the time of resettlement, Panel (B)
of Table 2.4 shows results for younger (less than 13) and older (ages 13 to 18) in Columns
(1) and (2). Examining the point estimates shows that there are only detectable effects on
criminal activity for older children. The lack of effects for younger children is perhaps not
surprising given that household mobility in this sample is relatively high over a sufficiently
long window which would limit the possibility of social interactions between children and
displaced households. For example, supplementary analysis (not presented) shows that after
3 years 44 percent of resettlement area children (who are reported on subsequent social
assistance case records) have moved.17
As a final exercise to shed further light on resettlement effects, I examine whether there is
heterogeneity across blocks where displaced young males did and did not resettle. Table 2.5
provides results from estimating a modified specification version of Equation 2.1. The key
addition to my basic model is an indicator for living on a (treated) block with displaced
17 To examine mobility behavior, I use a panel of address records in social assistance case files. By definition,
an address is only available for children whose household receives some form of social assistance such as
foodstamps, TANF or Medicaid. Three years after resettlement, I find that 52 percent of children in the
analysis sample have an address in the social assistance case files. For subsequent post-resettlement years,
the number of resettlement sample children in the address records declines notably.
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households which has young (age 13 to 25) males. The model also includes: an indicator
for living on a (treated) block with displaced households which have young females (and
no males), and (2) an indicator for living on a (treated) block with displaced households
that do not have any young members. As in previous analyses, the omitted group in this
specification is a child who lives on a non-resettlement block that is within one-quarter mile
of a resettlement block.
The results in Table 2.5 provide suggestive evidence that the effect of resettlement is larger
in areas where displaced households with a young male resettled. At the same time, these
results should be assessed cautiously the lack of precision of the estimates. In particular, I
am unable to reject the null hypothesis that the effects of resettlement are the same in blocks
with young displaced males and without any young displaced persons (p-value = 0.173).
2.6 Conclusion
This paper examines whether displaced public housing residents had adverse effects on
criminal behavior of children living in their new neighborhood using novel administrative
data from Illinois. Following the initial wave of demolitions that occurred in Chicago during
the mid-1990s, displaced households tended to resettle in relatively low-income and high-
crime areas. This sorting pattern suggests that children who lived in resettlement areas may
have different unobserved characteristics than children who lived elsewhere in the city.
To minimize the differences in unobserved characteristics, I rely on an identification strat-
egy pioneered by Bayer, Ross and Topa (2008) and compare children who lived on city blocks
where resettlement occurred to their peers living in nearby, non-resettlement blocks. To sup-
port the validity of this empirical design, I show that there are few detectable differences in
the characteristics of adults and children prior to the resettlement of former public housing
residents. Most importantly, there are no detectable differences in past criminal histories of
adults which suggests that children living in resettlement areas did not live in notably worse
criminal environments.
Analyzing administrative data on arrests in the years after resettlement suggests that
children who lived on resettlement blocks had about 7 percent more property crime arrests.
There are also small increases in the likelihood of ever being arrested for property or drug
crimes. Importantly, the effects for both the intensive and extensive margin of violent crime
are small and never statistically significant.
Supplementary analysis supports the idea that the effects detected in this paper are
driven by social interactions between children in resettlement areas and displaced public
housing households. Two pieces of evidence support this interpretation. First, the effects of
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living on a resettlement block are largest for adolescents (age 13 to 18) rather than younger
children who are likely to have moved away from the resettlement block by the time they
became old enough to become involved with criminal activity. Second, the analysis provides
suggestive evidence that the effects on property crime are larger on resettlement blocks with
displaced young (age 13 to 25) males.
The negative effects of resettlement on criminal behavior of children living in resettlement
areas imply that policy-makers face tradeoffs in decisions that affect the distribution of low-
income households that receive housing assistance. Previous research by Chetty, Hendren
and Katz (2016) and Chyn (2015) suggests that policies that reduce exposure to low-poverty,
high-crime environments may positively affect the long-run labor market and criminal out-
comes of disadvantaged children. The results in this paper suggest that these benefits come
at a price: for every 1,000 children living in resettlement areas, the main estimates suggest
there are 1.9 additional arrests for property crime.
Overall, a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the social costs of these
negative peer effects for resettlement area children are small relative to benefits that accrue
to society from relocating displaced households. Based on Lochner and Moretti (2004), the
social cost of burglary (the most expensive form of property crime) is $987. Using data from
the 2000 Census, there are 200,000 total children living on resettlement blocks, and this
implies that the social cost of effects on property crime is about $370,000. Compensating for
these negative effects is the finding from Chyn (2015) which shows there are about 100 fewer
arrests for violent crime for every 1,000 children that relocates from disadvantaged public
housing. Since violent crimes have the highest social cost, the benefits from relocating public
housing households appear to more than offset the costs.18
18 Using to estimates from Lochner and Moretti (2004), the social costs per incident of assault (the least
costly form of violent crime) is $9,917.
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2.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Hypothetical Census Blocks and Sample of Children
Displaced Household 
Treated Child Household 
Child Household Not Included in Analysis 
Control Child Household 
Resettlement Census Block 
Notes: This figure shows hypothetical Census blocks to illustrate the definition of the sample used in my analysis. The colored
circles represent different types of households on social assistance with children. There is a single displaced public housing
household, and the block of their address is the resettlement block. All non-displaced children living on the resettlement block
are the treatment group. Only non-displaced children who live on nearby (within one-quarter of a mile) non-resettlement blocks
are included as controls in my analysis.
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Table 2.1: Comparing Resettlement and Non-Resettlement Areas of ChicagoTable 1. Comparing Resettle ent and Non-Resettlement Areas of Chicago 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
All Demolition Non-Resettlement Resettlement 
Total Population 1,267.80 770.54 1,331.76 1,122.29 
 
[860.434] [915.604] [827.047] [915.772] 
% Black 0.31 0.84 0.13 0.72 
 
[0.402] [0.248] [0.253] [0.368] 
% Govt. Assistance 0.06 0.24 0.03 0.13 
 
[0.088] [0.179] [0.041] [0.118] 
% Below Poverty 0.14 0.44 0.08 0.28 
 
[0.152] [0.287] [0.083] [0.181] 
Average Family Size 3.38 3.72 3.30 3.57 
 
[0.553] [0.618] [0.505] [0.612] 
Median HH Income $48,111.09 $27,222.91 $55,185.47 $32,017.55 
 
[25,094.913] [28,590.478] [24,203.411] [18,897.718] 
Violent Crime (per 10,000) 26.55 77.31 11.80 39.81 
 
[24.041] [31.629] [9.758] [25.314] 
Property Crime (per 10,000) 80.60 156.13 59.02 100.00 
 
[154.036] [63.445] [41.202] [206.790] 
N (Census Block Groups) 4,241 46 2,946 1,295 
 
Notes: This table displays averages and standard deviations (in brackets) for neighborhoods in Chicago. All statistics are measured at 
the block group level and come from the 2000 Decennial Census. Each column contains a different sample of block groups: Column 
(1) presents statistics for all block groups in Chicago; Column (2) presents statistics for block groups where public housing 
demolition occurred from 1993-1998; Column (3) shows block groups where no displaced public housing residents resettled; 
Column (4) presents statistics for block groups where displaced public housing residents resettled in the year after demolition. Block 
groups are identified as having resettlement based on tracking addresses in social assistance case files. Note that Census statistics are 
not publicly available at the individual block-level. 
 
  
Notes: This table displays averages and standard deviations (in brackets) for neighborhoods in Chicago. All statistics are
measured at the block group level and come from the 2000 Decennial Census. Each column contains a different sample of block
groups: Column (1) presents statistics for all block groups in Chi ago; Column (2) pr sents statistics for block groups where
public housing demolition occu red fro 1993-1998; Column (3) shows bl k groups where no di placed public hou ing residents
resettled; Column (4) presents statistics for block groups where displaced public housing residents resettled in the year after
demolition. Block groups are identified as having resettlement based on tracking addresses in social assistance case files. Note
that Census statistics are not publicly available at the individual block-level.
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Table 2.3: Effect of Resettlement on CrimeTable 3. Effect of Resettlement on Crime 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Non-
Resettlement 
Comparison 
Group, Children 
(Age 18 or Less) 
Diff., Within 
Estimate,                     
No Controls 
Diff., Within 
Estimate,      
Controls 
Panel A. 
   # Violent Arrests 0.545 -0.001 -0.003 
  
[0.012] [0.011] 
# Property Arrests 0.265 0.019** 0.019** 
  
[0.008] [0.008] 
# Drug Arrests 0.95 0.013 0.01 
  
[0.023] [0.022] 
Panel B. 
   Ever Violent Arrest (=1) 0.271 -0.002 -0.003 
  
[0.004] [0.004] 
Ever Property Arrest (=1) 0.162 0.008** 0.008** 
  
[0.003] [0.003] 
Ever Drug Arrest (=1) 0.253 0.008* 0.007* 
  
[0.004] [0.004] 
N (Individuals) 38,304 63,282 63,282 
 
Notes: This table presents results from Equation (1) where the dependent variable is a measure of total 
arrests or ever being arrested computed during in my sample of post-resettlement years. Crime 
measures are based on Illinois State Police data which is comprehensive up to the first quarter of 2012. 
The specification includes fixed effects for "reference groups". Reference groups are defined as a 
specific resettlement block and all non-resettlement blocks that are within one-quarter of a mile of this 
resettlement block. Under this definition, all individuals living in non-resettlement blocks may be 
members of multiple reference groups. The data is structured such that these children have one 
observation per reference group. Standard errors are computed via a pairwise bootstrap procedure 
(Reps=500) and clustered at the reference group level. Appendix Section 2 provides robustness checks 
that show that the results are not sensitive to limiting the sample to one observation per child who is a 
member of multiple reference groups. 
 
  
Notes: This table presents results from Equation 2.1 where the dependent variable is a measure of total arrests or ever being
arrested computed during in my sample of post-resettlement years. Crime measures are based on Illinois State Police data
which is comprehensive up to the first quarter of 2012. The specification includes fixed effects for “reference groups”. Reference
groups are defined as a specific resettlement block and all non-resettlement blocks that are within one-quarter of a mile of
this resettlement block. Under this definition, all individuals living in non-resettlement blocks may be members of multiple
reference groups. The data is structured such that these children have one observation per reference group. Standard errors
are computed via a pairwise bootstrap procedure (Reps=500) and clustered at the reference group level.
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Table 2.4: Effect of Resettlement on Crime, by SubgroupTable 4. ffect of Resettlement on Crime, by Subgroup 
 
Panel A. Effects by Sex 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Males Females 
 
Non-
Resettlement 
Comparison 
Group, Children 
(Age 18 or Less) 
Diff., Within 
Estimate,      
Controls 
Non-
Resettlement 
Comparison 
Group, Children 
(Age 18 or Less) 
Diff., Within 
Estimate,      
Controls 
# Violent Arrests 0.822 -0.011 0.283 0.011 
  
[0.018] 
 
[0.010] 
# Property Arrests 0.319 0.031** 0.213 0.009 
  
[0.012] 
 
[0.010] 
# Drug Arrests 1.751 0.002 0.191 0.031** 
  
[0.039] 
 
[0.016] 
N (Individuals) 18,713 30,845 19,591 32,437 
          
Panel B. Effects by Baseline Age of Children 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Younger Children (Age < 13) Adolescents (13 - 18) 
 
Non-
Resettlement 
Comparison 
Group, Children 
(Age 18 or Less) 
Diff., Within 
Estimate,      
Controls 
Non-
Resettlement 
Comparison 
Group, Children 
(Age 18 or Less) 
Diff., Within 
Estimate,      
Controls 
# Violent Arrests 0.531 0.006 0.564 -0.01 
  
[0.016] 
 
[0.014] 
# Property Arrests 0.264 0.013 0.266 0.027** 
  
[0.010] 
 
[0.012] 
# Drug Arrests 0.837 -0.021 1.09 0.058* 
  
[0.027] 
 
[0.032] 
N (Individuals) 21,170 34,743 17,134 28,539 
Notes: This table presents results from an augmented version of Equation 2.1 where the dependent variable is a measure of
total arrests. Panel A provides results which include interactions between an indicator for living on a resettlement block and
indicators for the sex of the individual. Panel B provides results which include interactions between an indicator for living
on a resettlement block and the age group for the child based on age at the time of resettlement. Crime measures are based
on Illinois State Police data which is comprehensive up to the first quarter of 2012. The specification includes fixed effects
for “reference groups”. Reference groups are defined as a specific resettlement block and all non-resettlement blocks that are
within one-quarter of a mile of this resettlement block. Under this definition, all individuals living in non-resettlement blocks
(the comparison group) may be members of multiple reference groups. The data is structured such that these children have one
observation per reference group. Standard errors are computed via a pairwise bootstrap procedure (Reps=500) and clustered
at the reference group level.
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CHAPTER III
Peers and Motivation at Work: Evidence from an
Experiment in Malawi
From a work with Lasse Brune and Jason Kerwin
3.1 Introduction
Social scientists and policymakers have a long-standing interest in understanding how
peers shape an individual’s behavior. A key question is whether peers affect productivity in
the workplace. The answer to this question has particular importance for determining the
optimal allocation of labor and designing firm incentives.
While an emerging literature provides compelling evidence that peer effects exist in work-
place settings, the mechanisms behind these peer effects are less clear.1 Several studies show
worker effort is sensitive to social pressure that arises in settings where there are externalities
from effort due to joint production and team compensation (Mas and Moretti, 2009; Gould
and Winter, 2009; Kaur, Kremer and Mullainathan, 2010; Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul,
2010; Babcock et al., 2015; Cornelissen, Dustmann and Scho¨nberg, 2013).2 Yet few studies
test whether peer effects on productivity may also arise from mechanisms such as motivation
or norms – channels not directly controlled by firms.
This paper provides new evidence on the mechanisms that drive workplace peer effects
by conducting a unique field experiment with an agricultural firm. We partner with a tea
estate in Malawi to randomly allocate about 1,000 piece-rate workers to different locations
on tea fields. Each worker is assigned a specific plot area to pick tea leaves each day, and
1 See Herbst and Mas (2015) for additional discussion and a list of previous studies on peer effects in the
workplace.
2 Another well-studied channel for workplace peer effects is knowledge spillovers (i.e., learning). Notable
studies testing for this form of peer effect include the following: Waldinger (2012); Azoulay, Zivin and Wang
(2010); Jackson and Bruegmann (2009); Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009).
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our design creates exogenous, within-worker variation in the composition of plot neighbors.
We focus on estimating the effect of the average of peers’ ability (permanent productivity)
on workers’ output.
Importantly, several aspects of this setting allow us to test for the existence of social
influences on worker’s performance that are unrelated to spillovers in the production process
or in the compensation scheme. Unlike much of the previous work examining peer effects,
workers in our setting are paid piece rates, and there is no cooperation in the process of
collecting tea. Hence, any impact of peers on productivity in our setting is likely to be
due to learning or psychological mechanisms related to “motivation” (e.g., self-control or
norms).3
We find that a worker’s daily volume of tea collected is affected by the average ability
(i.e. permanent productivity) of his or her coworkers that are located nearby. Increasing the
average ability of coworkers by 10 percent raises a tea worker’s productivity by about 0.5
percent. In terms of the previous literature, Mas and Moretti (2009) and Falk and Ichino
(2006) find effects that are about twice as large in very different settings.
In addition to our main estimates on the effects of mean peer productivity, we also test for
non-linear peer effects. We find notable heterogeneity in the effects on productivity, which
is consistent with the broader peer effects literature despite the markedly different contexts
(Sacerdote, 2001; Falk and Ichino, 2006; Carrell, Fullerton and West, 2009; Mas and Moretti,
2009; Carrell, Sacerdote and West, 2013; Cornelissen, Dustmann and Scho¨nberg, 2013). The
least able workers are the most responsive to the average ability of their peers, while there
is no detectable impact of peer productivity on higher-ability workers. This pattern of
heterogeneity is notable because it suggests that there is potential for aggregate gains for
the firm from sorting workers to ensure that the able workers are near higher ability peers.
These estimates differ from Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2010) who studied peer effects
among U.K. fruit-farm piece-rate employees who are friends. They find evidence that having
a higher ability friend nearby increases a workers’ productivity. Similarly, workers have
lower productivity when they work near lower-ability friends. They argue that workers’
desire to socialize with their friends is the driver of this pattern of peer effects between
friends.4 In contrast, we measure peer effects from all co-workers, not just for friends.
While we find similar conformism patterns (for all but the highest productivity workers),
3 In our setting, it is also possible that workers may synchronize their productivity and effort in an attempt
to socialize with other workers nearby. We discuss and provide evidence against this hypothesis in greater
detail in our analysis.
4 Park (2015) also provides evidence that manufacturing workers value socializing with their friends despite
such interactions resulting in earnings losses. In this case, peer effects due to socializing are associated
with compensating differentials: workers forgo monetary compensation to enjoy non-pecuniary benefits of
socializing with their friends.
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our analysis suggests that socialization is unlikely to be an important mechanism in our
setting. Using data on workers’ social networks, we find that friends have no detectable
impact on productivity while there are positive and significant effects for non-friends.
To learn more about the mechanisms driving the peer effects in our setting, we conduct
a choice experiment to measure demand for working next to specific peers. We conduct a
survey of a subset of employees in the season following our first experiment and implement
an incentivized choice experiment. We find that 71 percent of respondents state they would
prefer having a high-productivity co-worker nearby if re-assignment were possible. When
asked for the main reason for their choices in an open-ended question 79 percent workers
state that the higher-productivity peers provide motivation. Moreover, workers are willing
to pay for faster peers. We give workers the option to exchange all or part of the respondent
gift that they receive for taking the survey (two bars of soap) in order to be re-assigned next
to a high-productivity co-worker. Among those who stated a preference for being reassigned
next to a fast plucker, 71 percent are willing to give up one bar and 55 percent are willing
to give up two bars of soap - equivalent to 18 percent of average daily earnings. Our choice
experiment also allows workers to pay to work next to any other worker of their choice, but
almost none of them do so. This indicates that workers place value specifically on having
high-ability coworkers, rather than on other traits that are correlated with ability.
Overall, our analysis contributes to the literature by providing evidence that workplace
peer effects may be driven by a particular class of psychological mechanisms. As discussed,
our setting rules out the possibility that the effects are driven by externalities in the pro-
duction process or the terms of the financial contract. Supplementary analysis also suggests
that learning does not drive the estimates in our study because there no evidence that peer
effects vary by experience of workers. Further, the choice experiment that we conduct shows
that workers in our sample are willing to pay to work near high-productivity peers, a pattern
that is inconsistent with standard models of rank preferences, last-place aversion, shame or
reputational concerns (Tincani, 2015; Kuziemko et al., 2014; Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Breza
and Chandrasekhar, 2015). Overall, our results are consistent with models of contagious en-
thusiasm or limited self-control (Mas and Moretti, 2009; Kaur, Kremer and Mullainathan,
2014).
3.2 Background
To conduct our study, we partner with Lujeri Tea Estates, a large agricultural firm in
Malawi. Our sample is a group of roughly 1,000 employees who hand-pick (“pluck”) leaves
from tea bushes (hereafter, we refer to these workers as pluckers). Workers temporarily store
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plucked leaves in baskets and empty their baskets at a central weighing station. There is no
explicit cooperation involved in this process, and tea pluckers are paid a constant piece rate
for each kilogram of plucked tea.
Production at the firm is organized by assigning workers to “gangs” which are each
managed by a supervisor. The size of a gang is typically around 45 pluckers, but the sizes
range from 29 on the low end to 76 on the high end. Each gang is responsible for plucking tea
from a pre-determined set of fields over the course of a harvesting “cycle” (7 to 12 calendar
days). In our analysis sample, there are 78 fields for the 22 gangs we study.
On each tea field for a gang, the supervisor assigns workers to pluck tea from a specific
set of plots (between 1 to 3 per day depending on the characteristics of the plan and day
of the week). Each field has between 30 and 120 plots, and workers must pluck on their
assigned plots before moving on to other plots.5,6 At the completion of a harvesting cycle,
the gang returns back to the initial field for a new round of plucking – unlike with other
crops that are harvested once or a few times, tea bushes grow continuously throughout the
season.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the general assignment of workers to plots on a given field and
the rotation of workers throughout the harvesting cycle. Panel A shows that each worker is
assigned two contingent plots (blue squares).7 The example highlights three workers who are
colored red, green and yellow. The illustration shows that workers B and C are the immediate
plot neighbors of workers A. Panel B provides an illustration showing how workers change
assignments across fields covered during a 6-working-day harvesting cycle. On each day of
the harvesting cycle a given worker has an assigned set of plots for that day’s specific field.
Across days in the harvesting cycle, a worker will have different neighbors. In the example,
the three hypothetical workers are sometimes separated as shown for Cycle Days 3, 5 and 6.
On these days, the workers will have different plot neighbors.
3.3 Random Assignment of Workplace Peers
We designed our experimental intervention to randomly assign workers to plots on tea
fields in order to generate random variation in exposure to workplace peers. To implement
this, we obtained the roster of workers in each gang and a “plucking program” for each gang.
The plucking program is a predetermined list of which field (or fields) a gang works during
5 Pluckers are expected to finish their assigned plots in accordance with the cycle schedule. Pluckers who
finish their plots can ask for additional plots that are not assigned to other workers. If a worker is absent
on a given day, the supervisor will assign the plot to other workers for the day.
6 Fixed plot assignment is done so that workers internalize the negative effects of over- and under-plucking
bushes on their plots.
7 Note that in reality the fields and plots are often not sized as evenly-sized rectangles.
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each day of its cycle and the number of pluckers that should be assigned to each field. In the
simplest case, there is one field on each cycle day with all the pluckers working on it.8 We
use this information to generate randomly ordered lists of pluckers for each day of a gang’s
harvesting cycle. On cycle days where a gang works on multiple fields, we also randomly
determine which workers are on each field.
These randomized lists are used to determine the order in which pluckers are assigned to
plots on each field. The random assignment takes advantage of the usual assignment process
in which pluckers stand in a queue and are assigned to plots in the order in which they are
standing. The supervisor does the assignments by “snaking” back and forth across the field
and taking the next plucker from the queue for each plot. Our random assignment scheme
alters this system by giving the supervisors a randomly-ordered list to use in this snake
pattern.9 Each gang supervisor was responsible for assigning workers using the randomly
generated list of worker assignments in February 2015. We verified compliance with these
assignments by having our project managers visit each gang in the week after randomization.
As a result of our intervention, workers are randomly assigned to plots within a field for
different cycle days as illustrated in Panel B of Figure 3.1.
3.4 Data
To study the impact of workplace peers, we use three main sources of data. First, we
rely on administrative data from the firm on worker productivity. Productivity is defined as
kilograms of tea plucked per day and is electronically recorded by the firm for the purpose
of paying employees. As a result, it is measured with minimal error. This data on worker
productivity is available from December 2014 to April 2015 (the beginning and end of the
main tea harvest season, respectively). Second, we hired project staff to record information
on the plot neighbors assigned to each worker as a result of the randomized assignment that
we implemented. Third, we collected survey data to obtain measures of worker characteristics
such as background demographics and social networks.
8 Many gangs have more complicated schedules, spending multiple cycle days on some fields, and splitting
the gang across more than one field on certain days of their cycle.
9 An exception to our randomization is the first work day (“Cycle Day 1”) in a gang’s cycle. We in-
tentionally did not randomize work assignments in this data. On these days, supervisors assigned workers
using the usual method, in which the plots are still assigned using the snaking pattern across the field, but
the order of the pluckers comes from the order in which they stand in the queue. We use this non-random
assignment on the first work day to test for endogenous assignment and sorting of workers to locations on a
field in Section 3.5.
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3.4.1 Main Analysis Sample
Our study centers on 1,046 pluckers who worked during the main season after we im-
plemented our randomized work assignments in February 2015. Table 3.1 provides some
summary statistics based on the survey and administrative data. The average age for work-
ers is about 37 years and about 43 percent of the sample is female. Only 7 percent of workers
are new and average experience is nearly 8 years. Over the course of our study period, the
average daily output for each worker is 69 kilograms of plucked tea leaves.
As recorded in our data on work assignments, workers have on average about 5 assigned
neighbors on any given day of work. We measure ability as the estimated permanent pro-
ductivity for each worker in our sample (see Section 3.5 for details). Our study focuses on
studying how working alongside peers of different ability affects daily output. To provide
a sense of the variation in neighbor ability (measured as the logged average of co-worker
ability), Table 3.1 shows that the standard deviation of co-worker ability is about twice the
mean.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
The main question in this paper is whether working in close proximity to higher-ability
co-workers increases productivity in our sample of tea pluckers. To address this question,
we estimate the following linear model of peer effects for the productivity of worker i:
yift = µi + βAbility−ift + δt + λf + ift (3.1)
where yift is the (logged) total kilograms of tea plucked on field f and date t. The key
variable in Equation 3.1 is Ability−ift which is the mean of ability of all co-workers who are
assigned to work adjacent to the plots that worker i is assigned. The model also includes
date and field fixed, δt and λf , to control for variation in harvest conditions over the course of
the season and across the tea estate. Finally, we also control for time-invariant determinants
of productivity – such as the worker’s own plucking ability – by including individual-level
fixed effects µi.
To measure ability in our sample of tea pluckers, we rely on an approach pioneered by
Mas and Moretti (2009) which uses estimates of worker fixed effects as a measure of ability
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(“permanent productivity”).10 Specifically, we use the plucking data and estimate:
yift = µi + Miftγ
′ + δt + λf + τift (3.2)
where the term Mift is a vector of dummy variables which indicate whether worker j is
working next to worker i in the field f on date t.11 The idea is that the vector γ contains
a set of parameters that absorb any possible peer effects and allows us to obtain unbiased
estimates of worker fixed effects µi, under the assumption that each individual worker can
have any effect on his or her coworkers.12 For Equation 3.1, we use these estimates to define
Ability−ift = µ̂ift as our measure of peer influence.
13
In models of peer effects such as Equation 3.1, the key assumption for identification of β
is that there is no correlation between the average ability of one’s peers and the unobserved
determinants of individual productivity: cov(Ability−ift, ift) = 0. One way this assumption
could be violated is if supervisors assign workers with higher ability to work on particularly
productive areas of a field that are physically close together. Our intervention eliminates
this possibility by randomly assigning workers to plots within a field and makes it possible
to purge estimates β of any endogenous sorting effects.
Table 3.2 shows that this random assignment is key for producing causal estimates of peer
effects by presenting results from a series of regressions of worker’ own ability on the mean of
their co-workers ability.14 Column (1) shows that the there is a positive correlation between
own ability and peer ability on the sample of plucking days that correspond to “Cycle Day 1”
of each gang’s work cycle - these are days that we explicitly did not randomize workers and
which gang supervisors implemented plot assignments through the status quo system. In
line with our random assignment intervention, the results in Columns (3) and (4) show that
this correlation does not exist for the remainder of the sample which supports the identifying
10 Similar approaches to estimating ability as permanent productivity have been used in (Bandiera,
Barankay and Rasul, 2010) and (Park, 2015).
11 be clear, the set of possible co-workers is based on the gang for worker i so that Mift is a vector of Ji−1
dummy variables where Ji is the total number of pluckers in i’s gang.
12 One additional assumption for identification is that the form of any coworker peer effects is additively
separable across workers.
13 Since Ability−ift is based on estimated quantities, the correct standard errors for Equation (1) need to
adjust for this additional source of sampling variability. In practice, we find that the standard errors change
little when we use a repeated-split sample approach to estimate worker’s permanent productivity (discussed
in Section 3.6) so our main results report the naive standard errors.
14 Note that we follow the recommendation by Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009) and include the
leave-one-out mean in our test of random assignment. The inclusion of this term corrects for bias inherent
in typical tests for random assignment when peer groups are small. Intuitively, this bias arises from the fact
that individuals cannot be their own peers which generates a negative correlation between an individual’s
own characteristics and the characteristics of peers.
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assumption in our linear-in-means model.15
Finally, in addition to producing estimates from Equation 3.1, we are also interested in
testing whether there are non-linear peer effects in terms of a worker’s own-ability. Specifi-
cally, we estimate the following more general model of peer effects:
yift = µi +
q=4∑
q=1
θq(D
q
i × Ability−ift) + δt + λf + ift (3.3)
where the terms Dqi are indicators which equal one if a person is in the q quartile of the
distribution of worker ability. Previous research in education settings has used this type of
specification and found evidence of notable heterogeneity in peer effects across the distri-
bution of student ability (Hoxby and Weingarth, 2005; Carrell, Fullerton and West, 2009;
Imberman, Kugler and Sacerdote, 2012; Carrell, Sacerdote and West, 2013).
3.5.1 Main Results
To test whether the average ability of co-workers affects productivity, Table 3.3 reports
estimates from Equation 3.1. Column (1) shows that there is a positive and significant
effect of the mean ability of peers on worker productivity. Specifically, a 10 percent increase
in mean ability of peers is associated with a 0.5 percent increase in the daily amount of
kilograms of tea plucked for each worker. Column (2) shows that our estimates are essentially
unchanged when we condition on date-by-location fixed effects. Relative to the literature,
these estimates are about half the size of estimates produced in a lab setting by Falk and
Ichino (2006) and studying supermarket cashiers by Mas and Moretti (2009).
In addition to exploring peer effects in a linear-in-means model, we also test for the
existence of peer effects that are vary across workers with different ability. Importantly, the
existence of non-linear effects implies that there would be aggregate gains from selectively
choosing workers’ peer groups. Table 3.4 sheds light on this in our sample by presenting
results from Equation 3.3.16 We see that there is notable heterogeneity in the estimates for
workers of different ability. Workers in the first quartile of the distribution of ability have
the strongest effects: for a 10 percent increase in average coworker ability, the lowest ability
worker increases his output by nearly 1 percent. The remaining estimates show there are no
detectable effects of peers on any other ability-type of workers. Despite the fact that these
15 Column (2) shows that there is positive but not statistically significant correlation between own ability
and peer ability using the sample of all cycle days. As expected, the magnitude of this positive correlation
falls notably in the results shown in Columns (3) and (4) where Cycle Day 1 is excluded.
16 If peer effects were constant across individuals, then re-assigning a high-ability peer from one group to
another would have equal and offsetting effects.
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estimates are somewhat noisy, Figure 3.2 shows that the point the smallest point estimates
are consistently decreasing in magnitude for higher ability workers.17 In terms of policy, these
results suggest that low ability workers benefit the most from having high-quality co-workers
nearby.
3.6 Robustness
We construct an alternative measure of individual ability (permanent productivity) to
show that our peer effect estimates are robust. Specifically, we use a repeated-split sample
approach to estimate both the fixed effects for worker productivity and the effect of the
mean ability of peers on own-productivity. This process is iterative and proceeds as follows.
We begin by randomly splitting our sample of plucking data into two mutually exclusive,
exhaustive subsamples by date. Each subsample contains 50 percent of the dates that we
observe in the full sample. Using one of random subsamples, we estimate worker’s fixed
effects (ability) using Equation 3.2. Next, we merge these worker fixed effect estimates onto
the held-out random sample of plucking data. We use this hold-out sample to estimate
Equation 3.1 to obtain an estimate the effect of the average ability of peers.
The repeated-split sample approach allows us to address the concern that estimating
Equation 3.2 using the entire sample of plucking data could be biased by common shocks that
are not absorbed by date and field fixed effects. For example, two workers who both work on a
part of a field that experiences a particularly high-growth day will both have idiosyncratically
higher daily productivity which would push the estimates of µ̂i for each worker upward
in Equation 3.2; conversely, a negative shock will push the estimates downward. This is
problematic because these shocks that bias estimates of worker ability will also be contained
in the error term ift in our model of daily worker output in Equation 3.1. these common
shocks will cause violations of the assumption that cov(Ability−ift, ift) = 0.
Column (2) in Table 3.5 shows that the repeated-split sample approach generates a similar
finding on worker peer effects relative to our main estimates. Specifically, the mean of 750
split sample estimates for β is about 0.06 which is slightly larger than the point estimate we
obtained in Table 3.3. The standard deviation of the distribution of our estimates is 0.02,
which shows that our split-sample approach is relatively precise. Finally, it worth noting
that using the standard deviation of the repeated-split sample estimates provides us with
a measure of the standard error of β that takes into account the uncertainty due to the
two-step nature of our estimation strategy. This estimate is comparable to those we find
17 Note that we can reject the null hypothesis of equal effects for the highest and lowest ability workers
(p-value=0.01).
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through the simple clustered standard error estimates in our main specifications.
3.7 Discussion and Interpretation
The evidence presented thus far shows that co-worker ability has an impact on produc-
tivity. A range of mechanisms could generate positive peer effects in general, but our setting
allows us to rule out two of these immediately. First, unlike in many previously studied
settings, our context rules out the possibility of peer effects being driven by externalities in
the production process since there is no cooperation and no need for workers to coordinate.
Second, the fact that workers receive piece-rates also rules out that our peer effects are driven
by the firm’s compensation scheme. With this in mind, this section proceeds to consider
three other types of mechanisms that could be driving our estimates of peer effects.
One potential mechanism to explain our findings is learning (“knowledge spillovers”). It
is conceivable that plot neighbors learn from observing each other work, thereby generating
the positive effects that we observe.18 To explore this possibility, we test whether peer effects
in our setting are heterogeneous with respect to workers’ past experience. Under the learning
hypothesis, we would expect the effects of average peer ability would be largest for workers
who have no prior or relatively less experience.
Table 3.6 presents results from augmented versions of Equation 3.1 in which we add
measures of worker experience. The results in Column (1) replicate the estimate from our
baseline specification for the sample of workers for whom we have self-reported experience.
Column (2) builds on our main specification by adding an interaction between a dummy
indicating status as a new worker (no prior experience) and our measure of peer ability. The
estimate for this interaction is significant and implies that the effect of higher-ability peers is
actually negative for new workers. As an alternative test for heterogeneity in peer effects by
experience, we create dummies based on the quartiles of worker experience observed in our
sample. We interact these dummies with our measure of average peer ability and present
the results for these terms in Column (3). Although the results for this specification are
not precise, the point estimates for the least experience and most experienced workers are
remarkably similar which is not consistent with the idea that learning drives peer effects in
our setting.
Another leading mechanism for explaining workplace peer effects is socialization between
workers. In a relatively similar setting, Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2010) detect evidence
of peer effects among friends who pick fruit at a large agricultural firm in the UK. Their
18 Among previous studies testing for the existence of knowledge spillovers, Jackson and Bruegmann (2009)
find evidence of knowledge spillovers among teachers while Waldinger (2012) finds no evidence among uni-
versity scientists.
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analysis suggests that socialization drives their estimates. When slow fruit pickers work near
friends who are typically fast, they work harder to catch up. Similarly, relatively fast pickers
slow down for their slower friends.
Using data on social networks, we provide evidence that suggests the peer effects in our
sample are not driven by the desire to socially interact. Specifically, we use self-reported
friendship between pluckers to identify when workers are plucking on plots near their friends.
We then compute the average ability of nearby co-workers who are friends. Similarly, we
calculate the average ability of co-workers who are not friends. On the average day in our
sample, a worker has about three plot neighbors that are friends. We use these two separate
measures of average co-worker ability in our basic linear-in-means specification and report
the results in Column (3) of Table 3.7. The point estimates show that there is an effect of
working near higher ability non-friends while there is no detectable impact for the average
ability of friends.19
This pattern of results suggests that our peer effects are not driven by either learning
or socialization. A final prominent possibility that we consider is that the peer effects we
measure might operate through motivation and “contagious enthusiasm”. A key prediction of
this mechanism is that exposure to faster coworkers is beneficial, and thus workers should be
willing to pay for higher-ability peers. To test this prediction, we conducted a supplementary
survey and choice experiment for a subset of tea workers during the 2015-2016 harvesting
season. In this experiment, we asked workers whether they wanted higher-ability peers, and
whether they would be willing to give up part of the compensation that they received for
taking part in the survey (workers were each given two bars of soap as a token of thanks for
taking the survey).
Panel A of Table 3.8 reports that 71 percent of workers would like to be assigned next to
a fast (high ability) peer in their gang. Further, Panel B shows that these workers seeking
re-assignment are willing to pay for these peers: 71 percent of workers who want a fast peer
would be willing to give up one bar of soap while 55 percent would be willing to give up two
bars of soap. When asked for the main reason for their choices in an open-ended question, 83
percent workers state that faster peers provide motivation. Only 15 percent state learning
as a reason for wanting higher-ability peers.
The results from our willingness to pay experiment strongly suggest that motivation is
the key driver of the peer effects we measure in this study. They rule out a range of other
potential mechanisms posited in the literature, such as shame or a desire to avoid being last
(Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Kuziemko et al., 2014). Since workers are willing to pay for faster
19 While these point estimates appear quite different, we cannot reject a test of the null hypothesis that
the effects of non-friends and friends are equal (p-value = 0.22).
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peers, shame-type mechanisms can only be the operative mechanism inasmuch as it serves
as a commitment device, inducing workers to reach a higher level of effort that they truly
would like to achieve.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence on workplace peer effects by conducting an experimental
intervention with an agricultural firm in Malawi from February 2015 to April 2015. We
randomly assigned tea pluckers to plot assignments on fields and use this variation in peer
composition to examine the effect of mean coworker ability (permanent productivity) on
workers’ output. In addition, our analysis also explores whether the effect of peer ability
varies by workers’ own ability of workers.
Using administrative data on daily productivity, we find that the average of coworker
ability has a positive and significant effect: increasing the average of coworker ability by 10
percent increases own-productivity by about 0.5 percent. Further, supplementary analysis
suggests that these peer effects are non-linear, with the lowest ability workers being the most
responsive to working near higher ability peers. This finding is notable because it implies
that re-sorting workers on the basis of ability could generate gains in aggregate productivity,
which is only possible if peer effects are non-linear.
To shed light on the mechanisms driving our peer effect estimates, we conducted a choice
experiment in the next harvesting season that allowed workers to choose new coworkers as
plot neighbors. In this experiment, we find that 71 percent of workers wanted to be assigned
to a fast (high-ability) coworker. Moreover, workers were willing to pay for faster coworkers:
55 percent of workers were willing to give up two bars of soap (worth 18 percent of daily
wages) that we had given them as a gift for survey participation. In open-ended follow-up
questions, 83 percent of workers state that working near faster peers motivates them.
This analysis provides strong evidence that workplace peer effects in our setting stem
from the effect that peers have on motivation. In additional analysis, we do not find evi-
dence that the effects we detect are driven by learning or worker socialization. Finally, the
fact that workers receive piece rates and there is no cooperation in tea plucking rules out
that the effects in our setting stem from production externalities or incentives of the firm’s
compensation scheme.
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3.9 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Tea Worker Field Assignment Illustrations
(a) Hypothetical Assignment for Three Tea Workers
Worker (A) Assigned Plots 
Worker (B) 
Assigned 
Plots 
Worker (C) Assigned Plots 
(b) Plot Assignments Change Over Days in Harvesting Cycle
Day #1 
Day #6 
Day #2 
Day #5 
Day #3 
Day #4 
Notes: The two panels illustrate work assignments for tea workers at the Lujeri Tea Estates in Malawi. Panel A shows how three
workers would be assigned two plots each. For our analysis, all workers A, B and C would be neighboring co-workers. Panel
B shows how plot work assignments change over the course of a harvest cycle that lasts 6 calendar days and visits distinctly
different fields. On some days and fields, workers A, B and C are neighbors. Yet, there are also cases where they are not
neighbors: for example, on Day #3, #5 and #6, workers A, B and C are not assigned to work in neighboring plots.
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Figure 3.2: Non-Linear Peer Effect Estimates
-.1
0
.1
.2
Point
Estimate
1 2 3 4
Own Ability Quartile
Notes: This figure presents results from a regression of daily output (the log of kilograms of tea plucked) on the mean ability of
physically nearby co-workers interacted with dummies for the worker’s own ability level. The underlying data is a panel at the
worker and day level. All specifications control for individual fixed effects. The results parallel Column (1) of Table 3.4, and
control separately for date and location fixed effects. The measure of daily output comes from administrative data obtained
from Lujeri Tea Estates. Information on neighbors was collected by staff for this project. 95% confidence intervals are shown
with dashed lines; standard errors are clustered at the worker level.
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Table 3.2: Balance Test: Comparing Own and Peer Ability
 
   Dependent Variable: Log(Own-Ability) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Mean Peer Ability) 0.129* 0.0415 0.0201 0.00518 
 
(0.0737) (0.0283) (0.0308) (0.00849) 
Leave-One-Out Mean -1.455*** -1.552*** -1.595*** -43.27*** 
 
(0.404) (0.390) (0.394) (0.672) 
     Cycle Day 1 Yes Yes No No 
Remaining Cycle Days No Yes Yes Yes 
Worker Fixed Effects No No No Yes 
Date Fixed Effects No No No Yes 
     Observations 9,531 45,058 35,460 35,460 
R2 0.022 0.024 0.026 0.927 
 
Notes: This table presents results from a regression of our measure of a worker's own ability on the mean 
ability of physically nearby co-workers. The underlying data is a panel at the worker and day level. All 
specifications control for individual fixed effects. The results in Columns (1) are from the sample of "Cycle 
Day 1" days which did not have random assignment of workers to plot assignments at the tea estate. Column 
(2) presents results using the full sample of all dates and cycle dates in our data. Columns (3) and (4) use the 
sample of all non Cycle 1 days -- this is the sample for which we randomly assigned workers to locations on 
fields. The measure of daily output comes from administrative data obtained from Lujeri Tea Estates. 
Information on neighbors collected by staff for this project. Standard errors are clustered at the worker level.  
 
Notes: This table presents results from a regression of our measure of a worker’s own ability on the mean ability of physically
nearby co-workers. The underlying data is a panel at the worker and day level. All specifications control for individual fixed
effects. The result in Columns (1) are from the sample of “Cycle Day 1” days which did not have random assignment of
workers to plot a signments at the tea estate. Column (2) presents re ults using the full sample of all dates and cycle dates
in our data. Columns (3) and (4) use the sample of all non Cycle 1 days – this is the sample for which we randomly assigned
workers to locations on fields. The measure of daily output comes from administrative data obtained from Lujeri Tea Estates.
Information on neighbors was collected by staff for this project. Standard errors are clustered at the worker level.
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Table 3.3: Effects of Workplace Peers, Linear Model
 
 
 
  
Dependent Variable: Log of Daily 
Output 
 
(1) (2) 
Log(Mean Peer Ability) 0.0560** 0.0497** 
 
(0.0238) (0.0210) 
   Worker Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Date Fixed Effects Yes No 
Location (Field) Fixed Effects Yes No 
Date by Location Fixed Effects No Yes 
   Observations 35,460 35,460 
R2 0.416 0.736 
 
Notes: This table presents results from a regression of daily output (the log of kilograms of tea plucked) on the 
mean ability of physically nearby co-workers. The underlying data is a panel at the worker and day level. All 
specifications control for individual fixed effects. The results in Columns (1) and (2) use two different approaches 
to control for date and location effects. The measure of daily output comes from administrative data obtained from 
Lujeri Tea Estates. Information on neighbors was collected by staff for this project. Standard errors are clustered 
at the worker level. 
 
  
Notes: This table presents results from a regression of daily output (the log of kilograms of tea plucked) on the mean ability
of physically nearby co-workers. The underlying data is a panel at the worker and day level. All specifications control for
individual fixed effects. The results in Columns (1) and (2) use two different approaches to control for date and location effects.
The measu e of daily output omes from administrative data obtained from Lujeri Tea Estate . Inform ion on ighbors was
collected by staff for this project. Standard errors are clustered at the worker level.
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Table 3.4: Effects of Workplace Peers, Non-Linear Model
 
Table 4. Effects of Workplace Peers, Non-Linear Model 
 
  
Dependent Variable: Log of Daily 
Output 
 
(1) (2) 
Log(Mean Peer Ability) X Ability Quartile 1 0.123*** 0.0926** 
 
(0.0460) (0.0377) 
Log(Mean Peer Ability) X Ability Quartile 2 0.0846 0.0679 
 
(0.0518) (0.0500) 
Log(Mean Peer Ability) X Ability Quartile 3 0.0728 0.0391 
 
(0.0491) (0.0427) 
Log(Mean Peer Ability) X Ability Quartile 4 -0.0438 0.00350 
 
(0.0406) (0.0356) 
   Worker Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Date Fixed Effects Yes No 
Location (Field) Fixed Effects Yes No 
Date by Location Fixed Effects No Yes 
   Observations 35,460 35,460 
R2 0.416 0.736 
 
Notes: This table presents results from a regression of daily output (the log of kilograms of tea plucked) on the 
mean ability of physically nearby co-workers interacted with dummies for the worker's own ability level. The 
underlying data is a panel at the worker and day level. All specifications control for individual fixed effects. The 
results in Columns (1) and (2) use two different approaches to control for date and location effects. The measure 
of daily output comes from administrative data obtained from Lujeri Tea Estates. Information on neighbors was 
collected by staff for this project. Standard errors are clustered at the worker level. 
 
 
  
Notes: This table presents results from a regression of daily output (the log of kilograms of tea plucked) on the mean ability of
physically nearby co-workers interacted with dummies for the worker’s own ability level. The underlying data is a panel at the
worker and day level. All specifications control for individual fixed effects. The results in Columns (1) and (2) use two different
approaches to control for date and location effects. The measure of daily output comes from administrative data obtained from
Lujeri Te Estates. Information on neighbors was collected by staff for this project. Standard errors are clustered at the worker
level.
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Table 3.5: Effects of Workplace Peers, Split Sample Estimates of Linear Model
 
 
 
  
Dependent Variable: 
Log of Daily Output 
 
(1) 
Log(Mean Peer Ability) 0.065*** 
 
(0.021) 
  Worker Fixed Effects Yes 
Date Fixed Effects Yes 
Location (Field) Fixed Effects Yes 
Date by Location Fixed Effects No 
  Split Sample Reps 750 
 
Notes: This table presents results from a split-sample estimation 
approach to estimating the effect of mean co-worker ability on daily 
output. As described in Section 6, we proceed in two steps. First, we 
randomly split our sample of plucking data into two mutually 
exclusive, exhaustive subsamples. Each subsample contains 50 
percent of the dates that we observe in the full sample. Using one of 
random subsamples, we estimate worker’s fixed effects (ability) using 
Equation 2 from the text. Second, we merge these worker fixed effect 
estimates onto the held-out random sample of plucking data. We use 
this hold-out sample to estimate Equation 1 to obtain an estimate the 
effect of the average ability of peers. We repeat this process 750 times 
to generate a sample of estimates for effect of mean ability of 
coworkers and present this in Column (1) above.  
 
  
Notes: This table presents results from a split-sample estimation approach to estimating the effect of mean co-worker ability on
daily output. As described in Section 3.6, we proceed in two steps. First, we randomly split our sample of plucking data into
two mutually exclusive, exhaustive subsamples. Each subsample contains 50 percent of the dates that we observe in the full
sample. Using one of random subsamples, we estimate worker’s fixed effects (ability) using Equation 3.2 from the text. Second,
we merge these worker fixed effect estimates onto the held-out random sample of plucking data. We use this hold-out sample
to estimate Equation 2.1 to obtain an estimate the effect of the average ability of peers. We repeat this process 750 times to
generate a sample of estimates for effect of mean abili y of co s and present his in Colum (1) above.
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Table 3.6: Peer Effects by Experience Level
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Daily 
Output 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Log(Mean Peer Ability) 0.0585** 0.0692*** 
 
 
(0.0256) (0.0268) 
 New Worker (=1) X Log(Mean Peer Ability) 
 
-0.158* 
 
  
(0.0819) 
 Quartile 1 Exp. X Log(Mean Peer Ability) 
  
0.0693 
   
(0.0528) 
Quartile 2 Exp. X Log(Mean Peer Ability) 
  
0.0366 
   
(0.0526) 
Quartile 3 Exp. X Log(Mean Peer Ability) 
  
0.0675 
   
(0.0473) 
Quartile 4 Exp. X Log(Mean Peer Ability) 
  
0.0632 
   
(0.0527) 
Worker Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Date Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Location (Field) Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Date by Location Fixed Effects No No No 
    Observations 32,921 32,921 32,921 
R2 0.411 0.411 0.411 
 
Notes: This table presents results from a regression of daily output (kilograms of tea plucked) on the mean ability 
of physically nearby co-workers. The underlying data is a panel at the worker and day level. All specifications 
control for individual fixed effects. The results in Column (2) and (3) are from specifications that include 
additional interactions based on the worker's self-reported experience at Lujeri. The measure of daily output 
comes from administrative data obtained from Lujeri Tea Estates; information on neighbors was collected by staff 
for this project; and, measures of experience are based on our survey data collection. Standard errors are clustered 
at the worker level. 
 
  
Notes: This table presents results from a regression of daily output (kilograms of tea plucked) on the mean ability of physically
nearby co-workers. The underlying data is a panel at the worker and day level. All specifications control for individual fixed
effects. The results in Column (2) and (3) are from specifications that include additional interactions based on the worker’s
self-reported experience at Lujeri. The measure of daily output comes from administrative data obtained from Lujeri Tea
Estates; infor ation on neighbors was collected by staff for this project; and, measures of experience are based on our survey
data collection. Standard errors are clustered at the work r level.
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Table 3.7: Effects of Friends and Non-Friends in the Workplace
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Daily 
Output 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Log(Mean Peer Ability), Non-Friends 0.052*** 
 
0.052*** 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.020) 
Any Non-friends (=1) 0.017 
 
0.012 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.037) 
Log(Mean Peer Ability), Friends 
 
0.006 0.007 
  
(0.032) (0.032) 
Any Friends (=1) 
 
-0.006 -0.007 
  
(0.007) (0.007) 
    Worker Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Date Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Location (Field) Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Date by Location Fixed Effects No No No 
    Observations 35,445 35,445 35,445 
R2 0.415 0.415 0.415 
 
Notes: This table presents results from a regression of daily output (the log of kilograms of tea plucked) on measures 
of the mean ability of nearby co-workers who are friends and non-friends. The underlying data is a panel at the 
worker and day level. All specifications control for individual fixed effects. The results in Column (2) and (3) are 
from specifications that include additional interactions based on the worker's self-reported experience at Lujeri. The 
measure of daily output comes from administrative data obtained from Lujeri Tea Estates; information on neighbors 
was collected by staff for this project; and, measures of experience are based on our survey data collection. Standard 
errors are clustered at the worker level. 
 
  
Notes: This table presents results from a regression of daily output (the log of kilograms of tea plucked) on measures of the
mean ability of nearby co-workers who are friends and non-friends. The underlying data is a panel at the worker and day
level. All specifications control for individual fixed effects. The results in Column (2) and (3) are from specifications that
include additional i teractio s based on the worker’s self-reported exp rience at Lujeri. The m asure of daily output comes
fro dministrative data obtained fro Lujeri Te Estates; information on neighbors was collected by staff for this project;
and, measures of experience are based on our survey data collection. Standard errors are clustered at the worker level.
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Table 3.8: Willingness to Pay for Fast Peers
 
 
   
 
(1) (2) 
 
Pct. Obs. 
Panel A. All Survey Respondents 
  Who do you want to be re-assigned next to? 
  A fast plucker in your gang 0.71 724 
A slow plucker in your gang 0.05 724 
Any person of your choosing 0.11 724 
No-reassignment 0.14 724 
   Panel B. Respondents who want to be next to fast pluckers 
 If you could switch to be near a fast plucker… 
  …would you be willing to give up 1 bar of soap? 0.71 515 
…would you be willing to give up 2 bar of soap? 0.55 515 
 
Notes: This table presents statistics from survey data that we collected for tea pluckers 
at the Lujeri Tea Estates. For the choice experiment, respondents were given a gift of 
two bars of soap (18 percent of average daily wages) and asked if they would be 
willing to give up soap in exchange for being re-assigned.  
 
Notes: This table presents statistics from survey data that we collected for tea pluckers at the Lujeri Tea Estates. For the
choice experiment, respondents were given a gift of two bars of soap (18 percent of average daily wages) and asked if they would
be willing to give up soap in exchange for being re-assigned.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix for Moved to Opportunity: The Long-Run
Effect of Public Housing Demolition on Labor Market
Outcomes of Children
A.1 Detailed Analysis of Differential Attrition
As explained in Section 1.5.1, I use the following specification for my analysis of the
impact of demolition:
Yit = α + βDb(i) +X
′
iθ + ψp(i) + δt + it
where i is an individual and t represents years. The indexes b(i) and p(i) are the building
and project where individual i lived. The terms δt and ψp(i) are year and project fixed effects,
respectively. The vector Xi is a set control variables that help improve precision by reducing
residual variation. The dummy variable Db(i) takes a value of one if an individual was living
in a building slated for demolition. Hence, β represents the net impact of demolition on
children’s outcomes.
One identification condition for this analysis is that cov(Ai,t, i,t) = 0 where A is a binary
indicator of attrition. While I do not actually observe A, I follow Grogger (2013) and impute
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A using various administrative sources. Specifically, the measure of attrition that I calculate
is straightforward. Permanent attrition at time t implies that an outcome is zero after the
point of departure (i.e. Yi,t+j = 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , T − t}, where Y is an administrative data
outcome and T denotes the last unit of time in the data). For a single outcome k, I measure
attrition by creating a binary indicator of a d-period run of zeros as
aki,t(d) = 1
(
d−1∑
j=0
Y ki,t+j = 0
)
.
Administrative data for the K-many outcomes available across administrative sources can
be pooled and attrition can measured as:
ai,t(d) = 1
(
K∑
j=1
akd = K
)
.
In what follows, I use the following compact notation: aki,t ≡ aki,t(d) and ai,t(d) ≡ ai,t.
Table A1 shows the distribution of terminal runs of zeros by the year in which the
run begins. The first three pairs of columns report statistics based on terminal runs for
three different outcomes: (1) employment, (2) foodstamp receipt and (3) TANF or Medicaid
receipt. The first column in each pair reports the probability that a terminal run is observed
in a given post demolition year for the sample of non-displaced youth. For example, the first
entry of the first column shows that 20.8 percent of non-displaced youth began a terminal
run of employment zeros in the first year after demolition. By the definition of terminal
run, this sequence was 14 years-long in the first year after demolition. In the second year
after demolition, the probability of observing a terminal run of zeros was 21.5 percent. Note
that in the second year post demolition, the definition of a terminal run is a 13 year-long
sequence. Because the length of the terminal sequence of zeros shrinks in each row, the
probability of observing a terminal run of zeros grows over the sample period. Based on the
employment data alone, the imputed attrition is 63.1 percent in the final post-demolition
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year of the sample. Imputed attrition is slightly lower based on data for assistance outcomes
as shown in Columns (3) and (5) of Table A1.
Attrition as measured by pooling these administrative sources is reported in Column (7).
Combining the three data series dramatically affects the distribution of terminal runs of
zeros. Based on the three outcomes, less than 2 percent of the sample begins a terminal run
of zeros in the first year after demolition. This contrasts with the 20.8 for employment in
isolation. Moreover, attrition based on all three measures is only 30.3 percent in the final
year of the sample, which is less than half of the imputed attrition as measured using the
employment data alone. This dramatic affect on the distribution is primarily due to the
negative correlation among the outcomes under consideration.
The main concern in this analysis is whether demolition appears to be correlated with
imputed attrition. For each pair of columns that pertain to a particular outcome in Table A1,
the second column of the pair reports the regression computed difference in the probability
of attrition for displaced (treated) and non-displaced (control) adolescents who were age 7 to
18 at the time of demolition. Specifically, I use Equation 1.1 where the outcome is imputed
attrition aki,t. There is no strong evidence of differential attrition by treatment status for
any of the single outcomes in isolation. Across the three outcomes in 14 post-demolition
years, the difference between the treated and control probability of attrition is statistically
significant in just two of the 42 possibilities (5 percent). More importantly, Column (8)
shows that there is no detectable difference in the probability of observing a terminal run of
zeros in any post demolition year after pooling all three outcomes.
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A1 Detailed Description of Sample Definition
As stated in Section 1.4, one of the main data sources for this paper is data on social
assistance participation from the Illinois Department of Human Services (IDHS). The raw
sampling frame for the data used in this paper is the set of individuals (“grantees”) living in
Cook County who received some form of social service assistance (specifically, TANF/AFDC,
Food Stamps or Medicaid) at any point between June 1, 1994 and July 1, 1997. Note that
the record for using social assistance during this time period is referred to as the “target
case”. With the initial list of grantees, IDHS created a list of other members of the grantee’s
household. These additional household members are identified as the set of additional in-
dividuals listed on the grantee’s target case. Using this definition for the sampling frame,
the raw IDHS data contains 992,729 individuals (463,542 are grantees while 529,187 are
individuals living in the same household).
Note that everyone in this sample of social assistance households has a unique ID code
created by Chapin Hall at the University of Chicago. Chapin Hall uses IDHS data on social
assistance utilization to define a unique identifier for individuals who appears in these data.
Using information such as name, date of birth and social security number, Chapin Hall used a
probabilistic matching technique to link these IDHS-based identifiers to other administrative
data such as Illinois state employment data and Illinois State Police (ISP) records, which I
also use in the present paper.
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A2 Program Rules for Housing Vouchers
A2.1 Voucher Eligibility
Unlike other major social programs, housing vouchers are not an entitlement, and there
are long waiting lists to receive housing assistance in many large cities. Housing voucher
program eligibility is based on the local median household income. For example, a family
of four is eligible for assistance if they fall under 50 percent of the local median income for
all families in an area (although some families with incomes up to 80 percent of the local
median income may be eligible depending on their location) (Olsen, 2003). Note that, unlike
other means-tested programs, there are no asset tests for eligibility for housing vouchers.
The eligibility limits for families of different sizes are equal to the following percentages of
the four-person limit:
Housing Voucher Income Eligibility Adjustment by Family Size (Percentage of Four-Person
Limit)
Family Size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Adjustment 70 80 90 100 108 116 124 132
Notes: All numbers are taken from Olsen (2003), p. 379.
A2.2 The Value of the Subsidy
There are two main components for determining the value of a housing voucher. First,
the value of a voucher depends on the local Fair Market Rent (FMR) which is set by the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). In 1995, the FMR was equal
to the 40th percentile of the local rent distribution for a unit of a given size. For example, the
FMR for a two-bedroom apartment in Chicago was equal to $699 (nominal dollars) in 1995.
Starting in 2001, the FMR was raised to the 50th percentile in some specific metropolitan
areas, including Cook County, Illinois (in which Chicago resides). Second, the value of the
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voucher depends on household income. Specifically, a fraction of the income – 30 percent –
must be paid toward rent. Hence, the value of a housing voucher is given by:
Subsidy Value = FMR− S
S = max{0.3× Yah, 0.1× Ygh}
Yah = Adjusted income under housing program rules
= Earnings + TANF
− ($480 ∗ Children)− ($400 ∗Disabled)
− Child care expenses
−Medical care expenses
− Attendant care expenses for disabled family
Ygh = Gross household income
= Earnings + TANF
Note that TANF benefits are included when determining program eligibility and the family’s
rent contribution, while the value of other forms of government assistance such as foodstamps,
EITC and Medicaid are not. Earnings by children younger than age 18 or payments received
for foster children are also not counted under the voucher program rules. Medical care and
attendant care expenses must exceed 3 percent of annual income.
Note that families offered housing vouchers usually have a limited time to lease a private
market unit. The time limit is usually 3 to 6 months after initial receipt of the offer. In ad-
dition to the time limit, families must also obtain a private-market housing unit that meets
HUD’s minimum quality standards. As noted in previous work studying vouchers, land-
lords may prefer non-voucher tenants because of these quality standards or other paperwork
associated with the voucher program. Finally, also note that once an individual qualifies
for a housing voucher, they are not removed from the program if their income exceeds the
eligibility limit. Of course, the value of the subsidy diminishes as income rises because a
fraction of household income (generally 30 percent) must be paid toward rent.
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A3 Determining Dates of Building Closure Due to Demolition
The date of closure for demolished (treated) buildings used in this paper is taken from
Jacob (2004). As explained in the appendix of his paper, Jacob determines the date of
building closure by examining trends in administrative data on building-level occupancy
rates. Specifically, the year of closure can be determined by sharp declines in building
occupancy. As an example, the figure below shows how the year of closure is determined
from occupancy data. Occupancy at building #85 (the blue line)of the Washington Park
project drops notably in early 1996 and later falls to zero starting in 1997. Because CHA
policy requires tenants to be notified at least 120 days prior to building closure, the pattern
in the occupancy data implies that residents of building #85 knew the building would close
in late 1995. As a point of comparison, the figure also shows occupancy at a stable (control)
building. We see that occupancy in building #35 (the red line) is relatively stable after 1995
which is the year of the first closures due to demolition at Washington Park. In addition to
using administrative data on occupancy, Jacob (2004) also used information from interviews
with CHA officials, housing advocates and the presidents of the Local Advisory Councils
(LACs) in projects affected by building demolition during the 1990s.
Occupancy Trends and the Date of Building Closure Due to Demolition
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Notes: The figure displays monthly occupancy at two buildings at the Washington Park project in Chicago. Occupancy data
is from administrative records from the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA).
92
A4 CHAC 1997 Lottery Data and Summary Statistics
A4.1 Data and Summary Statistics
The data sources used in this paper’s analysis of the CHAC housing voucher lottery
have been used previously in Jacob and Ludwig (2012) and Jacob, Kapustin and Ludwig
(2015). As mentioned in Section 1.9, these two studies examine individuals (adults and
children) living in private market housing at the time that they applied for the CHAC
housing voucher which differs from this paper’s interest in youth living in public housing.
The following discussion, which describes the lottery data, is similar to the information
provided in the online appendices for Jacob and Ludwig (2012) and Jacob, Kapustin and
Ludwig (2015).
The starting point for creating the lottery analysis sample is the application data for the
82,607 adults who applied for a CHAC housing voucher in 1997. These files include informa-
tion on lottery number and basic household demographics. In addition, the application data
also contains baseline address data which allows me to identify the subset of lottery appli-
cants that are the focus of my analysis: applicants living in public housing at baseline. Note
that one drawback of the application data is that these data do not contain information on
other members of the applicant’s household such as children. Instead, I obtain a list of these
household members by linking the application data to the Illinois Department of Human
Services (IDHS) data. The procedure for linking applicants to IDHS data is described in
greater detail below in A4.2. Note that this linking process uses entirely pre-lottery data, so
measurement error in identifying non-applicant household members is orthogonal to winning
the housing voucher lottery.
To measure labor market activity, I link data from the Illinois Department of Employment
Security (IDES) to the sample of individuals identified in IDHS data as living in lottery
households at baseline. The link between the IDES and IDHS data is based on probabilistic
matching techniques using name, date of birth and Social Security number. The IDES lets
93
me examine both earnings and labor market participation (defined as having any positive
earnings) over time for individuals residing in the state of Illinois.
Similar to my analysis of relocation due to project-demolition, I rely on address informa-
tion contained in IDHS case records to examine neighborhood outcomes. Recall a concern
is that address information is not available when youth are not on active social assistance
cases. If this attrition from the IDHS data is correlated with winning a lottery, it may bias
estimates of the impact on neighborhood quality. In the following results section, I show
that lottery winning has no statistically significant effect on the probability of having an
active social assistance case suggesting that my mobility analysis is not biased by differential
sample attrition.
Linking lottery application and administrative data allows me to construct panel data
for each youth from the baseline year 1997 to 2009. As mentioned above, I limit my main
analysis focuses on the set of lottery applicant households living in project-based public
housing at baseline. The sample in my CHAC 1997 analysis has 4, 661 children who are
between ages 7 and 18 at randomization.
The table on page 95 presents summary statistics on my main analysis sample of children.
Nearly the entire sample (98 percent) of my sample is African American and lives in a
disadvantaged household at baseline. Among adults living in youth households, only 33
percent were employed and average annual income was about $4,300. Nearly 77 percent of
adults received some form of social assistance such as TANF, Medicaid or Foodstamps.
Finally, the key to my analysis is that the CHAC randomly assigned its voucher offers in
its 1997 lottery. The descriptive statistics in the table on page 95 provide evidence consistent
with such random assignment for my main analysis sample of children. The mean values of
children and adults in treated and control households are nearly identical. None of the 23
pair-wise differences is significant at the 5 percent level.
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Descriptive Statistics for the CHAC 1997 Housing Voucher Lottery Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Control Mean Treated Mean
p-value
Difference:
Treated–Control
Panel A. Children (Age 7-18)
Demographics
Black (=1) 0.98 0.98 0.97
Age 11.69 11.81 0.28
Male (=1) 0.49 0.47 0.23
Arrests (Age>13)
Violent 0.03 0.03 0.49
Property 0.02 0.02 0.41
Drugs 0.05 0.05 0.90
Other 0.03 0.03 0.94
N (Individuals) 3,402 1,300
Panel B. Adults in Households with Children
Black (=1) 0.97 0.98 0.78
Age 31.16 31.34 0.47
Male (=1) 0.18 0.2 0.10
Any Arrest 0.77 0.76 0.83
Employed (=1) 0.37 0.38 0.22
Earnings $4,340.24 $4,422.76 0.70
Any social assistance (=1) 0.77 0.75 0.09
N (Individuals) 4,694 1,781
Panel C. Households with Children
# of Kids 2.59 2.66 0.31
Neighborhood
Percent Black 89.14 89.45 0.81
Percent Below Poverty Line 67.14 66.88 0.81
N (Households) 1,464 556
1
Notes: All descriptive statistics are for children (age 7 to 18 at baseline) or adults in these households with children.
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A4.2 Linking the CHAC Applicants to Other Households Members
Since the CHAC 1997 lottery application form data do not include identifying information
for other household members such as children, Jacob and Ludwig contracted Chapin Hall
at the University of Chicago to match CHAC applicants to administrative data on social
program participation from the Illinois Department of Human Services (IDHS). Chapin Hall
matched these two data sources using name, date of birth and Social Security numbers and
successfully linked nearly 94 percent of CHAC applicants to the IDHS data. For each CHAC
applicant who matched to the IDHS data, Chapin Hall identified the spell of social program
participation – referred to hereafter as the “target case” – that was closest in time prior to
the date of the CHAC lottery drawing (July 1, 1997). Individuals (such as children) linked to
these target cases are counted as residing in the CHAC applicant’s household and included
in the lottery analysis sample. For further details on this process of imputing household
members see the online appendix for Jacob, Kapustin and Ludwig (2015).
For the present paper, I focus on children (age 7-18 at baseline) who are members of
households that reported living in public housing at the time they applied for a housing
voucher. Note that baseline residency (address) information is taken from the CHAC 1997
lottery application forms. The list of youth affected by the CHAC lottery is merged to
longitudinal administrative data using unique identifiers created by Chapin Hall. These
identifiers link individuals across data sources and are created by matching on name, date
of birth and social security number.
Specifically, the sample of children living in public housing is merged to the following
sources: (1) Illinois State Police (ISP) data recording all arrests up to the first quarter of
2012; (2) Illinois Department of Employment Security (IDES) data on quarterly earnings
(1995-2009) and (3) IDHS data on AFDC/TANF, foodstamp and Medicaid participation
(1989-2009). Note that these administrative data are also used for the analysis of youth
affected by public housing demolition presented in Section 1.6.
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A5 An Economic Model of Reverse Roy Selection in Voucher Programs
This section presents a stylized model of parental investment in child outcomes to explain
the pattern of negative selection in the context of a housing mobility program. In particular,
the model accounts for two salient features of MTO. First, 80 percent of MTO participants
listed fear of crime as their main motivation for joining the program (Orr et al., 2003). In
addition, 24 percent of MTO participants reported that someone in their household had been
beaten or assaulted in the past six months. This rate of victimization was about four times
greater than contemporaneous statistics for other public housing households (Zelon, 1994).
Second, fear of neighborhood crime affected parental behavior in MTO households. Kling,
Liebman and Katz (2001) interviewed MTO participants before the program and found that
“[f]ear has led mothers to constantly monitor their children’s activities.” Notably, studies
of MTO showed that the program reduced parents’ active supervising behavior, plausibly
because parents who moved felt safer in their new neighborhood (Kling, Liebman and Katz,
2001).
A simple model captures this context and generates negative selection into a housing
mobility (voucher) program. Assume that each parent living in public housing has a different
belief about the safety of their neighborhood qi. Parents care about their own consumption pi
and their child’s outcome Yi. Let them believe that their child’s outcome is a function of their
parenting effort ei (e.g., active parental monitoring) and their perception of neighborhood
safety qi. To ensure that parents face tradeoffs, assume that there is a budget constraint:
I = pi + ei.
If parents have no ability to move, they make different investments in their children based
on their beliefs about the relative safety (high qi) or danger (low qi) of their neighborhood. To
make this point clearly, consider the following parameterization of the parent’s preferences:
U(pi, Yi) = log(pi) + log(Yi).
Parents maximize utility subject to the budget constraint and the child production function
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which I specify as Yi = ei + qi. To optimize, parents choose higher ei when they have a
relatively low qi. This compensatory behavior is driven by the assumption that parental effort
and neighborhood safety are substitutes, which aligns with the behavior of MTO parents
who reduced their child monitoring activities after moving to lower poverty neighborhoods.
Now consider how parents respond if an experimental housing voucher program such as
MTO program begins recruiting. Assume that the program randomly offers parents the
chance to win a housing voucher with probability pi. Parents can use the voucher to lease
private market housing in a new neighborhood that has high safety θ, where θ > q and q
denotes the mean of parents’ perception of neighborhood safety. In this case, parents with
sufficiently low qi are incentivized to move because they believe their child will live in a much
safer neighborhood. Finally, to complete the model, let us assume that there is a utility cost
c which ensures that parents with high values of qi will not want to move through MTO.
In this case, the model fits into the treatment effects framework presented in Jones (2015)
and Pinto (2015), and solving the model proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, parents
decide whether they want to volunteer (Vi = 1) or not (Vi = 0). Next, parents choose
optimal consumption p∗i (Di) and effort e
∗
i (Di) as solutions to a second-stage problem that
takes into account whether they are in the program and they receive a voucher (Di = 1).
(To be clear, there is no compliance problem in this model. A parent who signs up for MTO
and is assigned to the treatment group always uses their voucher.)
Based on the solutions to the second stage, the first-stage decision is a cutoff condition
based on the realization of qi. Specifically, parents predict their consumption in the second
stage and choose to volunteer if the following inequality holds:
piU(p∗(1), y∗i (1)) + (1− pi)U(p∗i (0), y∗i (0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Payoff to Vi = 1
> U(p∗i (0), y
∗
i (0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Payoff to Vi = 0
Note that the cost c is borne by the parent only if she is assigned to the treatment group
and thereby induced to move.
This two-stage model yields a simple expression for the volunteering decision.1 Specifi-
1 Note that the model is solved via backward induction whereby the parent forecasts consumption and
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cally, the log-utility functional form implies that we can re-write the volunteering condition
as:
2 log
(
I − θ
I + qi
)
> c
⇒ I + θ
exp.5c︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡γ
> qi
In other words, parents with sufficiently poor perceptions of neighborhood safety – below γ
– will select into MTO.
With this in mind, we can consider treatment effects generated by the experiment when
there are heterogeneous perceptions of neighborhood safety that generate different parental
investments. Importantly, note that parents choose to volunteer in the program based on
their idiosyncratic signal of neighborhood safety qi, the mean of which is q and is assumed
to be the actual level of neighborhood safety. That is, I assume that the actual outcome for
a child who does not move is Yi = ei + q. This setup for the model implies that parents with
low values of qi are overly concerned about neighborhood safety.
Now, define the potential outcomes for each child as:
Y1i = e
∗
i (1) + θ
Y0i = e
∗
i (0) + q
where each expression shows that the difference in potential outcomes (and treatment effect
heterogeneity) is due to different parental choices for child investment. With selective vol-
unteering, we can use the demand functions to examine treatment effects for children. For
the sake of illustration, let us assume that the parent’s signal qi is a normally distributed
random variable with mean q and variance σ2.
In this case, the effects for children of MTO volunteers are:
E(Y1i − Y0i|γ > qi) = .5
(
θ − q + σ−φ(α)
Φ(α)
)
where α = (γ−λ)/σ. This expression shows that the average treatment effect for participants
utility when they volunteer for MTO.
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is decreasing in the standard deviation of parents’ perception of safety. Correspondingly, the
effects for children of non-volunteers are:
E(Y1i − Y0i|γ < qi) = .5
(
θ − q + σ φ(α)
1− Φ(α)
)
where treatment effects are now increasing in the variance of parents’ beliefs about neigh-
borhood safety.
The key point in this model is that the effects for children of non-volunteers exceed
effects for children of volunteers. Intuitively, this occurs because parents who select into
the experiment would have chosen high levels of ei if they do not move through MTO.
Correspondingly, if these fearful households move via MTO, they reduce ei because their
new neighborhood has relatively high safety. Again, this effect corresponds to MTO reports,
which note that treated parents who moved were less likely to engage in intense parental
monitoring relative to parents in control households.
In contrast, parents with high values of qi are overly optimistic about their neighborhood
safety. These households will forgo MTO and choose low values of ei. This implies that forced
relocation would generate large benefits for children because non-volunteers engage in less
active child monitoring. Hence, this simple model, which features heterogeneity in beliefs,
can explain the Reverse Roy pattern of treatment effects that appears when comparing the
impact of vouchers allocated by MTO or Chicago’s public housing demolition.
But, is this model reasonable? One way to address this question is to illustrate the
quantitative implications of the model by examining treatment effects on child outcomes
after calibrating the model. For this illustration, I will focus on the studying effects on adult
earnings of children. The model has five parameters: (1) household income I; (2) private
market housing quality θ; (3) the mean of public housing neighborhood quality q; (4) the
variance in signals about neighborhood quality σ2; and (5) the (utility) cost c of moving
through a voucher program. To calibrate the model, I assume that the annual household
income is $1,700 which was the mean household income for families living in public housing
projects subject to Chicago’s demolitions during the 1990s. In addition, I normalize the
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value of living in private market housing θ to zero.
With these assumptions, I can use three moments from the data to solve for the three
remaining parameters: q, σ and c. First, we have an equation for aggregate volunteer-
ing. In the data, we know that about 25 percent of public housing parents opted into the
CHAC 1997 lottery. In the model, this implies that the parameters need to be set such that
Φ ((γ − q)/σ) = 0.25. Second, the model should be able to generate to generate the earnings
treatment effects observed for children of parents that joined the 1997 CHAC voucher lottery
which is about roughly $10 (although this is an imprecise estimate). In terms of the model,
this implies 10 = E(Y1i − Y0i|γ > qi) = .5 (−q − σφ(α)/Φ(α)). Similarly, the model should
also generate the treatment effects for non-participants. A back of the envelope calculation
using the effects observed in the demolition and lottery samples suggests that this is roughly
$770, and this implies: 770 = E(Y1i − Y0i|γ < qi) = .5 (−q + σφ(α)/(1− Φ(α))).2 Solving
for these three equations provides the following model parameters: q = 1129, σ = 906 and
c = 9.44. Hence, this simple calibration of this stylized model matches the observed pattern
of Reverse Roy selection when there is seemingly moderate variation in parents’ beliefs about
neighborhood quality (qi) and a moderate utility cost of moving (c).
2 The effect observed in the demolition sample can be interpreted as the average treatment effect of moving
using a voucher which is a weighted average of the effects for children whose parents would and would not
voluntarily seek vouchers. In terms of the model, we can write this as: E(Y1i − Y0i) = E(Y1i − Y0i|γ <
qi)P(γ < qi) + E(Y1i − Y0i|γ > qi)P(γ > qi). The estimate for the participation rate in the CHAC 1997
housing voucher lottery and the treatment effects in the demolition and lottery samples imply that the effects
for non-participants are $770.
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A6 Estimating the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) of Moving for MTO
As discussed in Section 1.9, the Moving-to-Opportunity (MTO) studies are an important
comparison for the findings in this paper. The MTO studies focus on reporting intention-
to-treat (ITT) and treatment on the treated (TOT) effects of receiving a voucher offer.
Specifically, these studies use the following estimating equation to estimate the ITT effects:
yi = α + β
ITT
E Expi + β
ITT
S S8 i + γXi + siδ + i (A1)
The MTO studies also estimate the TOT effects to understand the effect of changing
neighborhoods through the intervention. Specifically, the TOT is calculated by dividing the
ITT effect by the take-up rate for MTO vouchers. This is implemented using two-stage least
squares where the endogenous variable in the first stage includes indicators for taking-up the
experimental and Section 8 vouchers. The instruments are indicators for treatment group
assignment (Kling, Ludwig and Katz, 2005).
While MTO focuses on the impact of voucher offers and take-up, I do not have data on
voucher usage for the demolition sample.3 Due to this data limitation, I focus on estimating
the effect of the treatment of moving out of project-based housing. This parameter can be
measured in both the demolition and MTO samples because I can use MTO treatment group
assignment and living in a building set for demolition as instruments for the endogenous
treatment of moving out of public housing.
The specific parameter that I calculate across samples is the local average treatment
effect (LATE) of moving out of public housing which is calculated as:
LATE =
E(Y |Z = 1)− E(Y |Z = 0)
E(D = 1|Z = 1)− E(D = 1|Z = 0) (A2)
Note that the LATE in this context differs from the average treatment on the treated (ATET)
– E(Y1i−Y0i|Di = 1) – because there are always-takers in the MTO and demolition samples.
Moreover, note that the LATE in this context differs from the TOT effects reported in MTO
3 Recall that any household displaced by demolition received an offer for a Section 8 voucher. Alternatively,
households could also request to move to another public housing project that had openings although this
option is unlikely given the long waiting list for project-based public housing in Chicago.
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since the denominator is difference in rates of moving rather than the MTO voucher take-up
rate.
Because I lack access to the MTO data, I must construct estimates of the LATE of
moving using estimates published in the MTO studies. Specifically, I use estimates of the
ITT effect for a given youth labor market outcome from Exhibit 5.8 (p. 154) of Sanbonmatsu
et al. (2011) for the numerator in Equation A2. Note that the youth sample used for this
estimate includes only “grown children” who were under age 18 at baseline and over age 20
as of December 31, 2007. Since randomization for MTO took place between 1994 and 1998,
this implies that the youngest child in the grown children sample would have been 7 years
old at baseline and this corresponds to the minimum age included in my demolition sample.
For the denominator in A2, I use estimates of the impact of the MTO voucher offers on the
probability of making any residential move out of public housing from Table IV of Katz,
Kling and Liebman (2001). These mobility rates are measured using data from a follow-up
survey sent to MTO households about 2 years after randomization.
As mentioned in Section 1.9, I construct confidence intervals for the LATE of moving
out of public housing using a parametric bootstrap procedure (Efron and Tibshirani, 1994).
Specifically, I create 10,000 draws of the ITT effect on youth labor market outcomes and
first-stage estimates of moving estimates from normal distributions with means and standard
deviations set equal to the point estimates and standard errors from the previously mentioned
published MTO studies. This generates 10,000 realizations of the LATE based on the MTO
data. The values of the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the distribution of the LATE constitute
the 95-percent confidence interval for the LATE of relocation that one would obtain for the
MTO sample.
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A7 Appendix Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Homicide Rate Before and After Demolition: Event Study Coefficients and
95-Percent Confidence Interval
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Notes: This figure plots event-study coefficients (solid black dots) from a regression of the tract-level homi-
cide rate on time-dummies. Specifically, the figure plots a set of coefficients pij and τj from the following
specification:
hi,t =µi +
−1∑
j=−4
pij 1(t− t∗ = j) +
10∑
j=1
τj 1(t− t∗ = j) + δt + s,t
where the dependent variable hi,t is homicide rate for tract i at year t. The terms µi and δt are tract
and year fixed effects, respectively. In the notation, t∗ is the year t in which a particular tract experiences
treatment (displacement). The dummy variables 1(t − t∗ = j) indicates that an observation in year t is
j-periods before or after demolition occurs. For example, the dummy variable 1(−1 = j) indicates that
the observation is one year before the policy is implemented. I restrict the estimation sample to include
(1) tracts that contained public housing which had at least one building demolition and (2) tracts that are
within 1 mile of a public housing demolition site. By definition, all tracts included in this specification are
treated at some time. The data contains observations that are at most four years before demolition and up
to 10 years after a demolition. I choose four pre-periods because the bulk of the demolitions I consider occur
in 1995 and my homicide data start in 1991. Note that year effects δt are identified using data from locations
that have not yet or already have had a demolition. Grey dots and dashed lines illustrate the 95-percent
confidence interval for the coefficients. Data comes from the extended version of Block and Block’s Homicides
in Chicago (ICPSR #6399).
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Figure A2: Propensity Score Distribution
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Notes: The figure shows kernel density estimates of the propensity scores for demolition and lottery households, respectively.
I construct propensity scores by pooling data on household characteristics for both samples. The unit of observation is at the
household level and I estimate a probit with the binary dependent variable equal to 1 if a household selected into the lottery
sample. Variables included in the propensity score include baseline measures of the following: (1) the number of criminal arrests
(by category for violent, property, drugs and other crimes), (2) household labor market outcomes such as total household income
and the fraction of adults that are working in the household, (3) demographic characteristics such as the number of adults and
children in the household and (4) measures of past criminal arrests for children. Note that I trim the sample for the figure to
exclude propensity scores below 0.01 and above 0.99. These covariates allow me to construct the estimated propensity score
pi = Pr(Lotteryi = 1|Xi) which I use to construct weights wi = pi(1− q)/(1− pi)q where q is the overall fraction of the pooled
household sample that participates in the housing voucher lottery. These weights are used in my analysis of the impact of
demolition on long-run child outcomes.
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Table A2: Spillover Specification Results: Adult Outcomes for Children
(1) (2) (3)
All Children
Control
Mean
Difference: Treated–Far,
Within Estimate (β′)
Difference: Near–Far,
Within Estimate (pi)
Employed (=1) 0.419 0.044** 0.005
[0.017] [0.014]
Earnings $3,713.00 $513.422** $-122.782
[195.356] [167.376]
Total Arrests 0.358 -0.031 0.017
[0.040] [0.027]
1
Notes: Children are age 7 to 18 at the time of demolition. In the table, “near” refers to the group of children who lived in a
public housing building that was adjacent to a building that was demolished while “far” refers to the group of children who
lived in public housing buildings that were not adjacent to demolished buildings. The control mean statistics – Columns (1) and
(4) – refer to the averages for non-displaced individuals living in the group of far buildings. The regression estimates are from
a spillover specification as specified in the text in Equation 1.2. As described in the text, the estimate β′ is the difference in
outcomes between displaced and non-displaced children who are part of the far group. Similarly, the estimate pi is the difference
in outcomes between non-displaced children in the near group and non-displaced children in the far group. Standard errors are
presented below each regression estimate and are clustered at the public housing building level. Note that statistical significance
is denoted by: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05.
107
T
a
b
le
A
3
:
E
ar
n
in
gs
Q
u
an
ti
le
T
re
at
m
en
t
E
ff
ec
ts
b
y
S
ex
Q
u
a
n
ti
le
s
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
9
0
9
5
F
ra
ct
io
n
w
it
h
Z
er
o
E
a
rn
in
g
s
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s,
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
M
a
le
$
0
.0
0
$
0
.0
0
$
2
5
3
.5
7
$
3
2
0
7
.5
3
$
1
1
,3
0
1
.1
3
$
1
9
,2
6
9
.5
1
0
.6
7
F
em
a
le
s
$
5
0
.0
7
$
1
2
7
7
.5
4
$
3
8
4
1
.6
7
$
8
2
3
6
.4
4
$
1
5
,4
0
9
.3
4
$
2
1
,5
9
9
.0
7
0
.4
9
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
Q
u
a
n
ti
le
T
re
a
tm
en
t
E
ff
ec
ts
M
a
le
s
–
–
$
0
.0
0
$
8
5
6
.2
9
6
*
*
$
1
,3
1
4
.9
6
$
5
4
2
.7
6
[1
3
.3
6
7
]
[4
0
8
.9
3
3
]
[1
,7
4
3
.9
9
6
]
[1
,3
1
2
.6
8
3
]
F
em
a
le
s
$
1
7
1
.4
3
$
1
,0
3
3
.8
2
*
*
$
1
,8
7
7
.9
7
*
*
$
2
,4
6
1
.8
1
*
*
$
1
,7
2
4
.6
3
*
*
2
,4
1
5
.5
2
*
*
[1
0
5
.7
3
1
]
[1
0
4
.9
9
8
]
[2
2
3
.5
2
2
]
[3
8
6
.6
5
4
]
[6
0
7
.6
5
0
]
[7
8
7
.5
0
2
]
1
N
ot
es
:
T
h
is
ta
b
le
p
re
se
n
ts
d
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
st
at
is
ti
cs
a
n
d
q
u
a
n
ti
le
re
g
re
ss
io
n
re
su
lt
s
u
si
n
g
a
d
u
lt
a
n
n
u
a
l
ea
rn
in
g
s
d
a
ta
fo
r
d
is
p
la
ce
d
a
n
d
n
o
n
-d
is
p
la
ce
d
ch
il
d
re
n
(a
ge
7
to
18
at
b
as
el
in
e)
fr
om
p
u
b
li
c
h
ou
si
n
g
p
ro
je
ct
s.
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
p
u
b
li
c
h
o
u
si
n
g
b
u
il
d
in
g
le
ve
l.
N
o
te
th
a
t
st
a
ti
st
ic
a
l
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
is
d
en
ot
ed
b
y
:
∗
p
<
0.
10
,
∗∗
p
<
0
.0
5
a
n
d
∗∗
∗
p
<
0.
0
1
.
108
Table A4: Subgroup Analysis: Impact on Adult Labor-Market Outcomes of Children
(a) Dependent Variable: Labor Participation (=1)
(1) (2) (3)
Subgroup
Fraction of All
Children
Employment
Control Mean
Employment Difference:
Treated–Control, Within
Est.
Baseline Age
<13 0.59 0.374 0.038**
[0.017]
13-18 0.41 0.436 0.041**
[0.018]
Household Employment
> 0 Working Adults 0.18 0.454 0.03
[0.032]
No Working Adults 0.82 0.403 0.042**
[0.014]
Household Past Arrests
> 0 Adults with Arrest(s) 0.31 0.39 0.021
[0.028]
No Adults with Arrest(s) 0.69 0.418 0.050**
[0.012]
(b) Dependent Variable: Annual Earnings ($)
(1) (2) (3)
Subgroup
Fraction of All
Children
Earnings Control
Mean
Earnings Difference:
Treated–Control, Within
Est.
Baseline Age
<13 0.59 $2424.83 $583.34**
[200.505]
13-18 0.41 $4106.29 $588.36**
[247.348]
Household Employment
> 0 Working Adults 0.18 $3,983.29 $-77.61
[408.349]
No Working Adults 0.82 $3,305.27 $723.79**
[185.151]
Household Past Arrests
> 0 Adults with Arrest(s) 0.31 $2,998.69 $386.71
[354.330]
No Adults with Arrest(s) 0.69 $3,571.25 $713.292**
[167.586]
1
Notes: This table presents results from labor market analysis of subgroups of children defined on baseline (the year before
demolition) characteristics. Panels (a) and (b) present subgroup results where the dependent variable in the regression is an
indicator for annual employment and earnings, respectively. The control mean statistic in Column (2) refers to the averages
for non-displaced individuals. Each specification includes indicators for treatment group interacted with subgroup membership
indicators as well as project fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the public housing building level. Note that
statistical significance is denoted by: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
109
Table A5: Adjusted p-values for Main Demolition Analysis of Adult Outcomes of Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
p-values
Outcome
Difference:
Treat-Control, Within
Estimate
Standard
Error
Pairwise
FDR-
Adjusted
Employed (=1) 0.040 [0.135] 0.0044 0.0040
Earnings $602.27 [153.91] 0.0003 0.0003
Any Assistance (=1) 0.128 [0.022] 0.5633 0.5633
Total Arrests -0.022 [0.024] 0.1628 0.3648
1
Notes: The results in Columns (3) and (4) are per-comparison (pairwise) and false discovery rate (FDR) adjusted p-values for
four main outcomes considered in the analysis of children (age 7 to 18 at baseline) forced to relocate due to building demolition.
The FDR-adjusted p-values control for the number of false positives when multiple hypotheses are tested. These adjusted
p-values are calculated using the two-step procedure from Benjamini, Krieger and Yekutieli (2006). Columns (1) and (2) repeat
the results from Tables 1.3, 1.5 and 1.7 for convenience.
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Table A6: Comparing the Short-run Impact of Demolition and Housing Voucher Offers on
Neighborhood Characteristics
(a) Demolition Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control
Mean
Difference:
Treated-Control
(Reduced Form)
Percent Black 94.897 -2.563**
[1.125]
Percent Below Poverty Line 64.208 -12.929**
[2.531]
Percent on Public Assistance 57.153 -18.365**
[2.164]
Percent Unemployed 39.337 -12.422**
[1.497]
Violent Crime per 10,000 Residents 68.855 -23.426**
[4.371]
Property Crime per 10,000 Residents 103.247 -15.72
[10.122]
N (Households with Address) 2,162
(b) CHAC 1997 Lottery Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control
Mean
Difference:
Treated-Control
(Reduced Form)
LATE
(2SLS)
Control
Complier
Mean
Percent Black 84.25 2.47 7.45 79.84
[1.841] [5.351]
Percent Below Poverty Line 45.59 -3.236** -9.771** 48.39
[1.550] [4.428]
Percent on Public Assistance 38.04 -2.719** -8.210** 40.45
[1.293] [3.689]
Percent Unemployed 27.61 -1.790** -5.423** 29.52
[0.894] [2.568]
Violent Crime per 10,000 Residents 32.13 -0.47 -1.44 31.74
[1.075] [3.127]
Property Crime per 10,000 Residents 69.41 -1.78 -5.43 72.40
[1.853] [5.441]
N (Households with Address) 1,363 1,363
1
Notes: The unit of analysis in this table is a household and there is one observation per household. The dependent variables
in each row of the table are neighborhood characteristics measured three years after baseline. This implies that households are
only included in the regression if they have valid address (neighborhood) data three years after baseline. Recall that address
data is only available if one member of a household actively receives social assistance. Panels (a) and (b) present results for the
demolition and CHAC 1997 housing voucher lottery samples, respectively. The control mean statistic – Column (1) – refers to
averages for individuals whose household is not displaced by demolition or does not win a voucher offer. The reduced form effect
is calculated by regressing each outcome (row) on an indicator for living in a building marked for demolition in Panel (a) or
winning a voucher offer in Panel (b). The local average treatment effect (LATE) is estimated using the two-stage system where
the dependent variable in the first stage is an indicator for whether a household used a housing voucher and the instrument is
an indicator for winning a CHAC 1997 housing voucher.
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Table A7: Comparison of Demolition and CHAC 1997 Lottery Households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lottery
Sample
Demolition
Sample
p-value
Difference:
Lottery–
Demolition
Weighted
Demolition
Sample
p-value
Difference:
Lottery –
Weighted
Demolition
(a) Adults in Households with Children (Age 7-18)
# Adults 1.44 1.15 0.00 1.38 0.01
Single Female Head (=1) 0.69 0.69 0.00 0.70 0.27
Age 31.68 32.16 0.01 31.87 0.28
Earnings $ 5,595.30 $ 1,747.06 0.00 $ 5,248.41 0.15
Employed (=1) 0.36 0.16 0.00 0.36 0.77
Past Arrests, Any 0.66 0.64 0.01 0.68 0.47
Past Arrests, Violent 0.19 0.16 0.77 0.19 0.95
Past Arrests, Property 0.16 0.15 0.21 0.17 0.72
Past Arrests, Drugs 0.14 0.15 0.02 0.14 0.55
Past Arrests, Other 0.20 0.18 0.37 0.20 0.84
(b) Children (Age 7-18)
# Kids 2.44 2.10 0.00 2.43 0.86
Past Arrests, Any 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.26
Past Arrests, Violent 0.01 0.01 0.61 0.01 0.44
Past Arrests, Property 0.01 0.01 0.39 0.01 0.40
Past Arrests, Drugs 0.01 0.02 0.80 0.01 0.67
Past Arrests, Other 0.01 0.01 0.75 0.01 0.62
N (Households) 2,242 2,767 2,767
Notes: This table compares summary statistics for the demolition and lottery samples and the unit of analysis is at the
household-level. Panel (a) presents statistics for adults in households with children (age 7 to 18 at baseline) while Panel (b)
presents statistics for children (age 7 to 18 at baseline). Baseline in this context refers to the year before demolition or the
year before randomization in the CHAC 1997 housing voucher lottery. Column (4) presents statistics for the demolition sample
after re-weighting. The weighting procedure balances sample characteristics between the demolition and lottery samples which
is evident from the p-values in Column (5). See Section 1.9.4 for further details on the weighting procedure.
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Table A8: Sensitivity of Main Demolition Analysis to Sample Definition
(a) Sample: All Children Ages 5 to 18 at Baseline
Panel Model Results
(1) (2)
Control Mean
Difference:
Treated-Control,
Within Estimate
Employed (=1) 0.415 0.037***
[0.013]
Employed Full Time (=1) 0.096 0.012**
[0.006]
Earnings $3,628.97 $549.582***
[149.769]
Earnings (> 0) $8,737.85 $559.260**
[217.636]
N (Obs.) 36,601
N (Individuals) 6,130
(b) Sample: All Children Ages 6 to 18 at Baseline
Panel Model Results
(1) (2)
Control Mean
Difference:
Treated-Control,
Within Estimate
Employed (=1) 0.417 0.037***
[0.014]
Employed Full Time (=1) 0.097 0.013**
[0.006]
Earnings $3,659.23 $565.376***
[152.780]
Earnings (> 0) $8,777.10 $579.157**
[219.569]
N (Obs.) 36,223
N (Individuals) 5,752
1
Notes: This table analyzes adult labor market outcomes for displaced and non-displaced children using different definitions for
the sample. Panel (a) uses children age 5 to 18 at baseline while Panel (b) uses children age 6 to 18 at baseline. The control
mean statistic – Column (1) – refers to averages for non-displaced individuals. The mean difference between displaced and
non-displaced children is reported in Column (2). This difference is computed from a regression model where a labor market
outcome (each row) is the dependent variable for individual i in year t. The independent variables in the regression are an
indicator for treatment (displaced) status and a set of project fixed effects. See Equation 1.1 of the text for more details. The
indicator variable for “Employed Full Time” is based on whether an individual makes more than $14,000 in annual earnings –
this is the equivalent of 35 hours a week at $8 per hour for 50 weeks. Robust standard errors are clustered at the public housing
building level. Note that statistical significance is denoted by: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The analysis omits
some observations (less than one percent) that are outliers in the distribution of earnings.
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Table A9: Impact on Long-Run Criminal Arrests of Children
Panel Model Results
(1) (2)
Control Mean
Difference:
Treated-Control,
Within Estimate
Total Arrests 0.362 -0.035
[0.024]
Violent Arrests 0.072 -0.010**
[0.004]
Property Arrests 0.034 0.006*
[0.003]
Drug Arrests 0.103 -0.005
[0.011]
Other Arrests 0.154 -0.025**
[0.011]
N (Obs.) 56,629
N (Individuals) 5,250
1
Notes: This table analyzes criminal arrests for displaced and non-displaced children. The results here differ from Table 1.7
because the sample includes all observations where the individual is age 13 or older. Note that the panel for each individual is
restricted to the years after demolition. The control mean statistic in Column (1) refers to averages for non-displaced children.
The mean difference between displaced and non-displaced children is reported in Column (2). This difference is computed from
a regression model where an outcome (each row) is the dependent variable for individual i in year t. The independent variables
in the regression are an indicator for treatment (displaced) status and a set of project fixed effects. Robust standard errors are
clustered by at the public housing building level. Note that statistical significance is denoted by: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05 and
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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